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Editors’ Note

S

ustainable Development Law & Policy publishes a Climate Law Reporter each year with the goal of providing a
default tool for practitioners and academics to gauge the
current state of climate law.  We have sought out articles for this
issue that give as complete a snapshot as possible of the increasingly amorphous realm of climate law.  There is no doubt that
after the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen, international
climate law is at somewhat of a loss—we hope to provide some
clarity through an evaluation of the Copenhagen Accord and its
potential impacts moving forward.
Also at the international level, our authors provide an
assessment of the UNFCCC provisions employed in Copenhagen, an in depth evaluation of the current international offsets
mechanisms in place under the Kyoto Protocol, and a look at one
of the major players in this political game: China.
On the domestic side, one author provides suggestions on
how simple policy mechanisms can help to implement decidedly advanced geoengineering responses to global warming, and
another gives the industry perspective on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s proposed tailoring rule on the prevention of significant deterioration.  
SDLP is proud to present the 2010 Climate Law Reporter
and looks forward to continuing to provide a forum for climate
law and policy analysis on an annual basis, through the UN
negotiations in Cancún in December of this year, and beyond.
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Introductory Comments: The Current State
of Climate Change Law
by Michael B. Gerrard*

T

he three words that best characterize the current state of
climate change law are fragmentation, uncertainty, and
insufficiency.
Almost everyone who takes climate change seriously
believes that comprehensive federal legislation is needed.  President Obama and the majority leadership of the House and the
Senate agree, but regional politics, massive lobbying by various
interest groups, and partisan posturing, have combined to form
an almost impenetrable bramble bush.  The legislative journey
may have begun with a rational plan, but to accumulate the
necessary votes, important elements are cast aside and dreadful
provisions are added.  As I write this in mid-March 2010, I do
not know if a bill will reach the President’s desk and, if it does,
whether it will have any potency.
Meanwhile, existing legal tools are being hurled at the problem.  They were all designed for tasks other than solving global
climate change; some are federal, some are state, some are local.  
Adding them all up reveals some overlap, even more gaps, and
precious little coordination.  Hence the fragmentation.
The future course of all this is unknown.  Empowered by the
U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 2007 decision in Massachusetts
v. EPA and by the 2009 inauguration of a sympathetic president,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is moving forward
with its best existing tools, disparate portions of the Clean Air
Act, to regulate what it can.  Opponents are lobbing legislative
and litigation grenades in the path; some may be duds, but all are
scary.  Thus industries, both clean and dirty, cannot plan because
they cannot see the road ahead.  Hence the uncertainty.
Any legislative outcome that is plausible in the near term
will achieve far less greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions reduction than the scientists tell us is needed to avoid serious climate
consequences.  The existing legal tools fall even shorter of the
mark.  Almost all of these efforts are focused on mitigation of
emission levels; none seriously grapples with adaptation to the
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climate change that is coming, or with governance of the geoengineering schemes that will surely be proposed as bad climate
events accelerate.  Hence the insufficiency.
If there is a ray of light, it is in the area of energy.  This
matters, since 80% of U.S. GHG emissions come from fossil
fuel combustion.1  Congress has not enacted a major new environmental statute since 1990, but it manages to pass new energy
bills every two or three years.  Thus we have major new incentives for energy efficiency and renewable energy, and even more
may be coming soon, even if comprehensive climate legislation
remains stalled.  Many brilliant minds are also at work in private enterprises devising energy solutions; those who succeed
stand to become the next billionaires.   States and cities have
been especially vigorous laboratories of innovation, and some
of the techniques they have devised, such as renewable portfolio
standards and green building codes, can make a real difference,
especially if expanded nationally.
The rest of the world is waiting for the U.S. tumult to subside.  Though China has overtaken the U.S. as the largest GHG
emitter, the U.S. is still responsible for the largest portion of the
GHGs that have accumulated in the atmosphere.  It is difficult for
leaders abroad to adopt strong climate controls when the biggest
historic emitter still hasn’t.  It is too much to expect Congress
to remove all the fragmentation, uncertainty and insufficiency in
one swoop, but the need for real progress is urgent.

Endnotes:
1

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2010 Draft U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Inventory Report, ES-5 - ES-6, (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/emissions/downloads10/US-GHG-Inventory-2010-ChapterExecutive-Summary.pdf.

* Michael B. Gerrard is Andrew Sabin Professor of Professional Practice and
Director of the Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School.
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Implications of the Copenhagen Accord for
Global Climate Governance
by David Hunter*

R

Introduction

arely has as much anticipation accompanied an international meeting than swirled around the 15th Conference
of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), also known as the
Copenhagen Summit in honor of the city where it was held in
December, 2009. The announcements in early November that
President Barack Obama and Premier Wen Jiabao would attend
the conference turned an important climate negotiation into an
enormous summit featuring most of the world’s leaders. Along
with these leaders, upwards of 40,000 participants from civil
society, the private sector, and governments sought to shoehorn
their way into the conference center.
Rarely, too, has so much fanfare accompanied so little substance. Although many in the United States heralded the outcome as a diplomatic success that freed the climate issue from
the chains of an unworkable UN process, by almost any measure
the Copenhagen summit has to be viewed as a disappointment.
Rather than a detailed, binding framework for furthering global
climate cooperation, the parties left Copenhagen with a general
political statement that privileges the voluntary actions of states
and devalues the role of international law and global climate
governance.
The result was not a negotiation over targets or actions, but a
series of unilateral press releases, with each country announcing
what it is willing to do to mitigate climate change. The potential give-and-take that, in theory at least, is one of the hallmarks
of international negotiations was relevant only to the modalities
of climate finance, adaptation, technology transfer, reporting,
and verification. Even with these issues, precious little compromise or leadership was apparent, and little was ultimately
accomplished.
There is plenty of blame to go around. Rather than marking the United States’ triumphant return to international climate negotiations with strong leadership in unifying the world
around shared bold action, the Obama Administration offered
only modest targets and never moved from them throughout the
two weeks. Nor did any other major emitting country strengthen
its mitigation actions during the negotiations. Instead of participating in a discussion over what mitigation targets industrialized countries should take, the United States drew its line in
the sand around the extent to which large developing countries
would allow their mitigation actions to be monitored, reviewed
or verified (“MRV’d”). While maintaining a central focus on
this issue, the United States essentially refused to budge on most
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other issues (with the arguable exception of financing, which is
discussed below).
Ultimately, the Copenhagen Accord seems as much a capitulation as a compromise. The Accord reflects the United States’
preferred “pledge and review” approach; each country that associates with the Accord is expected to make some commitment
to mitigate climate change. This was not a negotiating victory
except in the sense that the United States was not forced to take
on any legally binding obligations in the absence of similar
developing country commitments. Although developing countries had to drop their desire for a Kyoto-like agreement that
would hold only industrialized countries to binding targets, the
net result was that no one would be subject to binding targets.
The United States, China, and India could all claim success, but
the environment was the clear loser. India and China did agree to
more reporting requirements but virtually no international monitoring or verification of their commitments. Also lost was any
schedule for negotiating a binding legal agreement.
Only twelve paragraphs long, the Copenhagen Accord
could nonetheless mark a substantial realignment of global climate governance. To be sure, the long-term ramifications of the
Copenhagen Accord are not yet certain, but some initial, tentative conclusions can be reached about the direction that the
Copenhagen Accord seems to lead us in global climate governance. After describing what exactly the Copenhagen Accord
does and does not do, this article will lay out some initial implications for international climate law and governance.

The Road to Copenhagen
The Copenhagen negotiations were formally convened as
the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (“CoP”) to the UNFCCC1
and the Fifth Session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol.2 The UNFCCC, signed in 1992, sets forth the broad
framework for international climate governance, including the
overall objective, principles, and institutional structure for international cooperation with respect to climate change.3 The United
States, as well as almost every other country of the world, is
a party to the UNFCCC, which is widely understood to set no
binding targets or timetables for reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions. The Kyoto Protocol, negotiated in 1997, on the other

* David Hunter is assistant professor and director of the Program on International and Comparative Environmental Law at the American University Washington College of Law. He is also the director of AU’s Washington Summer
Session on Environmental Law.
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hand provides for clear targets and timetables for industrialized
countries that are parties. President Clinton signed the Protocol,
but it was subsequently repudiated by President Bush in 2001.
The Protocol entered into force without U.S. participation in
2005.4 Under the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union and other
industrialized countries agreed to reduce their greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions an average of five percent below 1990 levels.5 These reductions are to be achieved during the years 20082012, known as the first reporting period.6 The Protocol also
established an elaborate “cap-and-trade” system to reduce the
costs of compliance through the creation of a market for GHG
emission reductions—the so-called carbon market.

The Bali Work Plan
Recognizing that the first
reporting period under the Kyoto
Protocol would end in 2012, the
global community worked for
several years to set forth a negotiating plan that would build on
the Kyoto Protocol, bring the
United States back into the UN
process for addressing climate
change, and outline the future
obligations, if any, of developing countries. These efforts
culminated in 2007 when the
parties to the Framework Convention agreed to the so-called
Bali Road Map—a roadmap to
Copenhagen.7 The Bali Road
Map is comprised of several forward-looking decisions, including (1) a timetable with a 2009
deadline for negotiating further
commitments of those parties
that have adopted an emissions
cap under the Kyoto Protocol
(called “Annex I Parties”),8 (2)
a decision operationalizing the
Adaptation Fund that had been
created under the Kyoto Protocol and was critical for developing country participation,9 (3) a
compromise on what to include in the review of the adequacy of
the Kyoto Protocol as required under Article 9,10 and (4) the Bali
Action Plan.11 The Bali Action Plan set out an ambitious framework for negotiating a post-Kyoto agreement with binding commitments on all parties. The parties, including the United States
and most other major countries in the world, agreed to launch
a “comprehensive process” for achieving a “shared vision for
long-term cooperative action, including a long-term global goal
for emission reductions.”12 That process was intended to culminate in an agreement at Copenhagen.
The Bali Action Plan further enumerated a number of topics for “consideration” during the negotiations, including: (i)

“measurable, reportable and verifiable” commitments, including
quantified emissions limitations, by all developed countries; and
(ii) nationally appropriate mitigation actions (“NAMAs”) by
developing country Parties, “supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.”13 Thus, in the Bali Action Plan,
all developed countries (including the United States) agreed to
negotiate commitments that would include further binding caps
on emissions. For their part, all developing countries (including China and India) agreed to negotiate NAMAs to reduce the
threat of climate change. The developing countries did not commit to negotiating caps on emissions, but did commit to negotiations over taking actions of some indeterminate nature. Other
provisions in the Bali Action Plan committed the parties to
negotiate positive incentives for
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
(“REDD”) in developing countries,14 enhanced actions for
adaptation,15 technology development and transfer,16 and international financial support for
responding to climate change.17
The Bali Action Plan committed both the United States
and developing countries to
negotiating a post-Kyoto agreement with some form of binding—or at least measurable,
reportable, and verifiable—
commitments. Under the terms
of the Bali Action Plan, the
agreement was to be negotiated by the Fifteenth CoP of the
UNFCCC in December, 2009 in
Copenhagen. The Bali Action
Plan set forth the priorities for
the Copenhagen negotiators and
all of the elements are reflected
to some extent in the Copenhagen Accord.
The track from Bali to Copenhagen was a roller coaster ride of expectations. The inauguration
of the Obama Administration, for example, gave new hope that
an era of U.S. exceptionalism and isolation with respect to climate change had ended, yielding to greater U.S. willingness to
accept binding international targets for GHG reductions. Indeed,
the Obama Administration placed climate change on the top of
its domestic legislative agenda with the hopes that economywide emission targets passed by the U.S. Congress could form
the basis for international commitments at Copenhagen.18 Even
before his inauguration, Obama signaled to the international
community his intention to engage in meaningful climate negotiations by publicly endorsing federal cap-and-trade legislation
with targets for reducing current emissions to 1990 levels by

Rather than a detailed,
binding framework
for furthering global
climate cooperation, the
parties left Copenhagen
with a general political
statement that privileges
the voluntary actions
of states and devalues
the role of international
law and global climate
governance.
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2020, and eighty percent reductions from 1990 levels by 2050.19
In the end, the Obama Administration’s international position
would remain tethered—some would say held hostage—to the
prospects of climate legislation in the U.S. Congress.
As the prospects were turning positive in the United States,
other countries began to announce their positions with respect to
the Copenhagen negotiations. Europe agreed to reduce emissions
by 30% from 1990 levels if there was an agreement reached by
all major countries, but would otherwise reduce emissions only
20%. At the December 2008 negotiations in Poznan, developing countries, too, proposed a wide range of commitments that
were generally seen as signaling their willingness to take serious
mitigation steps. Among these 2008 proposals: China promised
to reduce its energy intensity by twenty percent by 2020; Brazil committed to cut its deforestation rate by seventy percent by
2017 (resulting in a thirty to forty-five percent reduction in the
country’s GHG emissions); Mexico pledged to cut its emissions
by fifty percent by 2050; South Africa committed to capping its
GHG emissions by 2025 and working toward a decline thereafter; and Kazakhstan announced a decision to join Annex I of the
Kyoto Protocol and reduce emissions to 1992 levels by 2012.20
These developing country pledges were premised on access
to expanded financing and technology from the industrialized
countries.
More problematic was the form of any international agreement. Most observers initially assumed that the Copenhagen
negotiations would result in an amended or revised Kyoto Protocol.  The United States is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol,
however, and consistently opposed any suggestion that it would
agree to anything that even looked like the Protocol. Many climate advocates nonetheless hoped for a new binding “Copenhagen Protocol” that imported most, but not all, parts of the Kyoto
Protocol, giving the United States some political cover while
maintaining the basic components of the Kyoto carbon market.  
This offered a relatively clean solution, but it would become
clear in Copenhagen that the Obama Administration, emphasizing a lack of support in the U.S. Senate, would not seriously consider such an option. Moreover, such an approach left open the
question of how to incorporate “measurable, reportable and verifiable” commitments from developing countries, which resisted
making such commitments in a legally binding instrument.
The leading alternative option to a binding Protocol was to
implement the Copenhagen agreements through a series of decisions by the Conference of the Parties (“CoP”) to the UNFCCC.  
This would not require ratification by any of the parties, but
the legal status of CoP decisions was open to question.  Such
decisions do not fit into the traditional sources of international
law and they may not be viewed as binding in many national
jurisdictions.  A U.S. appeals court, for example, has found that
CoP decisions made under the Montreal Protocol are not part
of domestic law and do not have to be implemented by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency.21
One variation was Australia’s pledge-and-review proposal.  Patterned loosely after the way tariff schedules are created under the World Trade Organization, each country would
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be asked to make some kind of commitment based on factors
such as their economic status and their historical contribution to
climate change.  In this way, industrialized countries would be
expected to accept mandatory emissions caps, while developing countries might choose from a wide range of policy options,
including energy intensity targets, sectoral targets, or promises
to create certain policies.22 Unclear in these proposals was how
or whether the pledges would be mutually binding and how the
transfer of Northern financial and technological support would
be aligned with the diversity of Southern commitments.  Developing countries were unlikely to make any significant commitments without the binding promise of Northern financial
support, and the North was unlikely to make financial commitments without knowing what the pledges would be.
The long-awaited proposal by the United States released in
early May 2009 was deliberately ambiguous, referring vaguely
to an “implementing agreement” that would “allow for legallybinding approaches.”23  This language essentially left open the
form and binding nature of any Copenhagen agreement, to be
decided at a later time.  With only six months left until Copenhagen, wide divisions still remained over the basic form of the
negotiations—and time was running short.
President Obama’s Administration seemed to be working hard for an agreement, holding bilateral summits with both
China and India.24 The broad agenda for both summits placed
climate change cooperation high on the list. Subsequently, when
President Obama announced that he would attend the Copenhagen Summit (followed closely by similar announcements from
the leaders of both China and India), many observers believed
an agreement had already been reached among these key countries. Why else would these leaders risk their political capital
in showing up at Copenhagen? World leaders typically show
up for photo opportunities at international summits, not for
negotiations.
As Copenhagen approached, countries began to position
themselves more clearly for the upcoming negotiations—but
the public signals remained largely mixed. The United States
announced they would accept targets of 17% reductions from
2005 levels by 2050 and 80% reductions by 2050. 25 This
matched the reductions set forth in the proposed legislation
working its way through the U.S. Senate. Europe reaffirmed its
commitments to cut 30% from 1990 levels by 2020 if a universal
agreement could be reached.26 Most importantly, major developing countries, including eventually Brazil, China, and India
all agreed to at least some specific mitigation actions.
Despite these encouraging announcements, as Copenhagen
neared, no agreement among key countries had emerged over
the form and status of the agreement. In fact, hopes for a legally
binding agreement dimmed considerably when countries participating in the November, 2009 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting announced that Copenhagen should result in a
“political” deal only. As Copenhagen opened, many observers
believed that such a political agreement—with a firm deadline
for negotiating a future legally binding agreement—was the best
that could be hoped for.
6

At Copenhagen
The first week of the Copenhagen negotiations proved to be
contentious with little progress made even on the basic issue of
what form the agreement(s) should take. The nation of Tuvalu
demanded discussion on a single, legally binding agreement.
China and other developing countries adamantly opposed the
proposal, wanting to pursue the “two-track” approach: additional binding commitments for developed countries under the
Kyoto Protocol and nonbinding actions for developing countries pursuant to Decisions of the parties or by other means.
The United States opposed both Tuvalu and China’s positions
because both would require U.S. participation in an agreement
essentially patterned after the Kyoto Protocol. In the meantime,
a leak of a draft “Danish Agreement,” intended as the negotiating text for a non-binding, political agreement was met with
widespread acrimony, particularly from developing countries. A
new coalition of Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (quickly
dubbed the “BASIC” countries) called for continuation of the
Kyoto Protocol with stronger commitments and a binding U.S.
mitigation target, coupled with financial and technical support
for voluntary developing country mitigation actions. With no
clear consensus on even the most basic structure of the agreement, negotiators appeared to be waiting for the Heads of State
to arrive in the second week.
The Heads of State arrived, but with few answers or solutions. After all of the speeches were completed, no agreement
was evident. It was clear the United States would be taking a
hard line and offering little compromise. President Obama’s
well-publicized intervention into the meeting of the BASIC
countries would ultimately lead to the agreement on the Copenhagen Accord, but his haste to control the public messaging for
a domestic audience by announcing the agreement in a press
conference meant that the Accord would be met with anger
and frustration from many negotiators. Although some agreement was arguably better than none, the Accord left many issues
unanswered.

The Copenhagen Accord
The Copenhagen Accord is a non-binding political agreement. It is not a treaty nor did the parties intend in any way to
be legally bound to the commitments in the Accord. As a political declaration with widespread acceptance, it can rightly be
labeled a form of soft law—but that label adds little to the discussion of the impact of the Accord. Its impact will have less to
do with whether it is legally binding (it is not), and more to do
with whether it is politically accepted as a viable framework for
organizing international climate cooperation moving forward.27
If successful, the Accord could pave the way for more universal
commitments that in the future could form the shape of a more
legally binding set of commitments. This section looks more
closely at the terms of the Copenhagen Accord.

Shared Vision for Long-Term Cooperative Action
As part of the Bali Action Plan, the parties, including the
United States and most other major countries in the world,
7

agreed to launch a “comprehensive process” for achieving a
“shared vision for long-term cooperative action, including a
long-term global goal for emission reductions.”28 Much of the
discussion up to and during Copenhagen anticipated reaching
a global consensus regarding clear timetables for when global
emissions and atmospheric concentrations of GHGs would peak.
Unfortunately, the Accord provides little specificity surrounding future global targets and failed to advance the discussion much beyond what had been achieved seventeen years
before in the UNFCCC. Under the UNFCCC, the objective of
international climate cooperation has been to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.”29 That level has long been assumed to require holding the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius.
Given recent developments in climate science, however, small
island states and others were pushing for a consensus commitment to limit long-term changes to less than 1.5 degrees. In the
Copenhagen Accord, the countries agreed to “enhance [their]
long-term cooperative action to combat climate change,” “recognizing the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius.”30 They also agreed
that deep cuts in global emissions “are required according to science . . . with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold
the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius,
and take action to meet this objective consistent with science
and on the basis of equity.”31 In a compromise with those who
sought a stronger goal, the countries called for an assessment
of the Accord by 2015, which would include “consideration of
strengthening the long-term goal referencing various matters
presented by the science, including in relation to temperature
rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius.”32 In this way, the parties could be
seen as not turning their back completely on science-based calls
for stronger emission reductions.

The General Framework for Mitigation
Countries that decide to join the Copenhagen Accord are
required to commit themselves to a climate mitigation strategy
that they identify and report publicly to the international community. Countries are divided into two categories. First, Annex I
countries (i.e. industrialized countries that were listed on Annex
I of the UNFCCC) commit to implement “quantified economywide emissions targets for 2020.”33 These commitments are
expected to “further strengthen the emissions reductions initiated by the Kyoto Protocol.”34 Second, non-Annex I countries
(i.e. developing countries) will submit “mitigation actions,”
which are not further defined except that they should be in the
context of sustainable development.35 Least developed countries
and small island developing states “may undertake actions voluntarily and on the basis of support.”36 In addition and critically,
developing countries agreed for the first time to provide national
reports of their greenhouse gas inventories every two years consistent with Article 12.1(b) of the UNFCCC.37 Biannual reporting was considered a major concession by developing countries.
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Both Annex I and Non-Annex I countries that choose
to associate with the Copenhagen Accord were supposed to
announce their commitments by January 31, 2010. Those commitments are reported to the UNFCCC secretariat and reported
on their website.38 As of March 2010, approximately 75 countries
have made commitments under the Copenhagen Accord, including 41 Annex I and 34 non-Annex I countries. As expected, the
commitments vary considerably, even within each category of
countries. Many of the Annex I commitments are conditioned
on a more ambitious agreement in the future, or in the case of
the United States, on passage of
national legislation. Developing countries also took varied
approaches. Some, for example
South Africa, identified significant cuts from current “business
as usual” estimates of emission
trajectories (thus allowing their
emissions to increase but less
than expected). Others, such as
India and China, committed to
reducing their energy intensity
(i.e. to improving their emissions per unit output) but placing no overall cap on emissions.
Still others, like the Congo or
Brazil, listed numerous sectorspecific actions or goals they
would meet. Some representative examples of country
pledges are listed below on page
9-10.
The pledges under the Copenhagen Accord have been
met with mixed response. On the one hand, some value must
be attached to getting so many countries to commit publicly to
addressing climate change—and many of these commitments
are specific and significant. Overall, however, the aggregation of
commitments does not appear to get the world close to the levels
necessary to limit temperature increases to the 2 degree Celsius
goal identified in the Accord. According to the World Resources
Institute:
Existing pledges by developed countries, when added
together, could represent a substantial effort for reducing Annex I emissions by 2020—a 12 to 19% reduction of emissions below 1990 levels depending on the
assumptions made about the details of the pledges. But
they still fall far short of the range of emission reductions—25 to 40%—that the [Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change] notes would be necessary for stabilizing concentrations of CO2[equivalent] at 450 [parts
per million], a level associated with a 26 to 78% risk of
overshooting a 2ºC goal.40
Of course, the Copenhagen Accord is designed at least to
some extent to allow for changing commitments to be added
over time.41 Nonetheless, current reduction commitments were

disappointing to most observers and prompted repeated protests
in Copenhagen from, among others, 350.org, which seeks commitments at a level that will reduce long-term atmospheric GHG
concentrations to 350 parts per million.42

Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
Ever since the Bali negotiations finished and the world’s
attention shifted to Copenhagen, requirements for monitoring,
reporting, and verification (“MRV”) loomed among the most
controversial and difficult issues. It was clear that developing
countries would agree to a wide range of voluntary commitments, but they were resistant
to any international oversight—
i.e. any MRV requirements—
attaching to those voluntary
commitments. On the other
hand, developing countries
wanted MRV requirements to
apply not only to industrialized
country mitigation commitments, but more controversially
to their commitments of financial and technology assistance.
Ensuring some MRV requirements applied to the developing country NAMAs was a high
priority for industrialized countries, particularly for any actions
that would be supported through
international financial or technology assistance.
In the end, developing
country mitigation actions were divided into two categories:
those receiving support from developed countries and those that
would be unsupported. Unsupported mitigation actions taken
by developing countries will be subject only to “domestic measurement, reporting and verification the result of which will
be reported through their national communications every two
years.”43 Developing countries are also to provide “for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected.”44 If
a developing country chooses to seek international financing to
support their mitigation action, they must subject their activity
“to international measurement, reporting and verification.”45 For
developed countries, commitments both to reduce emissions and
provide financing will be measured, reported, and verified.46 In
each of these cases, detailed guidelines for MRV must still be
determined in future negotiations under the Conference of the
Parties, a potentially difficult task.

The result was not a
negotiation over targets
or actions, but a series of
unilateral press releases,
with each country
announcing what it is
willing to do to mitigate
climate change.
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Forests and REDD-Plus
One area that enjoyed perhaps the greatest consensus in
Copenhagen was the framework for reducing emission from
deforestation and forest degradation (“REDD”). Developing
countries saw this as an opportunity to generate significant
amounts of foreign assistance and investment to improve the
8

Appendix I - Quantified Economy-wide Emissions Targets for 2020
Annex I Party

Quantified Economy-wide Emissions Targets for 2020

Base Year

Australia

-5% up to -15% or -25%. Australia will reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 25% on
2000 levels by 2020 if the world agrees to an ambitious global deal capable of stabilizing levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at 450 ppm CO2-eq or lower. Australia
will unconditionally reduce our emissions by 5% below 2000 levels by 2020, and by up
to 15% by 2020 if there is a global agreement which falls short of securing atmospheric
stabilization at 450 ppm CO2-eq and under which major developing economies commit
to substantially restrain emissions and advanced economies take on commitments comparable to Australia’s.

2000

Canada

17%, to be aligned with the final economy-wide emissions target of the United States in
enacted legislation.

2005

EU and its 27 Member
States (Currently, not
all EU Member States
are Annex I
Parties)

20%/30%. As part of a global and comprehensive agreement for the period beyond 2012,
the EU reiterates its conditional offer to move to a 30% reduction by 2020 compared to
1990 levels, provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable
emission reductions and that developing countries contribute adequately according to their
responsibilities and respective capabilities.

1990

Japan

25% reduction, which is premised on the establishment of a fair and effective international framework in which all major economies participate and on agreement by those
economies on ambitious targets.

1990

Kazakhstan

15%

1992

New Zealand

10%/20% New Zealand is prepared to take on a responsibility target for greenhouse gas
emissions reductions of between 10% and 20% below 1990 levels by 2020, if there is a
comprehensive global agreement. This means: the global agreement sets the world on
a pathway to limit temperature rise to not more than 2° C; developed countries make
comparable efforts to those of New Zealand; advanced and major emitting developing
countries take action fully commensurate with their respective capabilities; there is an
effective set of rules for land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF); and there is
full recourse to a broad and efficient international carbon market.

1990

Norway

30-40%. As part of a global and comprehensive agreement for the period beyond 2012
where major emitting Parties agree on emissions reductions in line with the 2° C target,
Norway will move to a level of 40% reduction for 2020.

1990

Russian Federation

15-25%

1990

United States of
America

In the range of 17%, in conformity with anticipated U.S. energy and climate legislation,
recognizing that the final target will be reported to the Secretariat in light of enacted legislation. (The pathway set forth in pending legislation would entail a 30% reduction in 2025
and a 42% reduction in 2030, in line with the goal to reduce emissions 83% by 2050.)

2005
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Appendix II - Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions of Developing Country Parties (selected Parties)39
Non-Annex I
Party
Brazil

Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions

• Reduction in Amazon deforestation (range of estimated reduction: 564 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• Reduction in “Cerrado” deforestation (range of estimated reduction: 104 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• Restoration of grazing land (range of estimated reduction: 83 to 104 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• Integrated crop-livestock system (range of estimated reduction: 18 to 22 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• No-till farming (range of estimated reduction: 16 to 20 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• Biological N2 fixation (range of estimated reduction: 16 to 20 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• Energy efficiency (range of estimated reduction: 12 to 15 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• Increase the use of biofuels (range of estimated reduction: 48 to 60 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• Increase in energy supply by hydroelectric power plants (range of estimated reduction: 79 to 99 million tons of
CO2eq in 2020);
• Alternative energy sources (range of estimated reduction: 26 to 33 million tons of CO2eq eq in 2020);
• Iron & steel (replace coal from deforestation with coal from planted forests) (range of estimated reduction: 8 to
10 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
These actions are expected to lead to reductions of 36.1% to 38.9% from projected business-as-usual.

China

China will endeavor to lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45% by 2020 compared to the
2005 level; increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 15% by 2020; and
increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares and forest stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters by 2020 from
2005 levels.

Congo

Listed 33 specific actions, including training and education for forest conservation.

India

India will endeavor to reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by 20-25% by 2020 in comparison to the 2005
level.

Israel

Israel “will do its utmost” to reduce its CO2 emissions by 20% from a business-as-usual projection primarily by
calling for a 10% share of renewable energy generation and 20% reduction in electricity consumption.

Marshall
Islands

40% reduction of CO2 emissions below 2009 levels by 2020.

Mexico

Mexico aims at reducing its GHG emissions up to 30% from projected business-as-usual emissions by 2020, provided the provision of adequate financial and technological support from developed countries as part of a global
agreement.

South Africa

34% reduction in projected business-as-usual emissions by 2020. 42% reduction in projected emissions by 2025.
Implementation depends on financial resources, the transfer of technology and capacity building support from
developed countries.
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sustainable management of their forest resources and land-use
practices. Developed countries recognized avoided deforestation
as offering relatively inexpensive mitigation that could generate
cheap offsets for meeting their international reduction commitments. Ably chaired by Tony La Vina, the REDD negotiations
had progressed in Copenhagen to a relatively detailed proposal
being forwarded for approval by the parties, but the draft (like
many other draft decisions) was never formally adopted, and
was instead preempted by the Copenhagen Accord.47
The Copenhagen Accord endorsed REDD and called for
“the immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDDplus, to enable the mobilization of financial resources from
developed countries.”48 The parties also agreed to provide additional financial assistance in both the short- and long-term for
establishing REDD activities. Such a mechanism will likely be
established during the Mexico negotiations planned for November 2010, and the existing draft text will hopefully form the basis
for those REDD negotiations.

Financing and Technology
As in all environmental negotiations, the terms and extent
of financial support from developed countries was critical.49
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a high-profile announcement that the industrialized countries would collectively provide
$10 billion in annual support over the near term (2010-2012)
and financial resources up to $100 billion per year by 2020.50
These numbers would be enshrined in the Copenhagen Accord,
but several critical questions surrounding finance remain: (1)
what revenue sources will provide the promised financial support for addressing climate change; (2) what institutions would
be used to distribute it; and (3) for what purposes can the support
be used.
First, with respect to the sources of funding, the Copenhagen Accord contemplates that the additional financial resources
committed to climate change “will come from a wide variety
of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral.”51 Following Copenhagen, many donor countries have clarified their
specific financial commitments for the period 2010-2012, with
commitments as of March 2010 nearing $25 billion towards the
$30 billion goal.52 Less clear at this point is where the resources
will come from to meet the $100 billion per year commitment by
the period 2020. To this end, the Copenhagen Accord announced
a “High Level Panel” to be established under the Conference of
the Parties to study various potential sources of revenue to meet
this goal.53 The High Level Panel was subsequently created
under the auspices of the UNFCCC and is expected to provide
its recommendations by the time of the next meeting of the Conferences of the Party in November, 2010.54 The Panel may consider both public and private sources of climate financing; civil
society is hoping that the Panel will consider and recommend
innovative sources, including for example: taxes on international financial transfers (also known as a Tobin Tax); the use of
Special Drawing Rights under the International Monetary Fund;
a tax on bunker fuels from international aviation and maritime
shipping; and shifting money that currently funds fossil fuel
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subsidies towards climate mitigation. Each of these four potential revenue sources are generally of a magnitude that could contribute significantly to meeting the committed target, but each of
them also face political hurdles and additional challenges.
The institutional structure for delivering the promised climate finance is also yet to be determined. The United States
strongly supports using the World Bank and other existing institutions as the primary delivery vehicle for climate finance. The
United States argues that the Bank is an efficient and knowledgeable institution in delivering multilateral assistance, but perhaps
the more important reason for U.S. support is that the United
States enjoys dominant decision making power in the World
Bank (holding seventeen percent of the voting share). Not surprisingly, developing countries oppose the Bank and seek a new
funding mechanism with more representative decision making
structures.55
The Accord does not clearly decide what role the World
Bank or other existing institutions will play, but it did announce
that a new “Copenhagen Green Climate Fund” (“CGCF”) will
be established as “an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention.”56 The Fund cannot be formally established until the next meeting of the Conference of the Parties.
The operational and governance modalities will also need to
be negotiated. The expectation is that the governance structure
of the CGCF will have equal representation of developed and
developing countries. At least this appears to be the implication
from the Accord’s reference to adaptation funding: “New multilateral funding for adaptation will be delivered through effective
and efficient fund arrangements, with a governance structure
providing for equal representation of developed and developing countries. A significant portion of such funding should flow
through the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund.”57
In addition to the High Level Panel and the CGCF, the
Accord announced one further new institution at least indirectly
related to financial support: a Technology Mechanism “to accelerate technology development and transfer in support of action
on adaptation and mitigation.”58 The mission, operating guidelines, structure, and composition of the Mechanism have not yet
been clarified.
Finally, details will still have to be negotiated regarding
what activities will be eligible for international climate financial support. For the most part, the Copenhagen Accord was all
inclusive: the Parties agreed to provide “[s]caled up, new and
additional, predictable and adequate funding . . . to enable and
support enhanced action on mitigation, including substantial
finance to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD-plus), adaptation, technology development and
transfer and capacity-building, for enhanced implementation
of the Convention.”59 The Accord also promises a “balanced
allocation between adaptation and mitigation,” with priorities
for adaptation funding to go to “the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, small island
developing States and Africa.”60 The CGCF’s mission as spelled
out in the Accord will be to “support projects, programmes,
policies and other activities in developing countries related to
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

mitigation including REDD-plus, adaptation, capacity-building,
technology development and transfer.”61 The net result is that
the Accord contemplates financial support for a wide range of
climate-related activities, but more detailed conditions on the
use of the funds must still be negotiated in the next few years.
Indeed, financing is now expected to be a major focus of the
2010 negotiations in Cancun, Mexico.

Implications for Global Climate Governance
It is undoubtedly too soon to understand fully what the
long-term implications of the Copenhagen Accord may be. The
Accord is only one step in what is a decades-long effort to fashion a comprehensive and effective global approach to climate
change. Although the Accord arguably signals a major shift
away from the global cap-and-trade approach of the UNFCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol, we may find in ten years that the Accord
simply shaped a process that still led to a system fundamentally
shaped by the Protocol’s cap-and-trade system. We must, therefore, recognize that the implications of the Accord will depend
as much on what happens in the next few years of negotiations
as what happened at Copenhagen. This is all the more true, given
the relative general nature of the Accord, the lack of clarity in
how the Accord relates to the UNFCCC, and the lack of a clear
consensus for a way forward. Indeed, the lack of consensus on
next steps was particularly striking at Copenhagen; the Summit
ended with no clear work plan for ensuing CoP negotiations or
for the Secretariat, resulting in an unprecedented lack of clarity
over the direction of future climate negotiations. Although some
of the uncertainty has been addressed in the months following
Copenhagen, the long-term direction of the post-Copenhagen
climate regime is still unclear. With these caveats firmly in mind,
this article ventures some potential implications of the Copenhagen negotiations for the future of global climate governance.

The Threat to a Negotiated, Science-Based
Approach
The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol embody a clear topdown global approach to addressing climate change, in which
(1) scientists through, for example, the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (“IPCC”) inform the negotiators of what cap
on global emissions is necessary to avoid the most significant
negative climate impacts; (2) the negotiators agree to a system
of targets and timetables that will achieve the science-based
cap on emissions; (3) a global market-based system will assist
in re-allocating the cap, through such mechanisms as cap-andtrade and the offset market; and (4) compliance with targets
and timetables will be monitored internationally and sanctions
for non-compliance may be imposed by the other parties. The
Copenhagen Accord essentially has rejected such a sciencedriven, universally negotiated and enforced system of targets
and timetables. In its place, the Accord allows each country or
group of countries to make a separate and potentially unrelated
pledge regarding its efforts to reduce climate change. Nothing
in this process of pledges suggests that the GHG reductions in
aggregate will be tied to a scientifically based analysis of what is
necessary to avoid significant climate impacts. Indeed, as noted
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above, even if every country fulfills its pledges under the Copenhagen Accord, reductions will still fall short of what is necessary
to avoid significant climate disruption. Also lost in the Copenhagen Accord’s “pledge-and-review” approach is that the individual country’s pledges are not openly negotiated among the
parties. As a result, little possibility exists to increase commitments through the give-and-take of negotiations or by publicly
isolating a country that is doing too little. The net result is that
overall commitments are likely to be less than we could expect
through a negotiated process.

Emphasizing the National Level
Associated with the “pledge-and-review” approach of the
Accord is a shift in the emphasis of global climate policy from
the international to the national level. Rather than an internationally agreed set of caps, the focus is entirely on what national
governments are willing to pledge publicly to support. The attention is thus shifted to national level decision making. This makes
explicit what many observers have recognized all along—that
what happens at the international climate negotiations may be
less important to addressing global climate change than what
happens in the capitals of key countries. Indeed, although the
Accord provides for significantly less monitoring and oversight
than would be expected in a Kyoto-like system of mutually
negotiated and internationally accepted targets and timetables,
even compliance with a Kyoto-like system ultimately depends
on domestic action for compliance.
Perhaps the Accord’s more explicit focus on the national
level will provide for more resources being shifted from international negotiations to building capacity for national implementation. Given that developing countries have voluntarily
self-identified their mitigation actions, we could expect greater
commitment to implementation and failure to meet these individually-tailored actions may be more embarrassing than failure to
meet internationally negotiated targets. The result could be that
both donors and recipient governments may be more inclined to
invest in implementation of the mitigation commitments. If such
a focus on the national level can be transferred into a long-term
focus on the difficult work of building national capacity, global
efforts to address climate may benefit. But long-term capacity
building does not provide the promise of a quick headline or the
excitement of international negotiations. Funders, governments,
and civil society must resist the allure of international negotiations and shift at least some of their work to the less romantic
drudgery of long-term training, capacity building, and movement building at the national level. If nothing else, anything that
shifts resources from talking to action should be welcomed in
global climate policy.

The Emergence of a Pluralistic Approach to
Climate Governance
Both the substance of the Accord’s pledge-and-review
approach and the process by which it was negotiated arguably
undermine the importance of the United Nations, particularly the
UNFCCC Secretariat, in future climate governance. The Accord
was ultimately negotiated outside of the formal UNFCCC
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process, behind closed doors, with only a handful of countries
present. For the most critical part of the negotiations, only the
United States and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa,
India, and China) were in the room—and those five countries
had not been authorized by any others to negotiate the Accord.62
This process was heavily criticized by many other countries and left the parties wondering how the Accord fit with the
UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol. This tension manifested itself in
the debate on the floor at Copenhagen over whether and how the
parties to the UNFCCC should recognize this document labeled
the Copenhagen Accord. Ultimately, the UNFCCC parties neither adopted nor endorsed the Accord, instead simply “taking
note” of it. This meant the UNFCCC Parties as a whole recognized that the document existed, but gave it no formal status.
This decision threatened the legitimacy and importance of the
Accord and revealed the relatively weak consensus that surrounded it.
The debate over the formal status of the Accord revealed
deeper tensions over the appropriate forum for negotiating climate governance. The Accord was seen as a new path separate
from, and potentially dominant over, the UNFCCC process. It
also revealed the weakness of the UN process, in which under
the current rules of decision even a handful of oil-dependent
states, for example, can continue to disrupt overall progress. To
some observers the UN process is too unwieldy and too easily
held hostage by a small number of states to allow for effective
negotiations. On the other hand, the heavy-handed approach by
just a few states in negotiating and announcing the Accord also
arguably undermines progress toward reaching broad global
consensus for long-term cooperative action.
The potential for splitting off a new negotiating process under the Accord raises the specter of a more pluralistic
approach to climate governance, with significantly more institutions involved in climate policy. The Accord itself creates
three new institutions—the High Level Panel on Financing, the
CGCF, and the technology mechanism—without fully clarifying their relationship with existing institutions. Moreover, the
willingness to negotiate the Accord outside of the UNFCCC
processes suggests that in the future the most critical climate
negotiations may take place in meetings of the G-20, the Major
Economies Forum (“MEF”), or in bilateral or regional forums.
The increase in forums is not necessarily negative, but it does
raise additional challenges for ensuring policy coherence and
integration. These alternative forums do not have the broad participation of the UN process, potentially missing, for example,
the moral voice brought to the negotiations by the countries
hardest hit from climate change (the small island states and the
least developed countries). Excluding these countries from the
negotiations may make the negotiations more comfortable, but
climate policy will likely suffer. The alternative forums will also
likely be less transparent and accessible to the public. An elaborate system for civil society participation has developed around
the climate negotiations that has until now been largely lacking
in the G-20, MEF or similar forums.
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The emergence from Copenhagen of a pluralistic approach
is also evident in specific areas of climate governance. For example, Copenhagen appeared to do little to further the interests of
a global carbon market, and in fact the failure to make progress
on a second reporting period under Kyoto suggests that a global
carbon market is not likely in the near future. This does not
mean that we have seen the end of carbon markets, however. On
the contrary, the carbon markets do not require a global cap-andtrade system to flourish. The carbon marketers were not visibly
upset with the outcome of Copenhagen because they know that
the most important decisions for a carbon market will be made at
the national and bilateral level. For example, the carbon market’s
future depends mostly on whether the United States establishes
a national cap on emissions and a framework for integrating its
market with the European emissions trading system. In addition,
Europe and the United States can adopt, through their respective legislation, the necessary rules for creating an offset market
with opportunities for developing country participation. Thus,
for example, the United States may adopt legislation that allows
U.S. companies to purchase offsets from pre-approved sectors
of specific developing countries (for example, forest credits
from Brazil). In this way the carbon market is established and
maintained not by a global set of standards negotiated under the
UNFCCC, but by a series of bilateral and regional agreements,
creating an interconnecting market for emissions trading and the
purchase and sale of reduction credits.
The situation is similar with respect to climate finance architecture. As noted above, the Copenhagen Accord reflected significant new commitments in financial transfers from the North
to the South, but it left open significant questions regarding the
future institutional architecture for managing these funds. Climate financial architecture is controversial. Among the recurring issues are: (1) the extent to which decision making will be
controlled by the donor countries; (2) what conditions, including
environmental and social safeguards, will be placed on financing; (3) how the financing commitments will be monitored to
ensure that funds earmarked for climate financing are “new and
additional;” and (4) the extent to which the UNFCCC will set
policy and coordinate financing.63 Complicating this further
is the multiplicity of institutions that already address climate
finance. The World Bank itself administers the Climate Investment Funds (“CIF”), the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, and
approximately a dozen other climate-related funds, not to mention the general climate and energy-related lending it does under
its normal operations.64 Added to the World Bank’s climaterelated activities are the Adaptation Fund, the Global Environment Facility, the Clean Development Mechanism, and a variety
of national and regional climate-related funds. For obvious
reasons, ensuring coordination among these institutions and
between these organizations and the UNFCCC secretariat was
a high priority.
Unfortunately, the Copenhagen Accord, itself, did little to
enhance coordination, consolidate climate finance architecture,
or answer any of the related questions. In fact, in announcing
the new Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, the parties added a
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new institution with little operational clarity. The expectation is
that decision making at the CGCF will be made by equal representation of developed and developing countries—still unknown
is whether the CGCF will be independent or operate under the
World Bank, what safeguard policies will attach to its operations, or what will be the composition of the CGCF decision
making structure.
The parties to the Accord also established the High Level
Panel for climate financing, but in so doing they apparently
missed an opportunity to provide for greater institutional coordination. The High Level Panel has a relatively limited mandate to
investigate new sources of revenue. During the Copenhagen
negotiations, a consensus had
been emerging for the need of
such a high level panel to coordinate the myriad of financing
institutions and to ensure that
the goals of the UNFCCC were
being efficiently advanced.
This greater coordinating role
was not (or at least not yet)
included in the High Level Panel’s mission.

Implications for
International Law

[B]oth the process and
outcome of Copenhagen
do not offer significant
reason to hope that the
world’s leaders can put
aside short-term political
expedience to make
the long-term, shared,
equitable steps needed to
avert substantial climate
disruption.

Much of the debate, both
before and after Copenhagen,
centered around whether the
parties would continue the pursuit of legally binding targets
and timetables. In the end, the
choice to accept a non-binding option reflected a lack of
political consensus—not over
whether there should be a binding agreement, but what the
requirements should be and to whom they should apply.  Indeed,
virtually every country has endorsed (and continues to endorse
after Copenhagen) the pursuit of a binding agreement, but of
course this did not lead to any binding decision at Copenhagen.
Moreover, the parties excised (with the insistence of China and
India) any language in the Accord that would have set a schedule for negotiating a binding agreement in the near future. In
short, Copenhagen can only be viewed as a major set-back for
anyone seeking a hard, binding agreement.
To some extent, however, the concerns over the relative
“hardness” of the climate regime may be too formalistic an
inquiry. We should not lose sight that the end goal of global
climate policy is to take action to reduce the risk of significant
climate disruption — it is not to have a binding agreement. In
that respect, it is helpful to abandon the arcane discussion of
whether the Copenhagen Accord is or is not binding (it clearly
is not), in favor of a discussion of whether the Accord nonetheless promotes commitments and actions that can be effectively
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monitored and enforced. As Jake Werksman of the World
Resources Institute notes, more important than the formality is
the functionality of binding international law.65 According to
Werksman, the salient questions in the context of the Accord
would be: (1) are norms being developed under the Accord specific and clear enough to monitor and determine compliance, (2)
is there a viable institutional framework available for monitoring
and determining compliance, and (3) are there sanctions available for non-compliance.
Looking first at the normative framework, the Accord
offers some modest steps forward. The Accord’s “pledgeand-review” system means that
both the United States and most
developing countries for the first
time have agreed to take some
specific actions for mitigating
climate change. As can be seen
from the few examples excerpted
above, many (although not all)
of the commitments made under
the Accord could, in theory, be
measured and verified. Thus, for
example, economy-wide reductions, improvements in energyintensity, or sector-specific
actions can all be monitored
effectively, assuming the country has established appropriate
baselines, developed methodologies for measuring results, and
committed the resources to monitoring over time. Developing
countries also agreed for the first
time to submit national reports,
including GHG inventories, biannually. This is an important commitment that can easily be monitored for compliance. In general,
then, the Accord does offer some standards of behavior that are
sufficiently clear and detailed to allow for holding the signatory
responsible.
On the other hand, the institutional framework for monitoring, reporting, and verifying country actions under the Accord
does have significant deficiencies. The MRV requirements were
one of the most hotly contested issues in Copenhagen and indeed
to some extent the entire negotiations pivoted on the extent to
which parties could reach consensus on the international MRV
requirements that would be applied to their various commitments. This is not surprising given that the MRV requirements
in many ways are critical to whether an agreement is or is not
functionally binding.
In the end, a variety of MRV requirements were suggested
by the Copenhagen Accord, but most of the details have been
left for future negotiations. Developed country mitigation commitments are expected to be subject to MRV requirements similar to those currently existing under the Kyoto Protocol. The
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financial commitments of developed countries are also to be
subject to MRV, but under guidelines yet to be adopted. The
most controversial issue relating to MRV—the extent to which
developing country NAMAs would be subject to international
oversight—resulted in a two-tiered outcome. For developing
countries that take steps without international support, MRV
will be conducted at the national level according to national
MRV requirements and included as part of the biannual national
reports submitted to the UNFCCC. These actions will also be
subject to “international consultation and analysis,” which was
left undefined but recognized to be considerably less than international MRV requirements would normally entail. Developing
countries that accept international financial support to implement their NAMAs will be subject to more robust international
MRV oversight requirements, according to detailed guidelines
to be negotiated in the future. Overall, the MRV requirements
in Copenhagen were disappointing to those who wanted to see
progress on a system with strong and comprehensive international oversight. India, China and the emerging economies considered the relative lack of MRV requirements to be a major
victory that preserved their national sovereignty.
Even more disappointing for those who want muscular
international oversight is the lack of any sanctions for noncompliance in the Accord. This is a difficult area generally in
international environmental law, with the primary sanction
being one of “naming and shaming” those in non-compliance.
This is the only sanction implicitly available under the Accord,
although there is no mechanism for parties to formally condemn

each other for non-compliance. By contrast, non-compliant parties to the Kyoto Protocol could face more significant mitigation
commitments in future reporting periods (assuming there are
subsequent reporting periods).66 The Protocol would also lend
itself readily to sanctioning non-compliance by reducing certain
regime benefits (for example, withdrawing eligibility for receiving funding under the regime or for participating in the offset
markets). The Accord thus far contemplates no such sanctions.

Conclusion
It may be too soon to understand the ultimate impact of the
Copenhagen Summit; it is after all only one step in a long-term
process of global cooperation to address climate change. In this
regard, agreement to even the anemic Copenhagen Accord is
arguably better than if the negotiations had failed to reach any
agreement at all. Most of the world has now, or soon will have,
associated with the Accord and announced either an economywide target (in the case of developed countries) or one or more
mitigation actions (in the case of developing countries). These
commitments, along with progress relating to financing, REDD,
and technology transfer may subsequently be viewed as critical
building blocks in an effective, comprehensive climate regime.
For now, however, both the process and outcome of Copenhagen
do not offer significant reason to hope that the world’s leaders
can put aside short-term political expedience to make the longterm, shared, equitable steps needed to avert substantial climate
disruption.

Endnotes: Implications of the Copenhagen Accord for Global
Climate Governance
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Endnotes: Implications of the Copenhagen Accord for Global
Climate Governance continued on page 56
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Standardization of REDD Monitoring
Technology to Level the Playing Field
by Beth Zgoda*

T

o meet the goals of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), the nations of the
world must address the approximately seventeen percent
of global greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation.1 Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (“REDD”) will
require transparent accountability for national mitigation action
and effective technology sharing.2 Remote-sensing technologies—primarily utilizing satellite imagery—are an effective means
of monitoring and verifying REDD.3 Although many developing
countries currently lack the capacity to make use of remote-sensing
technology,4 the technology is readily available to governments
and non-governmental organizations through software programs
that analyze publicly-available data sets produced by existing satellites.5 With this in mind, the REDD Web Platform of the UNFCCC
website already provides links to information about remote sensing,
including, among other things, technical assistance for data collection and training.6 The UNFCCC Parties must further encourage
the use of effective remote-sensing monitoring of REDD in two
ways. First, they must reach out to all developing country parties
to ensure that they receive capacity-building training and funding.
Second, they must develop uniform standards for data collection
and processing so that the software programs under development
can produce results easily comparable to each other.
Many developing nations lack the technical capacity and skills
to make use of available technologies.7 Currently, the UNFCCC
has a Regional Capacity Building Project for Sustainable National
Greenhouse Gas Inventory Management Systems in Southeast Asia
(“SEA GHG Project”).8 The SEA GHG Project is focused on building capacity within eight Southeast Asia countries by strengthening
their institutional and technical capacity to monitor national GHG
data, including training on software that incorporates remote-sensory imaging into its data analysis.9 This project is scheduled for
completion in September of 2010.10
The UNFCCC REDD Web Platform states that a replication of
the SEA GHG Project is scheduled for 2010 in Africa.11 The SEA
GHG Project should coordinate with the Australian government’s
National Carbon Accounting System, which is already supporting
capacity building for monitoring in several developing countries,
including in Kenya, Tanzania, Guyana, and Cambodia.12 In addition, the SEA GHG Project should be replicated in South and Central America. Efforts in South America should also incorporate the
Brazilian government’s experience, as Brazil has already developed
its remote-sensing technological skills and made its datasets publicly available.13
The Copenhagen Accord recognizes the need for a mechanism
to provide financing from developed to developing countries for
REDD.14 Any REDD-financing mechanism should invest in hiring
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teams within each country, or within partnerships of countries, providing them with the available technology and training. Much of
the technology, including data sets from satellites and programs to
process the information, is available free or at low cost; many of the
programs can run on a standard desktop computer.15 The funding
would primarily go to salaries and training. As the teams for monitoring remotely would be smaller than teams needed for on-theground monitoring, remote-sensing will not only increase accuracy
but decrease costs for monitoring REDD progress in developing
countries.
One way for developing countries to fund ongoing monitoring
programs is to allow the sale or trade of their carbon credits on a
worldwide carbon market. For such a market to function properly,
the carbon credits must be based on uniform standards of measurement.16 Several different countries and organizations are developing
software for monitoring REDD from satellite data.17 Unfortunately,
there are no uniform standards for the data produced by the satellites and for the output and input of the REDD-monitoring software
programs,18 which will hamper any capacity-building efforts by
reducing the ability to trade REDD credits. Without uniform standards, each satellite dataset and software program may lead to different results for the same area. The lack of standardization both of
data and of software processing may allow countries with greater
capacity and additional dedicated funding to shop around for the
program and satellite that show better results for them, and the less
developed countries will not have that option to game the system.
The UNFCCC needs to develop uniform standards that software
program developers can incorporate into their designs and REDD
financing must include funding for a team of researchers to develop
and issue guidelines for what factors and standards the software
programmers should use.
Monitoring of REDD can be achieved with currently available technologies if the UNFCCC community is willing to build
the capacity necessary to utilize those technologies. Building capacity requires direct investment in all developing forest nations. To
build capacity adequately, there must be uniformity of data and data
processing so that each country is trained to use systems that reach
compatible and interchangeable results. If REDD is to be used as a
means of trading within the carbon market, the means of measuring
results must be interchangeable to ensure tradable results.

Endnotes: Standardization of REDD Monitoring Technology
to Level the Playing Field continued on page 57
* Beth Zgoda is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University Washington College of Law.
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Exceptionalism United?: Unpacking UNFCCC
Article 7.2(c)
by Niranjali M. Amerasinghe and Kristen Hite*

I

Introduction

n the wee hours of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (“UNFCCC” or “Convention”)
fifteenth Conference of the Parties (“COP-15”), the United
States invoked Article 7.2(c) of the Convention,1 an obscure
and little understood provision, in a last-minute effort to reach
agreement on the post-2012 climate regime.2 What is Article
7.2(c), and what are its potential applications beyond the specific context of the negotiations at Copenhagen? Some have
suggested that this particular provision could present a unique
opportunity for specific groups of countries to take coordinated
action to address climate change while remaining under the
UNFCCC umbrella. This article offers an initial analysis of the
scope of Article 7.2(c) and its potential application to international efforts to address climate change.
Under the UNFCCC, Article 7.2(c) provides that:
The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body
of this Convention, shall keep under regular review
the implementation of the Convention and any related
legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties
may adopt, and shall make, within its mandate, the
decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention. To this end, it shall:
. . . (c) facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of measures adopted by them
to address climate change and its effects, taking into
account the differing circumstances, responsibilities
and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments under the Convention.3
Article 13.4(d) of the Kyoto Protocol (“KP” or “Protocol”)
has nearly identical language to the text contained in Convention Article 7.2(c). Like the Convention text, KP Article 13.4(d)
gives the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (“CMP”) the authority to:
Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the
coordination of measures adopted by them to address
climate change and its effects, taking into account the
differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments
under this Protocol.4
Indeed, the difference between the Convention text and this
provision lies only in the commitments: the Convention text
applies to the commitments of the Convention, while the Protocol text applies to commitments “under this Protocol.”5
For the purposes of this article, we focus our analysis on
the authority given to the Conference of the Parties (“COP”) to
17

facilitate coordination of measures adopted by a group of Parties
based upon the specific text in Article 7.2(c). We begin with the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”) for guidance on interpreting treaty-level text.6

Legal Framework
Rules for treaty interpretation are contained in Articles
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.7 These rules are widely
considered to be a codification of customary international law
regarding treaty interpretation.8 Thus, they are applicable with
respect to a given State regardless of whether it has ratified the
Vienna Convention.9
The primary rule of interpretation states, “[a] treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.”10 “Context,” in relevant part, can
include other provisions of the treaty,11 “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty
or the application of its provisions,”12 “any subsequent practice
in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation,”13 “any relevant rules
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties,”14 and any special meaning given to a term.15 Therefore,
with respect to interpreting Article 7.2(c) of the UNFCCC, relevant sources would include: operative and preambular text of
the UNFCCC, and its annexes; the Kyoto Protocol, which would
constitute a subsequent agreement applying provisions of the
UNFCCC (including, but not limited to, Article 4.2(a) and (b)
of the UNFCCC, relating to Annex I mitigation); COP decisions
and CMP decisions, which would constitute subsequent practice to the extent that they establish agreement of the Parties on
interpretation of UNFCCC provisions;16 and other relevant rules
of international law.17 For the purpose of this preliminary scoping, we will focus on context provided by provisions within the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.
Based on this Vienna Convention guidance, the relevant
terms of Article 7.2(c) should be analyzed in accordance with

* Niranjali M. Amerasinghe is an attorney at the Center for International Environmental Law. Ms. Amerasinghe holds an LL.M. in International and Comparative Law from the George Washington University Law School, and an LL.B.
from the University of Bristol. Kristen Hite is an attorney at the Center for
International Environmental Law and an adjunct professor of international
environmental law at the Paul H. Nitze Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies. She holds an M.S. in gestión ambiental/Environmental
Management from the Universidad San Francisco de Quito in Ecuador and a
J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center. The authors would like to thank
Matthew Axtell, Daniel B. Magraw Jr., Gordon M. Scott, and Stephen J. Porter
for their insightful comments and review.
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their ordinary meaning in context and in light of the object and
purpose of the UNFCCC. The next section of the article contains
this analysis, followed by an examination of procedural requirements for invoking the power, as well as additional considerations and a conclusion.

Interpretation
The purpose of this preliminary scoping is to provide initial guidance on what it would mean for the UNFCCC if the
COP were to facilitate coordination of measures adopted by two
or more Parties. As such, we have limited the examination of
“context” to key provisions within the UNFCCC and the KP
(which constitutes a subsequent agreement).18 For the purposes
of Article 7.2(c), the key operative phrase is, “facilitate coordination of measures adopted.”19 The remaining portions of the
paragraph provide broader context and procedural considerations, which we address in later
sections.20 We now consider the
ordinary meaning of these terms
and their context, taking into
account the object and purpose
of the UNFCCC.21

Ordinary meaning

In this section we examine specific contextual considerations associated with each of the key terms. Under the Vienna
Convention, “context” in relevant part includes, inter alia,
other provisions of the treaty;28 and “any subsequent agreement
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty
or the application of its provisions.”29 We now analyze “context” based on the specific key terms of Article 7.2(c) and their
broader context within the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.30

Facilitate
In the context of the scope of activities that may be facilitated, the UNFCCC contains several helpful references. With
respect to Party obligations, there are provisions that expressly
connect facilitation with: adequate adaptation measures to be
taken by all Parties;31 and the
transfer of technologies and
capacity building for developing
countries by developed country Parties, including those in
Annex II.32 “Facilitate” could
also indirectly apply to both mitigation and new and additional
financing measures through the
application of Articles 7.2(b) or
7.2(c), which provide for facilitation of measures to address
climate change and its effects;
however there are no express
provisions that link “facilitate”
with mitigation or new and
additional financing measures.33
Additionally, facilitation can
apply to: “(i) the development
and implementation of educational and public awareness programmes on climate change and
its effects; (ii) public access to information on climate change
and its effects; (iii) public participation in addressing climate
change and its effects and developing adequate responses; and
(iv) training of scientific, technical and managerial personnel.”34
This type of facilitation may be at national levels, and as appropriate, sub regional and regional levels.35
In terms of COP powers, there are two explicit powers to
“facilitate:” Article 7.2(b) on facilitating the exchange of information;36 and Article 7.2(c) on facilitating coordination.37 Additionally the Secretariat can provide facilitation with respect to
the provision of assistance in compilation and communication
of information required by the Convention, which is aimed at
assisting developing countries.38 Finally, within the UNFCCC,
“facilitate” is distinct from “promote” and “finance.” There are
several provisions that call for Parties/bodies to “promote and
facilitate”39 and one provision that requires Parties to “promote,
facilitate and finance,”40 indicating that the term “facilitate” is
distinct from the other two.

Based on this Vienna
Convention guidance, the
relevant terms of Article
7.2(c) should be analyzed
in accordance with their
ordinary meaning in
context and in light of the
object and purpose of the
UNFCCC.

Recognizing the key operative phrase of Convention
Article 7.2(c) is “facilitate coordination of measures adopted,”
we now examine the ordinary
meaning of “facilitate,” “coordination,” “measures,” and
“adopted.” 22 The UNFCCC
does not define any of the above
terms, so without explicit guidance on definitions we begin
our analysis with standard dictionary definitions.23 The ordinary meaning of “facilitate” is to “make easy or easier.”24 To
“coordinate” is to “adjust (various parts) so as to have harmonious action.”25 “Measures” typically refers to some form of legislative enactment, or a course of action to achieve a specified
goal.26 And “adopt” implies some type of formal acceptance
process.27
Based on these plain meaning definitions, the power to
“facilitate coordination of measures adopted” means: making
easier the harmonization of courses of action accepted by a formal process. Of course, this does not shed much light on what
facilitation or coordination might involve, nor what kinds of
actions can be considered measures for UNFCCC purposes. For
this we look to context—both specific to the terms and broadly
applicable to the power—provided in the UNFCCC and the KP,
and the object and purpose of the UNFCCC.
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Specific Contextual Considerations
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In the context of the scope of activities that may be facilitated, the Kyoto Protocol offers several textual references for
consideration. The Kyoto Protocol specifically allows for the
facilitation—including by the CMP—of adequate adaptation
measures.41 Further, it allows for indirect facilitation of mitigation measures to address climate change and its effects.42 Additionally, like the UNFCCC, “facilitate” can apply to technology
transfer, capacity building, and the exchange of information.43
Yet another similarity with the Convention is that, within the
Protocol, “facilitate” is distinct from “promote” and “finance.”44
While the Protocol and
Convention have largely similar, and in some cases identical,
provisions regarding facilitation,
the KP provides context, as per
the Vienna Convention framework, as a subsequent agreement applying provisions of the
UNFCCC. Beyond the express
powers of facilitating exchange
of information and coordination,
the Kyoto Protocol specifically
mandates the CMP to facilitate cooperation with respect to
Annex I (“AI”) Parties’ obligations.45 An additional consideration is that the Protocol has
provisions that explicitly allow
for facilitation at the national
and international levels, while the Convention also allows for
facilitation at the sub-regional and regional levels.46
In sum, facilitate seems to mean enhancing something
beyond promoting or financing, at various levels. To better
understand what that “something” is, we now consider the specific context for “facilitate coordination.”

information, “coordinate” could involve or be enhanced by, but
not be limited to, exchanges of information. Indeed, it is possible that facilitating the exchange of information of measures
adopted by all Parties under Article 7.2(b) is part of what would
allow the COP to coordinate measures taken by a subset of
Parties.
“Coordination,” in the context provided by the KP, has a
similar meaning as in the UNFCCC. It is clear that policies and
measures may be coordinated.52 “Coordination” can involve
specific activities, including developing the “ways and means”
for coordination, enabling consideration of reviews undertaken
across the UNFCCC and KP,
and establishing expert teams.53
“Coordinate” is a distinct term
from “cooperate” or “promote,”
although the terms are not necessarily completely distinct.54
In the context of seeking
“harmonious action,” as the
plain language indicates, “coordination” in the context of the
UNFCCC and KP can include
the development of ways and
means to undertake actions
regarding policies and measures,
consideration of reviews across
relevant treaties, and minimization of adverse impacts.55 For
the purposes of this analysis, we focus on “facilitate coordination” of “measures.”

Measures taken to protect
the climate system should
be tailored to “the
specific conditions of each
Party” and be “integrated
with national development
programmes.”

Coordination
Article 7.2(c) clearly indicates that coordination can apply
to measures that address climate change and its effects. There
are few other references to coordination in the UNFCCC;47
however, they do indicate that, in addition to measures, coordination can apply to specific instruments, such as “relevant economic and administrative instruments developed” by AI Parties
“to achieve the objective of the Convention.”48 Additionally,
the UNFCCC provides the Secretariat with powers to undertake
coordination activities with secretariats of other relevant international bodies.49 With respect to COP powers, as noted above,
there are two types of facilitation powers granted to the COP:
the power to facilitate exchange of information (Article 7.2(b)),
and the power to facilitate coordination (Article 7.2(c)).50 Noting that exchange of information relates to measures by all Parties, and coordination relates to a subset of Parties,51 the two
separate COP powers point to the inference that “coordinate”
and “exchange of information” are distinct. However, to the
extent that harmonizing action may involve the exchange of
19

Measures
The UNFCCC provides some interesting context for the
meaning and use of measures. At a general level, there are
references to “measures” with respect to: “addressing climate
change;”56 taking action to “combat climate change;”57 taking
precautionary action “to anticipate, prevent or minimize the
causes of climate change;”58 and protecting the “climate system
against human-induced change.”59 Measures taken to combat
climate change can be unilateral.60 Measures taken to protect the
climate system should be tailored to “the specific conditions of
each Party” and be “integrated with national development programmes.”61 Additionally, for all measures undertaken pursuant to the UNFCCC, the COP is required to assess their overall
effect, particularly “environmental, economic and social effects
as well as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which progress . . . is being achieved.”62
More specifically, measures are referenced in the context
of specific actions. For example, measures adopted by Parties
to “mitigate climate change” and to facilitate adaptation, “taking into account” national circumstances, must be included in
the formulation, implementation, and publication of all Parties’
national or regional programs.63 In implementing these measures, certain considerations, including “social, economic, and
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

environmental policies,” must be taken into account in order to
minimize adverse economic, health, and environmental effects
of such measures.64 Parties must also include details of these
measures in their national communications.65 In the specific
context of AI mitigation, measures (in tandem with policies)
are required on both national and regional levels.66 AI Parties
can jointly implement these measures.67 Detailed information
on these policies and measures must be included in national
communications in accordance with relevant articles.68 On mitigation generally, the COP can promote and guide comparable
methodologies to evaluate the “effectiveness of measures to
limit the emissions and enhance the removals of these gases.”69
Measures can also apply to obligations of developed country Parties and other Parties in Annex II for the provision of
financial resources and technology transfer.70 Although measures are not explicitly referenced in respect of providing financial resources for developing country mitigation, adaptation, and
technology transfer to developing countries when setting out
Party obligations, Article 12.3 on inclusion of details in national
communications specifically refers to such activities as “measures.”71 Thus, measures can be involved in the provision of
financial resources and technology transfer.72
Finally, “policies” and “measures” appear to have distinct
meanings in the UNFCCC. Particularly in the context of mitigation, the provisions refer to “policies and measures,” which
imply that there is a distinction between the two. 73 Thus, for the
purposes of Article 7.2(c), the COP could facilitate coordination
of activities that can be considered “measures” but not those that
would constitute “policies.”
We further consider the context of “measures” by looking beyond the Convention context to the use of the term in the
Kyoto Protocol. Under the Protocol, “measures” refers to adaptation and mitigation, for both AI and non-AI Parties.74 Measures
may be adopted by Parties, tailored to national circumstances,
included in national communications, as well as included in
the formulation, implementation, and publication of all Parties’
mitigation and adaptation measures.75 Additionally, measures
should minimize adverse effects, including social environmental
and economic impacts, and can enable the COP to take further
action, where appropriate.76
In the specific context of AI mitigation, the scope of “measures” appears broad and in tandem with “policies,” includes,
inter alia: enhancements of energy efficiency sectors, sinks,
transport, and some ozone depleting substances; protection of
sinks; promotion of sustainable forest management and agricultural practices, as well as of technologies; research for technologies; and public sector economic interventions, such as taxes,
incentives, duties, and subsidies.77 Specifically for AI Parties,
the COP may consider the “ways and means” of mitigation measures based on a CMP decision that coordination is beneficial.78
For all Parties, including non-AI Parties, measures can be
included in national and regional programs that apply to certain
sectors, such as energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry
and waste management, as well as adaptation technologies and
spatial planning.79 Even those “measures” undertaken by specific
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Parties can nevertheless involve cooperation to “enhance individual and combined effectiveness.”80
In sum, “facilitate coordination of measures,” in this particular context, seems to refer to enabling and enhancing harmonious action to address mitigation and adaptation actions,
potentially including ways and means such as financing and
transfer of technology. As such, “measures” would seem to be
most associated with the plain-meaning definition of a “course
of action to achieve a specified goal. At the same time, the alternative plain meaning of “measures” as a legislative enactment
may also be relevant given the need for “adoption” of measures.
We now consider what “adopted” could mean.

Adopt
What does it mean to have “adopted” measures? In the
UNFCCC, “adoption” can apply generally to the Parties81 and
to the COP.82 For example, all Parties can adopt measures to
address climate change and its effects.83 However, in the context of AI mitigation, UNFCCC Article 4.2(a) mandates that AI
Parties “adopt national policies and take corresponding measures,”84 also known as mitigation commitments, which includes
policies and measures adopted by regional economic integration
organizations.85 The UNFCCC also specifies when amendments
to these specific mitigation commitments are permitted.86
Further, the COP can adopt treaty-level text prior to further
acceptance or ratification, such as: legal instruments related to
the UNFCCC87 to the extent that such instruments constitute a
treaty; protocols, with specified procedures on adoption by voting if all efforts to reach consensus fail;88 amendments to the
UNFCCC, with procedures for voting if consensus fails;89 and
annexes, including amendments to those annexes, with procedures for voting if consensus fails.90 Other items include: legal
instruments that do not constitute treaty-level text;91 decisions
on matters within its mandate;92 rules of procedure and financial
procedures for itself and for any subsidiary bodies;93 guidelines
for national communications;94 regular reports on the implementation of the Convention;95 and rules of procedure for conciliation and arbitration in the context of dispute settlement.96
We look to the Kyoto Protocol for additional context. First,
similar to the UNFCCC, “adopted” can apply generally to the
CMP as well as specifically to Parties, including at the national
and international levels.97 At the international level, the CMP
may adopt future treaty text that has not yet entered into force,
as well as amendments and annexes.98 Note that treaty text can
specify when adoption can impact future commitments.99 Certain provisions must be adopted by undertaking amendment procedures such as a vote, but prior to ratification.100
Other items beyond treaty-level text may also be adopted
in the context of the Protocol. The CMP may adopt decisions,
including adoption “under” or “pursuant to” treaty provisions.101
Other items the KP explicitly references in the context of
“adopted” include commitment periods, guidelines for the preparation of information, and national communications.102 Finally,
as already noted in this article, Parties may adopt measures to
address climate change and its effects.103
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In sum, adoption is consistent with the plain meaning of a
formal acceptance process. In this context, recognizing that the
ordinary meaning of “measures” is either a course of action or
legislative enactment, “adopt” functionally modifies “measures”
to those on which formal action has been taken by Parties,
whether specifically legislative in nature or otherwise.

Broader Contextual Considerations
In this section, we briefly examine contextual considerations relevant to the power as a whole.
In international law, “Parties” typically means those States
for whom the treaty in question is in force.104 Because the
UNFCCC does not define Parties, we assume for the purpose
of this analysis that “Parties,” in the context of the UNFCCC,
means countries that have ratified the UNFCCC.105 Thus, only
countries that have consented to be bound (i.e. through formal
ratification procedures) by the UNFCCC can invoke Article
7.2(c), and only measures adopted by those countries are eligible
for coordination by the COP.106
In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, “Party” means, unless the
context otherwise indicates, a Party to this Protocol.”107 While
the KP’s governing body (the CMP) is legally distinct from
the UNFCCC’s COP, the Protocol does include provisions that
apply to the UNFCCC’s AI Parties.108 For KP Article 13.4(d),
only “Parties,” as opposed to “Party included in Annex I,” is
mentioned. Thus, unless the context indicates otherwise, “Parties” here means Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
The second half of Article 7.2(c) shapes the power to facilitate coordination of measures by requiring the COP to take “into
account the differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments under
the Convention.”109 It therefore follows that the COP has an
obligation, in facilitating coordination of measures, to consider
how those measures relate to differentiated responsibilities and
national circumstances, as well as the specific commitments of
different groupings of Parties within the UNFCCC.
Additional context is provided by the chapeau of Article
7.2:
The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of
this Convention, shall keep under regular review the
implementation of the Convention and any related legal
instruments that the Conference of the Parties may
adopt, and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention.110
This demonstrates that the primary role of the COP is to
promote effective implementation of the UNFCCC, thus any
exercise of powers must contribute to achieving this goal. Further, the chapeau provides guidance on the form of action that
the COP can take within its powers; the COP shall make the
decisions necessary to implement the UNFCCC.

Object and Purpose
The primary objective of the UNFCCC is to “achieve, in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at
21

a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system.”111 This objective is guided by, inter
alia: common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities; the specific needs and circumstances of the particularly vulnerable; the need to take precautionary measures;
the promotion of sustainable development; and promotion of
an open international economic system.112 The KP affirms the
overall objective of the UNFCCC.113 These are all important
considerations regarding the COP’s power to facilitate coordination of measures.

Procedural Matters and Additional
Considerations
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to examine
similar provisions in other Multilateral Environmental Agreements (“MEAs”), which could be helpful in determining the
application of powers to facilitate coordination of measures,
initial research shows that the explicit power to facilitate coordination of measures adopted by a subset of Parties is rare.114
Nevertheless, broadly speaking, there are examples of other conventions granting powers or creating bodies that have the effect
of coordinating measures adopted by different subsets of parties.115 Analyzing these examples in the future might be helpful in informing what kinds of actions the UNFCCC COP could
authorize under Article 7.2(c).
As noted above, there is a specific procedural requirement
to invoke the COP’s power under Article 7.2(c): “at the request
two or more Parties.” Typically, rules for this kind of procedural
matter are contained in the rules of procedure of a convention’s
governing body, however the UNFCCC COP to date has not formally adopted rules of procedure,116 due to an inability to reach
consensus on draft rule of procedure 42, containing, inter alia,
voting rules for substantive matters.117 Instead, the Parties provisionally apply draft rules of procedure, except for rule 42, at
all COP and CMP meetings until the rules are formally adopted,
which means that most procedural and substantive issues—
unless specified in treaty text or outside of rule 42—must be
decided by consensus.118 Therefore, at the moment, the draft
rules of procedure as provisionally applied can provide guidance
on the procedural elements of requesting facilitation of coordination measures.
The primary power of the COP is to take “the decisions
necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention,” as stated in Article 7.2. These decisions are adopted
at COP sessions, which are mandated to take place once every
year with the possibility of extraordinary sessions if Parties so
request.119 To ensure that an item is considered, it should be
included in the agenda for the session. According to the draft
rules of procedure, an item may be added to the agenda in one
of three ways: before circulation of the provisional agenda; after
circulation of the provisional agenda but before the opening of
the session, which would then be included in a supplementary
provisional agenda; or at the adoption of the agenda.120 The Secretariat, in agreement with the President of the session, drafts
the provisional and supplementary provisional agendas, which
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include “as appropriate: [a]ny item proposed by a Party.”121 At
adoption of the agenda, items can be added, deleted, deferred,
or amended only if the COP decides to do so.122 Thus, to get
an item on the agenda before adoption merely requires a proposal by a Party and the agreement of the President and cannot
be deleted, deferred, or amended without consensus, whereas
items introduced at the meeting must initially have consensus to
be added to the agenda. Additionally, items can only be added
at the meeting if the COP considers it urgent and important.123
Considering all of these procedural matters, perhaps the
most likely way that the COP would consider a request to facilitate the coordination of measures would be through a formal
agenda item proposed prior to circulation of the provisional
agenda. Presumably this could occur via a request from a single Party on behalf of two or more Parties, or as a joint proposal from multiple parties for inclusion as a COP agenda item
of facilitating coordination of measures adopted by a group of
Parties. Once the item is placed on the agenda, it would then
become incumbent on the COP to consider it and to facilitate the
coordination of measures, potentially through a COP decision
(which, pursuant to the draft rules of procedure, would need to
occur via consensus).

Conclusion
Following the Vienna Convention’s direction on treaty
interpretation by looking at the ordinary meaning, context,
objective, and purpose of a treaty, we begin to form a better
understanding of the scope of activities that may be undertaken
pursuant to UNFCCC Article 7.2(c).
Recognizing that the key operative component of Article
7.2(c) is “facilitate coordination of measures adopted,” we have
considered the meaning of the specific phrase and its broader
context.  Both the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol contexts
generally support the plain meaning of the terms, which collectively could be read as “making easier the harmonization
of courses of action accepted by a formal process.”  In simpler
terms, we could say that a plain meaning interpretation of Article
7.2(c) supports the COP’s enabling the harmonization of formal
national-level actions, whether legislative or otherwise.
What does this process of enabling harmonization of formal
domestic actions mean in the specific context of the Framework
Convention?  To answer this question we look to the specific
context of these terms as well as the broader context of the
UNFCCC and its successor treaty, the Kyoto Protocol.
Based on an analysis of the context of the specific terms, it
seems most helpful to consider Article 7.2(c), first based on the
action taken by the COP: “facilitate” in the context of “coordination,” and then consider the activity undertaken by specific
Parties: “measures adopted by them.” As such, we can piece
together the ordinary meaning and context of the two operative
clauses of Article 7.2(c): “facilitate the coordination” and “measures adopted by them.”
First, with respect to “facilitate the coordination,” we have
seen that “facilitate” means enhancing or enabling “something” beyond promoting or financing, at various levels.  That
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“something” is better explained in the specific context of “coordinate” or “coordination” under the UNFCCC and KP, which
includes the development of ways and means to undertake
actions regarding, inter alia, “measures.”  Putting these terms
together, in light of their ordinary meaning, we can thus conclude that “facilitate the coordination” could be interpreted to
mean enhancing or enabling the achievement of a goal, including through ways and means.
What is the specific goal we are seeking to achieve in the
context of Article 7.2(c)?   To answer this question we must
define “measures adopted by them.”  The ordinary meaning of
“measures” is “course of action” or “legislative enactment,”
which is informed by the UNFCCC and KP subset of actions and
enactments to address mitigation and adaptation.  In looking at
the relevant treaties, we see that some specific measures connote
specific mitigation actions by AI Parties, and, in some cases,
other Parties associating under Convention Article 4.2(g), while
other “measures” are relevant to all Parties, including AI and
non-AI Parties.  We also see that measures can broadly involve
adaptation and mitigation, including enhancements, protections,
and promotion of specific activities, research, and public sector
interventions.  We also see that these measures can apply at both
national and regional levels.
Given the relatively broad scope of potential “measures”
under the UNFCCC and KP, we focus on the meaning of the
“adopted” modifier.  In the context of Convention Article 7.2(c),
“adopted” measures seem to be consistent with their plain meaning involving a formal acceptance process.  As such, “measures
adopted by them” means those measures to which formal action
has been taken by Parties.
Putting these terms together, “facilitate coordination of
measures,” in this particular context, would seem to refer to
enabling and enhancing harmonious action to address mitigation
and adaptation actions formally adopted by specific Parties, and
potentially include ways and means such as financing and transfer of technology.  Taking this phrase in light of the complete
text of Article 7.2(c), we see that the COP has a mandate to take
action, such as issuing decisions, to ensure effective implementation of the Convention’s objective of avoiding anthropogenic
interference with the climate system in a manner that supports
sustainable development and takes into account common but
differentiated responsibilities.
Noting that the Kyoto Protocol has nearly identical language for facilitating the coordination of measures and affirms
the same objective as the Convention, either or both the COP
and CMP would have an affirmative obligation to act if two or
more of their respective Parties issue a request pursuant to Convention Article 7.2(c) and/or Protocol Article 13.4(d).  As such,
it is certainly possible that a subset of Parties could request the
COP and CMP to facilitate the coordination of formally adopted
domestic measures, and in doing so obligate the COP or CMP to
act on such a request.  While in theory this could enable a subset
of countries to act, due to the provisional rules of procedure,
in practice the COP may find it difficult to fulfill its mandate
given that any decision taken would need to be by consensus.  
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Nevertheless, real possibilities exist for enhanced coordination
at the international level—potentially even between the COP
and CMP as governing bodies—to work towards achieving the

ultimate objective of the Convention and avoiding dangerous
human interference with the Earth’s climate.
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FSM vs. Czech: A New “Standing” for
Climate Change?
by Paulo A. Lopes

I

n 2005, CEZ Power Company (“CEZ”) announced plans to
completely rebuild a lignite (brown coal) fired power plant
in Prunéřov, Czech Republic.1 Shortly before the expected
approval of CEZ’s Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”),2
the Federated States of Micronesia (“FSM”) sent two letters to the
Czech government.3 In December 2009, FSM requested the Czech
government to conduct a Transboundary EIA,4 which was followed
in January 2010, by an additional request for the government to
review the Best Available Technology (“BAT”) on the proposed
modernization of the Prunéřov II plant.5 FSM’s petition represents
the first time that a Non-Member State of the European Union
(“EU”) has brought a claim under EU Directive6 and Czech law
requesting a review of the environmental impacts of an EU Member State project on a Non-Member State country.7 However, does
FSM have standing to bring these claims?
FSM’s first claim is that CEZ’s EIA failed to consider the
climate affects of Prunéřov II and evaluate all possible alternatives.8 FSM asked the Ministry of the Environment to issue a negative ruling on the EIA because it ignored transboundary impacts.9
Although FSM agrees with the modernization of the Prunéřov II
plant, FSM takes issue with CEZ’s assertion that Prunéřov climate
impacts are “entirely marginal and unprovable.”10 FSM proposes
that the Czech government perform a Transboundary EIA, which is
required under Czech law.11
The 1991 Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context addressed transboundary impacts
on state parties12 and EC Directive 85/337 integrated the Espoo
Convention into EU law.13 In 2001, the Czech Republic ratified
the Espoo Convention and implemented the EC Directive under
the Czech legal Act No. 100/2001 Coll., on Environmental Impact
Assessment.14 According to Greenpeace, FSM has standing under
Czech Act No. 100/2001.15 The EC Directive indicates significant
effects on the environment “in another Member State.”16 However, section 11(1)(b) of the Czech Act defined “affected state” as
a state whose territory “can be affected by significant environmental impacts.”17 Greenpeace argues that, unlike the EU Directive,
the Czech Transboundary EIA section includes states that reside
outside the EU’s borders, which grants FSM standing to bring a
claim.18
FSM’s second claim is that the Prunéřov II lignite fueled power
plant violates the BAT19 required under the EU Integrated Pollution
Prevention and Control (“IPPC”) Directive 2008/1/EC and Czech
legal act No. 76/2002 Coll.20 In two 2005 press releases, CEZ indicated that it will “completely rebuild” the Prunéřov II plant.21 Then,
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in 2007, CEZ stated in a press release that the Prunéřov II plant
would undergo a “comprehensive reconstruction.”22 The classification of a plant as “new” or “existing” matters since the BAT under
the IPPC requires different levels of efficiency for each.23
The Directive established that BAT is required for installations like the Prunéřov II plant.24 The IPPC Reference Document
on Best Available Techniques (“BREF”) for Large Combustion
Plants emphasizes the importance of efficiency, which not only
results in the efficient use of natural fuel resources but also reduces
greenhouse gas emissions.25 The thermal efficiency established by
the Czech EIA estimates the proposed Prunéřov II lignite plant at
38%.26 With CEZ’s ongoing attempts to classify the plant as a retrofit, 27 a 38% efficiency falls within the range established by the
IPPC BREF for Large Combustion Plants.28 However, FSM states
that the Prunéřov II lignite plant is not a retrofit of an existing plant
but a “completely rebuil[t]” plant.29 Under the BREF BAT, a range
from 42%-45% thermal efficiency is required for a new PC lignite
plant.30 FSM notes in their request that the Czech government asked
CEZ to have a “new” power plant classification option reviewed
in the EIA, but that CEZ failed to comply with that request in the
EIA, even though it is required under both EU Directive and Czech
law.31
After this setback, on January 26, 2010, the Czech Environmental Minister Jan Dusík, unexpectedly announced that the government will request an independent international assessment of
the planned expansion of the Prunéřov II plant.32 The independent
assessment would review CEZ’s planned use of BAT on Prunéřov
II.33 The minister also announced that the government would now
classify the expansion as a “new” plant.34 However, the minister
did not address FSM’s concern that the EIA failed to consider and
assess the climate affects of Prunéřov II and all possible alternatives.35 Thus, although FSM has succeeded in preventing an
approval of the current EIA, it is unclear if FSM has standing to sue
and how the proposed independent assessment will review and rule
on the “new” Prunéřov II plant concerning BAT, climate change,
and possible alternatives.36

Endnotes: FSM vs. Czech: A New “Standing” for Climate
Change? continued on page 59
* Paulo A. Lopes is a J.D./M.P.P. Candidate, 2011, at American University
Washington College of Law and School of Public Affairs.
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Assessing Offset Quality in the Clean
Development Mechanism
by The Offset Quality Initiative*

T

Introduction

he Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), created
under the Kyoto Protocol, generates offsets through
investments in greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reduction,
avoidance, and sequestration projects in developing countries
(referred to as “non-Annex I Parties”). These offsets, called Certified Emission Reduction credits (“CERs”), are equivalent to a
reduction in one metric ton of carbon dioxide (“CO2”)1 emitted
to the atmosphere. Developed countries (referred to as “Annex
I Parties”) can use CERs to cost-effectively achieve their Kyoto
Protocol GHG reduction targets.
Over the past several years, the CDM has been subject to a
number of critiques, many of which call into question the program’s ability to generate high quality offsets. While the Offset Quality Initiative (“OQI”) neither endorses nor opposes the
CDM, this paper seeks to provide an impartial description of the
CDM and analyze its ability to ensure offset quality in the future.
Specifically, this paper analyzes the CDM through the prism of
the core criteria for offset quality outlined in OQI’s white paper
titled Ensuring Offset Quality: Integrating High Quality Greenhouse Gas Offsets Into North American Cap-and-Trade Policy.2
OQI considers the CDM process for addressing each criterion,
assesses whether the process is sufficient to ensure quality,
responds to related critiques of the CDM, and provides recommendations for improvement where appropriate.
Overall, OQI finds that the CDM’s processes perform sufficiently against most of our core offset quality criteria, and with
further refinement should be capable of performing sufficiently
against all criteria. The most significant quality issues in the
CDM historically have had to do with additionality and the reliability of independent third party verification. These issues are
common across all GHG offset programs and, in the case of the
CDM, can be addressed through streamlining and standardizing
the additionality tools and significantly restructuring the third
party verification system. On all other criteria, OQI finds that
the CDM, with some modification, can sufficiently ensure offset
quality.

Key Offset Quality Criteria
OQI’s “Offset Policy Design Principles and Recommendations”3 establishes a set of eight offset quality criteria. Offsets
should (1) be additional, (2) be based on a realistic baseline, (3)
be accurately quantified and monitored, (4) be independently
validated and verified, (5) be unambiguously owned, (6) address
leakage, (7) address permanence, and (8) do no net harm.
For each of these criteria, OQI has evaluated the CDM’s
performance, related critiques, and future ability to satisfy the
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criteria. The table at the end of this article summarizes the results
of this analysis.

OQI Criteria #1: Offsets Should Be Additional
Emission reductions resulting from offset projects should
be “in addition” to reductions that would have occurred without
the incentives provided by the existence of the offset program.
To determine if a project is “additional,” project developers,
auditors, and regulators generally rely on a series of tests, which
identify the regulatory, financial, technical, institutional, common practice, and/or other barriers to a project’s implementation.

CDM Process for Assuring Additionality
To ensure that offsets are additional, the CDM requires
project participants to apply three additionality tests:4 (1) a
Regulatory Test, (2) either a Barrier Test or an Investment Test,
and (3) a Common Practice Test. Project participants must apply
these tests on a project-by-project basis to assess the unique circumstances of each proposed activity.
The Regulatory Test identifies realistic and credible alternatives to the CDM project that are in compliance with all mandatory and enforceable legal and regulatory requirements, even
if those laws and regulations have objectives other than GHG
reductions. If the proposed project activity is the only viable
alternative, amongst all the practical alternatives that comply
with enforced regulations, then the proposed CDM project is not
additional.5
The Barrier Test examines whether there are hurdles preventing the project’s implementation in the absence of the CDM.
Barriers must be significant, realistic, credible, conservative, and
based on transparent and documented evidence. Examples could
* The Offset Quality Initiative consists of the following member organizations:
The Climate Trust, founded to manage a portfolio of compliance-grade carbon
projects as a result of Oregon’s leadership in passing the nation’s first legislation to limit carbon dioxide emissions, spearheads and leads the Offset Quality
Initiative; The Pew Center on Global Climate Change, established in 1998 as
a nonprofit, nonpartisan, and independent organization dedicated to providing
credible information, straight answers, and innovative solutions in the effort to
address global climate change; The Climate Action Reserve, a private nonprofit
organization addressing climate change and bringing together participants from
the government, environment and business sectors, directs the California Climate Action Registry, Climate Action Reserve and Center for Climate Action;
The Environmental Resource Trust, co-founder of the American Carbon Registry, which in 2008 was the most widely used voluntary carbon market registry in the world; Greenhouse Gas Management Institute, a registered nonprofit
organization, trains, certifies, and networks a global community of experts that
account, audit and manage GHG emissions based on world-class training and
professional standards; and The Climate Group, an independent nonprofit organization that works with government and business leaders to accelerate the
transition to a low-carbon economy, founded in 2004 with offices in the United
Kingdom, the United States, China, India, and Australia.
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include barriers related to securing investment or risk associated with unfamiliar technology.6 These same barriers must not
affect, or must affect less strongly, reasonable alternatives to the
project activity.
The Investment Test determines whether a CDM project
would occur without offset revenue. In the CDM, project participants typically make investment-related additionality arguments based on the internal rate of return (“IRR”) of a project,
both with and without CER income. If the project activity generates no revenue aside from the sale of CERs, then the project
participant applies a simple cost analysis to document project
costs and to demonstrate that there is at least one less expensive alternative to the project activity. If the activity does generate revenue in addition to CER sales, the project participant
must apply either (1) an investment
comparison analysis, which uses
a project-appropriate financial
indicator to compare the project’s performance to alternative
activities; or (2) a benchmark
analysis, which compares a standardized market indicator to the
CDM activity. If either analysis
indicates that there is a more
financially attractive option than
undertaking the CDM project,
the project passes this test. A
Sensitivity Test is also required
to ensure that the analytical
assumptions used are robust.7
Finally, the Common Practice Test measures the sectoral
and/or regional penetration of
the proposed CDM activity
(i.e., technology or practice). If
activities similar to the CDM
project activity are common, the
project participant must demonstrate that the project-specific circumstances are somehow unique; otherwise, the project is not
additional.8
If a project fails any of these tests (i.e., it is legally required,
is the most economically attractive approach and/or barrier-free,
or is common practice) the project is not additional and cannot
generate offsets under the CDM.9

cited Schneider’s paper widely for its assertion that up to twenty
percent of CERs—representing forty percent of CDM projects—may have been non-additional.11 Schneider’s paper also
argued that the additionality guidance provided under the CDM
with respect to barriers, investment, and common practice tests
was too subjective and/or insufficiently specific.12
The 2008 paper by Stanford University Professors Michael
Wara and David Victor titled A Realistic Policy on International
Carbon Offsets is another notable critique of the CDM’s ability to ensure project additionality.13 Wara and Victor largely
focused their criticism on the applications for CERs made by
nearly all new Chinese renewable energy capacity at the time,
despite the Chinese government’s national policy goals that
focused on increasing investment in renewable energy.14 The
implication of their argument was
that it would have been impossible for all these projects to
meet the CDM’s additionality test, since at least some of
the renewable energy capacity brought online at the time
must have been attributable to
China’s energy policy, not the
CDM.15 They claimed that if
the CDM’s additionality tests
could not sift out the additional
from non-additional projects in
this example, then they could
not sufficiently ensure offset
quality.16
Wara and Victor also criticized the concept of offsets
in general by asserting that
increasingly burdensome tests
would be required to sufficiently ensure additionality to an
acceptable level of offset quality,
and that such stringency would make the CDM too cumbersome
to function effectively.17 Ultimately, they declared that “enthusiasm [for offsets] is misplaced because any offset market of sufficient scale to provide substantial cost-control for a cap-and-trade
program will involve substantial issuance of credits that do not
represent real emissions reductions.”18

Critique: The CDM Does Not Adequately Ensure
Additionality

Finding(s): OQI finds that there have been valid concerns
about the efficacy of both the design and implementation of the
CDM’s measures to ensure additionality. However, the recent
rejection of a number of proposed Chinese renewable energy
CDM projects by the Executive Board (“EB”) (the body responsible for oversight of the CDM) on additionality grounds indicates that CDM executive leadership and staff have begun to
address at least some of the aforementioned quality critiques.
Furthermore, OQI believes that issues cited in the past concerning CDM additionality determinations are neither endemic

Overall, OQI finds that
the CDM’s processes
perform sufficiently
against most of our core
offset quality criteria, and
with further refinement
should be capable of
performing sufficiently
against all criteria.

A number of past critiques have questioned the effectiveness of these tests, or at least the consistency and adequacy of
their application by regulators. Of these, perhaps the most well
known critique was the November 2007 paper written by Lambert Schneider on behalf of the World Wildlife Fund, titled Is
the CDM Fulfilling its Environmental and Sustainable Development Objectives? An Evaluation of the CDM and Options for
Improvement.10 The media, academic literature, and trade press
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nor irreparable. Improvements in the past few years include
the introduction of both the Registration and Issuance Teams
(“RITs”) and additional secretariat staff that provide multiple
layers of project review, summarize submissions, and make
recommendations, all of which facilitate the CDM Executive
Board’s review and decision making process. The Executive
Board review and rejection rate for projects has increased significantly over the past two years.19 As the Executive Board
undertakes reforms to incorporate more objective, standardized criteria into additionality determinations, it will be possible
to create a program that both ensures offset quality and is not
overly burdensome or administratively complex.
Recommendation(s): Broadly speaking, CDM projects fall
into one of two categories, which largely dictate how difficult it
is to assess their additionality. For projects where CDM is the
sole or primary source of revenue, additionality is less challenging to determine because there are no other expected economic
incentives for the project besides the CDM.
Projects with multiple revenue streams are more challenging. For this category, the CDM could improve by implementing a more rigorous and standardized approach for determining
additionality, consistent with the recommendations made by
Lambert Schneider.
Standardized approaches determine additionality based on
a set of objective eligibility criteria, which consider the regulatory, financial, institutional, and technical conditions for a particular project type. Generally, standardized approaches involve
the establishment of performance benchmarks for both additionality and baselines. However, while a more standardized
approach to additionality can also help to promote offset quality, an entirely standardized approach would be challenging, if
not impossible, because of the diversity of developing country
contexts. Therefore, “hybrid” additionality assessments, which
combine elements of the current tests-based approach with more
project-type-specific standardized criteria, can help balance the
strengths and weaknesses of these respective processes. As the
CDM grows to meet increased global demand for international
offsets, a hybrid approach to additionality can help streamline the project cycle, increasing efficiency while maintaining
quality.
Providing more detailed guidance to both project participants and independent third party project auditors (referred to
as “Designated Operational Entities,” or “DOEs”) about how
to determine additionality for each project type, and providing
standardized investment and analysis tools, will improve the
quality of the CDM while also reducing transaction costs and
administrative burden. As the first large-scale GHG offset program in the world, the CDM is already incorporating some of
these recommendations as program administrators and participants learn through experience.

OQI Criteria #2: Offsets Should Be Based on a
Realistic Baseline
High quality offsets should be measured against a realistic baseline in order to achieve a transparent and conservative
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estimation of a project’s GHG emission reduction, avoidance,
and/or removal. A baseline is an estimate of the GHG emissions
that would occur in the absence of the offset project. Whereas
additionality involves demonstrating that a project activity
would not have occurred in the absence of the CDM, baselines
establish the plausible GHG emissions scenario without the
project.

CDM Process for Establishing Baselines
Under the CDM, project participants establish baselines
according to guidelines set forth in an approved project methodology. A methodology defines the likely emissions sources and
sinks in the absence of a project. The CDM specifies the following three approaches for establishing baselines:
1. Determining that the most likely activity in the
absence of the project would be continuance of the
existing activity.
2. Determining if an economically attractive alternative
exists that is neither the existing activity nor the CDM
project. In this case, the emissions associated with the
most economically attractive alternative to the CDM
project would constitute the baseline.
3. In the absence of a clear economically attractive
alternative, the baseline is based on the average
emissions of other commonly implemented and high
performing projects in the sector. Projects must have
been undertaken in the past five years and have similar
geographic, economic, environmental, political, social,
and other characteristics.20
For example, the baseline scenario for a CDM project that
proposes to capture and flare landfill gas might involve a plausible expectation that the landfill owner would normally take no
action to reduce or capture methane at the site.21 In this case,
baseline emissions would equal the amount of methane released
from the site without any gas capture. However, this is a fairly
straightforward example and it is possible that a given project
will have multiple plausible baseline scenarios from which the
project participant must choose.

Critique: CDM Project-by-Project Baseline
Determinations Are Administratively Burdensome
Some market participants believe the CDM’s approach to
baseline determination is inadequately streamlined and deem
the process to be overly burdensome. Project participants have
argued that a more efficient alternative approach would be to
establish generic benchmarks or default emission factors for particular project types, which would allow for streamlined estimation of baseline emissions.
Recently, the CDM has begun to address this concern by
moving away from project-specific baseline scenarios, towards
a hybrid approach that combines both project-specific and
standardized evaluations. For example, the Executive Board
approved a methodology in 2008 for the manufacture of energyefficient refrigerators, which takes a benchmarked approach
to establishing project baselines. As opposed to other methodologies that would require direct measurement of energy
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consumption, this methodology (“AM0070”) sets the baseline as
the manufacturing of “refrigerators with the specific electricity
consumption corresponding to the calculated benchmark for the
respective storage volume class.”22 In other words, the methodology provides a standardized baseline with a default factor for
calculating the energy savings of various refrigeration devices.
A degree of standardization is also underway for renewable
energy and energy efficiency projects, through the compilation
of standard baseline emission factors for electricity grids in several developing countries, such as India and South Africa.

OQI Findings & Recommendations
Finding(s): OQI finds that the CDM’s approach to baseline establishment is generally sufficient to ensure offset quality,
although a transition towards more standardized, benchmarked
baselines, where appropriate, could help increase administrative
efficiency. At the same time, OQI acknowledges that developing benchmark baselines requires a significant amount of data,
research, and work, particularly to ensure that they are current,
as well as contextually and regionally appropriate.
Recommendation(s): Standardization of baselines through
benchmarking for some types of projects may be appropriate
and more efficient in the CDM moving forward. The CDM trend
towards benchmarking baselines—as in the case of the AM0070
with efficient refrigerators—can streamline the project development process and reduce transaction costs and investor risk.
Similar to additionality, standardized baselines are not
appropriate for activities and/or regions with heterogeneous
characteristics that make accurate generalization difficult. Disadvantages to standardized baselines can include the significant
time and cost associated with developing rigorous benchmarks
across a broad range of project types, limits to the amount of
appropriate project types, and difficulties in accounting for different technological and market conditions across regions and
regulatory systems. In other words, while standardized baseline
scenarios may be appropriate in certain countries or sectors and
for certain project types, they may be inappropriate for those
with substantial project-specific considerations.

Offset Criteria #3: Offsets Should Be Accurately
Quantified & Monitored
Offsets should be accurately quantified and monitored to
ensure that only real, high-quality emission reductions receive
credits. To achieve accuracy, projects should have monitoring
plans that define how, when, and by whom data will be collected
and emissions quantified, using established standards.

CDM Process for Offset Quantification and
Monitoring
The CDM requires that an approved monitoring plan
for each project be included in its Project Design Document
(“PDD”).23 CDM methodologies lay out detailed rules and guidance on quantification and monitoring requirements for each
project type. Each project’s monitoring plan must specify monitoring and quality control procedures, necessary data for collection, measurement accuracy and calibration procedures, the type
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of measurement instruments, and who is responsible for monitoring. Plans must also address the monitoring of leakage and
be available to the public online.24 Prior to project registration,
independent auditors must validate monitoring plans.

Critique
In certain instances, there have been individual technical
issues or other problems with methodologies. However, revisions to methodologies have corrected these issues and, broadly
speaking, there have been no significant critiques of the CDM’s
ability to ensure quality offset quantification and monitoring, to
date.

OQI Findings & Recommendations
Finding(s): OQI finds that the CDM has strict criteria for
emission quantification and monitoring that sufficiently ensures
offset quality. Indeed, the CDM has served as a model for emissions quantification and monitoring procedures in subsequent
GHG offset programs and standards.
Recommendation(s): The CDM has a strong existing library of methodologies that include accepted monitoring and quantification formulas, and that have preceded most
other regional and international standards. In certain instances,
requiring the application of internationally recognized technical
standards to CDM monitoring plans could support greater standardization of data across projects and project types. Explicit
references to these standards also will give project participants
and auditors greater clarity on the requirements for project
implementation.

Offset Criteria #4: Offsets Should Be
Independently Validated & Verified
An independent and qualified third party, free from conflicts of interest, should audit (i.e., validate projects or verify
project performance) all offset projects to ensure accuracy and
impartiality. To avoid conflicts of interest, auditor compensation
should not depend on whether the project receives CER credits.
Regulatory offset systems should have accredited auditors and
procedures in place to review and re-accredit, suspend, or disqualify audit organizations on an ongoing basis.

CDM Process for Offset Validation and Verification
Independent third party auditors in the CDM are called Designated Operational Entities (“DOEs”) and are accredited by the
CDM Executive Board based on criteria relating largely to size,
technical competency, and management ability. DOEs are subject to random spot-checks and periodic review by the Executive
Board, and substandard work can lead to fines, suspension, or
revocation of a DOE’s accreditation.25
An independent auditor must validate the PDD (i.e., project validation) prior to registration of the project by the CDM.
Prior to CER issuance by the CDM, an independent auditor must
verify the emission reductions based on ex post data on project performance. Project participants contract DOEs to perform
these audits, and pay the DOEs for services directly. The use of
different DOEs26 at the validation and verification stages in the
28

project cycle is intended to ensure that the second audit is not
biased by findings of the earlier audit.27

Critique: Some Independent Third Party Verifiers
(DOEs) Have Not Sufficiently Evaluated, Validated,
and Verified Projects to Date
Some third party verifiers under the CDM have been criticized for a lack of capacity and competency to undertake the
level of quality checks required to ensure offset quality. In addition, because DOEs compete with one another for business, there
has been concern that they could be driven to lower the quality
of their audits to remain competitive and profitable. Questions
surrounding potential conflicts of interest for DOEs also exist,
because project participants hire and then pay DOEs themselves.
One example of the issues surrounding third party verification emerged in November 2008, when the largest CDM project
auditor, Norway’s Det Norske Veritas (“DNV”), had its accreditation suspended by the Executive Board for five alleged nonconformities related to its validation and verification practices.28
The suspension meant that DNV could not submit projects for
registration or request issuance of CERs for clients. At least in
part, the suspension reflected a move by the Executive Board to
tighten rules and ensure that CDM projects meet more stringent
offset quality standards. A second verifier suspension, this time
of the firm SGS United Kingdom Limited (“SGS”), signifies
continued vigilance by the Executive Board.

OQI Findings & Recommendations
Finding(s): DNV’s suspension and later reinstatement, as
well as SGS’ recent suspension, indicate that procedures for
spot-checks and periodic evaluation as well as oversight of
DOEs by the Executive Board is improving. However, more
training, guidance, experience, and the development of standardized protocols for auditing are needed, as well as consensus
on what constitutes validation and/or verification best practices.
Some progress has been made in this regard, with the adoption
of the Validation and Verification Manual (“VVM”) by the
CDM Executive Board in 2008.29
Recommendation(s): Significant reforms are needed to
better train DOE staff, to align the incentive structures of third
party validation and verification, and to ensure greater oversight
of DOEs by the Executive Board.
Individuals employed by DOEs should be required to meet
a minimum level of training, modeled after the existing training
program for Expert Review Team members that review national
inventories submitted under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. To be
on a verification team, individual auditors should have to complete this training and pass an exam, supplementing this training
with their own training on internal systems and procedures.
To align incentives and avoid potential conflicts of interest,
a neutral party could assign DOEs to projects instead of project
participants hiring DOEs themselves. For example, the Executive Board could assign DOEs, operating under a predetermined
fee structure, to projects.
29

In addition, the ability of the CDM Accreditation Panel
(which oversees DOEs) to assess whether DOEs have the capacity and competency to justify accreditation could be strengthened
through mandatory training and testing for Accreditation Panel
members and support personnel. To accomplish this, employees
must be specifically hired and trained to achieve this goal.
Finally, continual updates and improvements to the Validation and Verification Manual are essential to ensure that DOEs,
project participants, and the Executive Board have a clear understanding of the materiality of each requirement to the quality of
a project’s validation and verification.30

Offset Criteria #5: Offsets Should Be
Unambiguously Owned
Offsets should have a single owner with clear rights to the
credits so that the emission reductions they represent are not
claimed twice. “Double-counting” can be further prevented by
ensuring credits are serialized and accounted for in a registry
where transfer of ownership can be clearly documented.

CDM Process for Ensuring Unambiguous Ownership
Before any offset project activity can move forward, the
Designated National Authority (“DNA”)31 of the host country
must approve the project on behalf of that nation’s sovereign
government. The DNA is thereby responsible for assigning
unambiguous ownership rights to emission reduction credits to
project participants.
Furthermore, all CDM credits have individual serial numbers and a UN registry that meets international best practice
standards for accounting and transactions, like those used in
financial banking systems. The registry uses unique account
numbers for all participants, and participants may hold each
CER in one account at a time. Information in the registry is publicly available on the Internet.32

Critique
No significant critiques exist to date on the CDM’s ability to
ensure unambiguous ownership.

OQI Findings & Recommendations
Finding(s): OQI finds that the CDM is generally sufficient
to ensure that offset credits are unambiguously owned. In particular, because the CDM gives developing countries the ultimate
power to approve offset issuance, the system is structured to
respect domestic sovereignty and ensure clear ownership under
domestic law, while simultaneously ensuring that international
ownership transactions are clear and credible. Furthermore, the
serialization and registry accounting system promotes unambiguous ownership by allowing credit transfers and retirements in a
transparent fashion.
Recommendation(s): Requiring host country recognition
of CER ownership creates a robust mechanism for establishing unambiguous credit ownership and for prevention of double-counting. Improving national-level governance structures
through training and capacity-building would help DNAs do an
even better job of avoiding any ambiguous ownership issues that
may occur in the future.
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Offset Criteria #6: Offsets Should Address
Leakage
Leakage is an increase in emissions outside of an offset
project’s boundaries that occurs as a direct result of the project’s
implementation. To account for leakage, methodologies should
define a “project boundary” which specifies the GHG sources
and sinks for which project participants are responsible. Methodologies also should explain how the project will quantify any
significant changes in emissions outside the project boundary.
Offset programs should require that project participants evaluate
potential leakage effects, and that monitoring plans account for
actual effects over the life of a project.

credits that expire at a predetermined time. Once a credit expires,
the owner must replace it with another valid credit or emission
allowance unit.34 For example, if a country uses a reforestation
credit to comply with its obligations under the Kyoto protocol
in 2010 and the credit expires in 2020, the country will have
to submit a replacement credit or allowance in 2020 to remain
in compliance with its 2010 obligations. A significant disadvantage of temporary crediting is that it treats all forestry carbon
as short-lived, even where reversals may not have occurred.
The result is increased financial risk and uncertainty for buyers,
which creates a disincentive for project participants to invest in
forestry projects.

CDM Process for Addressing Leakage

Critique

In general, project participants must either demonstrate that
leakage is unlikely to occur, or monitor and quantify unavoidable leakage and deduct it from the total credited emission reductions by using procedures and formulas prescribed by the project
methodology. For example, projects that use wood waste instead
of fossil fuel in thermal boilers can cause leakage if wood waste
is in short supply, and other local wood-fired boilers switch back
to fossil fuels. The CDM methodology (“AM-0036”) for this
kind of project requires project participants to demonstrate that
wood waste is abundant. If such a demonstration is not possible,
project participants must calculate the increase in fossil fuel
emissions likely to occur at other boilers as a result, and must
deduct this from the total creditable reductions.33

No significant critiques exist to date on the CDM’s ability to
ensure permanence. However, critiques do exist about the efficacy of temporary crediting with respect to promoting investment in carbon sequestration projects.

Critique
No significant critiques exist to date on the CDM’s ability
to address leakage.

OQI Findings & Recommendations
Finding(s): OQI finds that the CDM has methodologies that
estimate leakage conservatively for most project types, and its
approach to addressing leakage is generally sufficient to ensure
offset quality.
Recommendation(s): OQI recommends that the CDM
continue to use a conservative approach in identifying and mitigating leakage issues, that it require all project types to address
leakage, and that it provide methodological guidelines for estimating leakage at a level commensurate with the project type’s
complexity and risk.

Offset Criteria #7: Offsets Should Address
Permanence
For certain project types, there is a risk that emission reductions generated are subject to reversal, and therefore could fail to
offset emissions permanently. For example, a forest fire, weather
event, or pest attack could release into the atmosphere carbon
stored by a forestry project. Therefore, regulatory regimes
should address permanence to ensure the minimization of loss in
the event of a reversal.

CDM Process for Addressing Permanence
In the case of afforestation/reforestation (“AR”) projects,
the CDM addresses permanence concerns by issuing temporary
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OQI Findings & Recommendations
Finding(s): OQI finds that, while temporary crediting is
sufficient to ensure offset quality, the CDM’s current approach
may be overly conservative, as it creates investor uncertainty
and has led to minimal investments in forestry projects under the
CDM to date.
Recommendation(s): OQI recommends investigating
alternate ways to address permanence. For example, policy
mechanisms that address reversal risk could provide more market certainty than temporary crediting mechanisms. Some GHG
programs in voluntary and pre-compliance markets are exploring and testing buffer pools and the use of insurance and other
financial products as alternatives to temporary crediting. Buffer
pools, for instance, address reversal risk by evaluating the risk
profile of a project, and then requiring project participants to set
aside a portion of the offsets, based on the results of applying
a methodology to determine risk and buffer size, into a shared
buffer pool. In the event of a reversal, project participants use
credits from this pool to account for negated sequestered tons.
As another example, insurance products work much like other
traditional types of insurance, addressing risk by making the
project whole by guaranteeing a replacement price for offsets
equivalent to the loss. Although applying these mechanisms in
many developing countries may be challenging, from a market
and investment perspective they could provide a more efficient,
certain, and cost-effective approach than temporary crediting.

Offset Criteria #8: Offset Projects Should Do No
Net Harm
Offset projects should not cause or contribute to adverse
effects on human health or the environment, and should seek
to provide health and environmental co-benefits whenever
possible.

CDM Process for Ensuring No Net Harm
To ensure that offset projects do no net harm, the CDM
requires project participants to sponsor a stakeholder consultation
process during the project design phase. During the consultation
30

process, submissions of public comments on the project activity
must be solicited, and in-person stakeholder meetings must be
held in the local community.35 Project participants are required
to undertake good faith efforts to publicize the event and make
materials available in the language of local constituents. The
PDD must include a summary of any stakeholder comments
received during the public comment period and describe any
anticipated environmental, economic, and/or social impacts. The
project must then be approved by the host country government
and be found consistent with its sustainable development goals,
as well as environmental and other regulations.36

Critique: CDM Projects Sometimes Cause Local
Environmental and/or Social Harm, and/or Fail to
Promote Sustainable Development
A small number of CDM projects have come under criticism
for causing local environmental or social harm. For example,
a number of environmental non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”) including International Rivers, the Center for Biological Diversity (“CBD”), and the Natural Resources Defense
Council (“NRDC”) submitted comments to oppose the validation
of a hydroelectric project in Panama sponsored by AES Corporation. The NGOs claimed the project would have threatened a
biologically rich World Heritage Site and the indigenous Ngobe
tribe.37
Another related critique frequently levied against the CDM
is that it has failed to meet one of its primary objectives: to assist
developing countries in achieving sustainable development.
While failing to promote sustainable development is not necessarily equivalent to doing net harm, it is worth mentioning in this
paper because of the prevalence of this criticism in debates over
the CDM to date.
According to Schneider:
The actual impact of CDM projects on sustainable
development is difficult to assess because it depends
on the definition of sustainable development which is
defined by most countries in very broad terms. Many
countries have established and published criteria to
assess whether a project contributes to sustainable
development. However, they are often very general
. . . [F]ew [projects] comply with criteria that are related
to the achievement of the Millennium Development
Goals. For example, many CDM projects, directly or
indirectly, reduce air pollution or contribute to the diffusion of environmentally sound technologies, whereas
only very few projects directly contribute to poverty
alleviation.38

OQI Findings & Recommendations
Finding(s): OQI finds that the CDM’s approach to preventing net harm is generally sufficient to ensure offset quality by
creating opportunities for public participation and giving host
countries recourse to reject projects if they fail to consider and
incorporate stakeholder concerns and sustainable development
goals. However, OQI acknowledges that ensuring absolute no
net harm of all offset projects is difficult, since in all cases some
31

trade-offs are likely to exist. For example, a landfill gas capture
system may reduce a number of trace pollutants that can cause
unpleasant odor and smog due to ground-level ozone. However,
it may also displace impoverished people who rely on scavenging the landfill as the basis of their livelihood.
On the question of whether the CDM sufficiently contributes
to sustainable development, OQI generally concurs with Lambert
Schneider that such a determination is difficult to make because
definitions of sustainable development differ significantly
between countries, and are often broad, vague, or multifarious.
Recommendation(s): The CDM Executive Board should
continue to work towards ensuring that offset projects do no
net harm. Programs to engage and educate local stakeholders
so they understand the purpose and impacts of offset projects
will improve the CDM’s ability to prevent net harm. Improving
national-level governance structures, through training and capacity-building, would further help DNAs develop and apply their
own sustainable development criteria and evaluation processes.

Conclusion
OQI finds that, with some improvements, the CDM can provide an acceptable assurance of project additionality and baselines. Recent trends towards standardization and benchmarking
of both additionality and baselines should continue to improve
quality. It is important to note that while standardized approaches
are often advocated in principle, in reality some project types are
less amenable to standardization, and variations across regions
and contexts require consideration and flexibility. OQI notes
that expert judgment will remain an important complement to
standardized approaches.
There are still challenges to address and further improvements to make. Project-by-project additionality determinations
remain administratively burdensome and susceptible to subjectivity and inconsistency; as such, movement towards a hybrid
approach would help streamline the process and increase efficiency while maintaining quality. Significant improvements to
the third party verification process are needed, and potential
conflicts of interest could be minimized if DOEs are not selected
by project participants. New policy mechanisms that address
reversal risk can ensure permanence without constraining the
market.
On the whole, based on the assessment criteria established in
Ensuring Offset Quality: Integrating High Quality Greenhouse
Gas Offsets Into North American Cap-and-Trade Policy,39 OQI
finds that the CDM is generally able to ensure sufficient offset
quality. As our recommendations continue to be addressed, particularly those regarding additionality determination and third
party validation/verification, the CDM could provide quality
international offset credits for use in a future U.S. cap-and-trade
program.
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APPENDIX 1: The CDM Project Cycle
The CDM process involves two stages: project design and project implementation. The CDM requires a number of documents at
various points in both stages to demonstrate that a project meets the CDM’s requirements.

Stage I: Project Design

Stage I begins with the project planning phase, where project participants prepare a document describing the project, and
get written approval from each country involved.40 Among other
things, the written approval must show that the CDM project
supports the host country’s sustainable development goals.
In the project document preparation phase, project participants complete a Project Design Document (“PDD”). The PDD
is a comprehensive document that explains how the project meets
the CDM’s additionality tests for the activity in question. The
PDD also describes the project’s geographic boundary, how the
GHG reductions will be monitored and estimated, and the period
of time the project participant seeks to receive credits.41 Further, the PDD summarizes any stakeholder comments received
during the public comment period, describes any anticipated
environmental, economic, and/or social impacts, and shows the
average annual reductions and total CER volume expected over
the project’s creditable lifetime. In general, project participants
develop projects according to standardized project “methodologies,” or blueprints, which the CDM Executive Board approves.
These methodologies outline the steps for undertaking a variety
of creditable GHG reducing activities.
Before the project can be officially “registered” by the
Executive Board (“EB”), an independent third party auditor,
called a Designated Operational Entity (“DOE”),42 must review
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Stage II: Project Implementation

the project activity and documentation against the requirements
of the CDM. The DOE checks all information in the PDD to
ensure transparency and rigor in data, calculations, and additionality arguments, and may come back to the project participant
with requests for clarifications. The DOE also conducts a site
visit to the project to ground-truth the project documentation,
and if they find that the project meets all established requirements, they submit a validation report to the EB, which may register or reject the project, or request clarifications if necessary.
Once the EB registers the project, the implementation stage
begins with the monitoring phase. Project participants must collect and analyze data from the project, according to standardized procedures established in the project’s methodology. The
project participant must continually monitor the project over its
creditable lifetime and calculate the GHG reductions the project
has achieved to successfully receive CER credits.
In the verification and certification phase, project participants again retain a DOE, this time to verify the project’s GHG
reductions as documented by the data acquired during the project monitoring process. Once the DOE reviews and verifies the
data, they submit paperwork certifying the accuracy of the GHG
reductions to the EB, and request issuance of CER credits to the
project participant.

32
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Offsets Should Be
Transparent/
Based on a Realistic conservative
Baseline
project-specific
assessment

2.

Inadequately
streamlined;
administratively
burdensome

Does not ensure offset
quality
· Additionality
guidance too
subjective and
vague; applied
inconsistently  

Regulatory, Barrier
or Investment, and
Common Practice
Tests

Offsets Should Be
Additional

CRITIQUES OF CDM

CDM
PROCESS

1.

OQI Quality
Offset Criteria

OQI RECOMMENDATIONS

Generally sufficient to ensure offset quality
· Administrative burden is being reduced where
possible, but more streamlining is necessary
· Development of benchmark baselines requires
a significant amount of data, research, and
work to ensure they are current as well as
contextually and regionally appropriate

Benchmark baselines in appropriate sectors
· Transitioning towards more standardized,
benchmarked baselines, where appropriate,
would streamline project development and
promote administrative efficiency

Processes for determining additionality in
Streamline existing process, standardize tools,
projects where there are multiple revenue streams provide more detailed guidance
should be improved
· For projects with multiple revenue streams,
· Valid concerns exist about the design and
implement a more rigorous and standardized
implementation of measures to ensure
approach to determining additionality
additionality
· For all projects, provide more detailed
· Recent rejection of certain project types
guidance to project participants and
indicate improvement in implementing these
independent third party project auditors
measures
· Provide standardized investment and analysis
· It is possible to modify the CDM so that it
tools
ensures sufficient offset quality, while not also · Develop “hybrid” additionality assessments,
being overly burdensome or administratively
which combine elements of the current
complex
tests-based approach with more project-type· It is easier to determine additionality where
specific benchmarks, to help balance the
CDM is the sole/primary source of revenue to
strengths and weaknesses of the standardized
the project
processes recommended above
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Table 1: Summary of Analysis Results
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Offsets Should
Be Accurately
Quantified &
Monitored

Offsets Should
Be Independently
Validated &
Verified

3.

4.

OQI Quality
Offset Criteria

Validation and verification processes should be
significantly restructured to ensure offset quality
· Procedures for spot checks and periodic
evaluation have been taken seriously and
oversight of DOEs by the CDM Executive
Board (“EB”) is progressing, but still needs
improvement
· Standardized protocols on the practice
of auditing are needed. Adoption of the
Validation and Verification Manual (“VVM”)
marks progress in this regard

To date, DOEs have
not sufficiently audited
projects due to:
· Lack of capacity
· Conflicts of interest
· Competition

Independent third
party auditors
called Designated
Operational
Entities (“DOEs”)
are contracted to
validate and verify
all projects

OQI FINDINGS

Generally sufficient to ensure offset quality but
could be improved
· CDM has strict criteria for emission
quantification and monitoring
· The CDM predates, and has served as a model
for, emission quantification and monitoring
under other offset programs

CRITIQUES OF
CDM

Monitoring plan
No significant critiques
must be included
in Project Design
Document (“PDD”)

CDM
PROCESS

Align incentive structure, improve training for
auditors, and improve Executive Board oversight
· Require a mandatory training and testing
program for individuals employed by DOEs
· Auditors could be assigned to projects
instead of selected and contracted by project
participants
· Train and test DOE accreditation assessors
before they evaluate the capabilities of an
audit organization
· Enhance resources for DOE oversight under
the CDM
· Continual updates and improvements to
the VVM are essential to ensure DOEs,
project participants, and the CDM Executive
Board have a clear understanding of what is
material to the quality of PDD validation and
verification

In certain instances, monitoring could be
improved by requiring application of recognized
technical standards to CDM monitoring plans
· Monitoring and quantification requirements
must retain some degree of flexibility and
diversity across different methodologies
· In certain instances, requiring the application
of internationally recognized technical
standards to CDM monitoring plans could
improve data quality
· Explicit references to recognized technical
specifications and standards will also reduce
ambiguity for project participants and
auditors

OQI RECOMMENDATIONS
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Offsets Should
Address
Permanence

7.

Offsets Should Do
No Net Harm

Offsets Should
Address Leakage

6.

8.

Offsets Should Be
Unambiguously
Owned

5.

OQI Quality
Offset Criteria

No significant critiques

“Temporary”
designation creates
investment uncertainty

Project boundary,
description, and
monitoring of
potential leakage
required in PDD
and deducted from
issuable credits

Temporary
credits issued
for afforestation/
reforestation
(“AR”) projects

Some projects
do harm; not all
projects contribute
to CDM goal of
promoting sustainable
development

No significant critiques

Serialization on
registry; offset tons
issued approved
by Designated
National Authority
(“DNA”), i.e., the
host country

Required public
comment period;
description
of potential
environmental/
economic/social
impacts in PDD

CRITIQUES OF
CDM

CDM
PROCESS

Explore possible alternative approaches to
address reversal risk
· Decrease use of temporary crediting to
encourage investment in forestry projects
· Allow for a range of policy mechanisms
(e.g., pooled risk in a buffer account, project
insurance) to address reversal risk, which
will help promote greater certainty and avoid
constraining the market

Continue to use conservative approach in
estimating leakage

Improve national level governance structures
through training and capacity-building to help
DNAs do an even better job of addressing any
ambiguous ownership issues that may occur

OQI RECOMMENDATIONS

Various approaches exist to ensure more
Generally sufficient to ensure offset quality
· Trade-offs mean achieving 100% no net harm projects contribute to sustainable development
· Improve national-level governance structures
is difficult in practice
through training and capacity-building to
· National sustainable development goals can be
help DNAs develop their own sustainable
varied and/or vague
development criteria and evaluation processes
· It is difficult to determine whether CDM
· Educate local stakeholders to promote
sufficiently contributes to sustainable
empowerment and understanding of offset
development
projects
· Provide clearer guidance on how to meet
sustainable development requirements

Generally sufficient to ensure offset quality, but
possibly too stringent
· Temporary nature of credits discourages
investment in forestry projects

Generally sufficient to ensure offset quality but
could be improved
· Methodologies to estimate leakage are
conservative for most project types

Generally sufficient to ensure quality
· The system is structured to respect domestic
sovereignty and ensure clear ownership under
domestic law, while simultaneously ensuring
that international ownership transactions are
clear and credible
· Serialization and a registry accounting system
promote unambiguous ownership by allowing
credits to be transferred and retired in a
transparent fashion
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Endnotes: Assessing Offset Quality in the Clean Development
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Climate Change and the Regional Human
Rights Systems
by Megan S. Chapman*

I

n last year’s Climate Law Reporter, Staff Writer Anne Parsons laid out the fundamental case for using a human rights
framework to shift the burden for protecting individuals from
the negative impacts of climate change to the state.1 The impetus
for that piece was the UN Human Rights Commission’s adoption
of Resolution 7/23.2 In the last year, with the flurry of preparation
for the December 2009 round of UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change negotiations in Copenhagen (“UNFCCC COP15”), a number of institutions have joined the call for developing
the nexus between human rights and climate change.3 The nexus
is meaningful because demonstrating climate change’s numerous
negative impacts on human rights, particularly for already vulnerable populations, is a way of measuring the harm.4 It is also meaningful because it connects this harm to obligations which the state
has already undertaken.5 Thus, it reveals the potential for using
developing supranational human rights legal systems to impose
a duty on states to prevent further climate change and protect
individuals from its negative impacts.6 This piece aims to briefly
explore this latter angle on the human rights-climate change nexus:
the likelihood that international human rights bodies, particularly
the regional human rights systems, will in the foreseeable future
hold states accountable for climate change.
International environmental law and climate change negotiations tend to be based on notions of state-to-state consensus and
cooperation.7 However, there is nothing like the build-up of hopes
and ultimate disappointment of the most recent UNFCCC COP15 negotiations8 to leave individuals wishing for some club to
hold over the heads of states. Aside from democratic processes or
domestic legal remedies, where they exist, regional human rights
systems may offer the best forum for individuals to confront states
that fail to come to consensus or otherwise take steps to combat
climate change.
This is not to say that regional human rights systems have
been perfected. The European Court of Human Rights, the InterAmerican Court of and Commission on Human Rights, and the
African Commission on and newly operational Court of Human
and Peoples’ Rights each face their own challenges: certain states
that accept only limited jurisdiction or no jurisdiction at all;9
absence of regional enforcement mechanisms other than diplomatic or political pressure;10 and consequent reliance on states
for compliance with recommendations and execution of binding
judgments. Nevertheless, each regional system has developed a
mechanism by which individuals may bring complaints against
states for failing to respect, protect, or fulfill regionally guaranteed
human rights.11
In evaluating the potential fate of a petition based on human
rights violations resulting from climate change, each of the three
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established systems has its own strengths. Unlike the foundational documents of the other two systems, the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights actually recognizes a right to environment.12 Moreover, the African Commission on Human and
Peoples Rights (“ACHPR”) has entertained petitions based on violations of this right and found states in violation of their associated
obligations.13 In a resolution on human rights and climate change
issued just prior to COP-15, the ACHPR referenced this “right of
all peoples to an environment favourable to their development”
under the Banjul Charter, along with other international instruments binding of member states of the African Union (“AU”).14
Using this right as a basis, it expressed concern that the COP-15
negotiations would unlikely incorporate human rights considerations and urged the heads of AU member states to ensure that
human rights standards, particularly protections for vulnerable
populations, be included in any climate change agreement resulting from the negotiations.15 The only indication of the ACHPR’s
inclination to hold states accountable for climate change, however,
was in noting that “climate change is principally the result of emissions of greenhouse gases, which remain relatively high in developed countries.”16
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“IACHR”) is the only of the regional bodies that has squarely
faced a petition based on the human rights consequences of climate
change. In 2005, Sheila Watt-Cloutier of the Inuit Circumpolar
Conference filed a petition with the IACHR on behalf of “all Inuit
of the arctic regions of the United States of America and Canada
who have been affected by the impacts of climate change.”17 The
petition alleged that the United States, the leading greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emitter in the world, is the greatest contributor to climate change, which threatens the enjoyment of numerous human
rights guaranteed by the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man18 to the Inuit living in the arctic regions.19 The specific rights identified include their rights “to the benefits of culture,
to property, to the preservation of health, life, physical integrity,
security, and a means of subsistence, and to residence, movement,
and inviolability of the home.”20 The petitioners argued that U.S.
government should be held accountable for these violations to the
extent that they result from both its acts—enabling or contributing
disproportionately to GHG emissions—and its omissions—failing
to take meaningful steps to reduce GHG emissions and otherwise
counteract climate change.21
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This petition faced several notable challenges. First, because
the United States has not accepted the jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, the petition could only be
brought before the IACHR, which may issue recommendations
but not binding judgments.22 Secondly, as would be the case
with any lawsuit relating to responsibility for climate change, it
faced the tremendous burden of proving legally sufficient causation between the harm resulting from climate change and the acts
and omissions of the U.S. government. The petition did an admirable job of laying out the scientific evidence for the connection
between GHG emissions and climate change, the U.S. contribution to GHG emissions, the effects of climate change on the arctic
environment, and the complete dependence of Inuit peoples on the
arctic environment.23
Despite these efforts, the IACHR dismissed the petition without prejudice on November 16, 2006.24 Nevertheless, the IACHR
did invite the petitioners, along with the Center for International
Environmental Law (“CIEL”) and Earthjustice to a thematic
hearing on the issue of global warming and human rights in the
Americas on March 1, 2007.25 This hearing offers perhaps the
best indication of the challenges that future litigation over human
rights violations as consequence of climate change will face before
a regional human rights body. The questions from three commissioners addressed (1) how to attribute or divide responsibility
among states in the region or even states that are not members
of the OAS;26 (2) how the rights violations suffered by the Inuit
could be tied more closely to concrete acts or omissions of specific states;27 (3) whether the petitioners had exhausted domestic
remedies, a requirement for admissibility in any of the regional
human rights systems;28 and (4) what examples of good practices undertaken by states could guide the Commission in making
recommendations.29
Counsel for the three organizations responded to each of the
questions deftly. To the first, they explained the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility,” as a key component of state
responsibility under international economic law.30 To the third, the
question of exhaustion of domestic remedies, they explained why
there is no comparable legal remedy available in the United States
or Canada that would require the government to pay compensation
for human rights violations associated with climate change.31 To
the fourth question, counsel from CIEL pointed to good practices
to counteract global warming in several states in the Americas,
particularly Brazil.32

The second question, as articulated by Commissioner Victor
Abromovich, seemed to remain most unresolved at the end of the
hearing:
Is there a precise form in which the impact you have
described very well on fundamental rights can be tied
to the actions or omissions of the particular states? . . .
[I]n all cases . . . considered by the Inter-American system, there have existed direct actions . . . or the failure
to act by the state in the face of a concrete situation, for
example . . . forestry in an indigenous territory. Now,
the problem you are laying out, without doubt, links to
state and non-state actors, but the relationship is much
. . . less direct. So, I would like clarification about how
there can be a relationship—not just any relationship, a
legal relationship, a relationship of responsibility—of
the states for violations of the rights that you have very
clearly described.33
This causal connection question presents the greatest gap
between precedent cases on environmental damage that have been
accepted by the regional human rights bodies and the issue of
climate change and resulting human rights violations. Like other
current frontiers in regional human rights law, resolution of this
question might require either meeting a nearly impossible quantum of proof or bringing a petition against several or all states in
a region.
One possible way forward may lie in the approach taken by the
European Court on Human Rights (“ECtHR”) in a series of precedents recently identified in a Council of Europe (CoE) report on
climate change and human rights. Although the European (Rome)
Convention on Human Rights does not affirmatively guarantee a
right to the environment,34 the ECtHR has held states accountable
for human rights violations resulting from environmental damage in a number of cases.35 Most often, these cases hold the state
accountable for failure to protect individuals from actions of third
parties, often corporations, and tie the environmental damage to
violations of Article 8 (right to family and private life), Article
2 (right to life), and Article 1 (right to property), although other
rights have also been implicated.36 As the CoE report pointed out,
these cases demonstrate a state’s positive obligation where “inaction would exacerbate [a threat to human rights]” of which the
state is aware.37 This obligation could also attach in the climate
change context, even though the causal connection between GHG
emissions and human rights may be difficult to prove.38
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Industry Cries Foul to EPA’s Attempt to
Regulate GHG Emissions Using the Clean
Air Act
by William J. Walsh, Mark A. Erman, & Jane C. Luxton*
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Introduction

he U.S. House of Representatives passed a comprehensive, albeit flawed, climate change bill, the Waxman/
Markey bill, in June 2009,1 and the Senate Environment Committee voted to bring a similar, but measurably more
demanding, bill, the Kerry/Boxer bill, to the floor of the Senate.2
The House and Senate bills cover the same greenhouse gases
(“GHGs”) and facilities, require an eighty three percent reduction
in emissions between 2005 and 2050, and create a GHG emission
allowance trading program, which lowers the cost of compliance,
generates funds to provide incentives for the use of carbon capture and sequestration, and encourages use of more energy-efficient buildings, among other things.3 The Senate bill: (a) requires
covered sources to reduce their GHG emissions twenty percent
below 2005 levels by 2020, as opposed to the House bill’s seventeen percent reduction; (b) codifies the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) Clean Air Act (“CAA”) GHG rule (ensuring the
worst of both worlds (cap-and-trade and command and control
CAA regulation)); (c) imposes a lower offset limit, which will
increase the price of allowances and the cost of the program,
according to the EPA; (d) reduces the total amount of free allowances, primarily to reduce the national deficit, and (e) provides
a $28 price cap on GHG emission allowances, lower than the
House bill’s cap.4 After this strong beginning, both bills stalled,
however, and prospects for passage remain uncertain.
As the year wore on, the climate change spotlight moved dramatically from the legislative arena and complementary international efforts5 to the development of EPA’s CAA regulations that
will impose GHG-related requirements on industry. In particular,
EPA’s proposed Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”)
tailoring rule (“PSD Tailoring Rule”) will require the installation
of “best available control technologies” (“BACT”) on new or
modified “major” sources that exceed certain GHG thresholds.6
Even if—as some believe—the Obama Administration’s motivation in proposing to use the CAA to reduce GHG emissions is to
provide leverage for a legislative solution, now that EPA has proposed the PSD Tailoring Rule, industry has had no choice but to
comment on it. This article provides an overview of these industry
comments regarding the merits of the CAA PSD Tailoring Rule.7

Background and Summary of the Proposed
PSD Tailoring Rule
In 2007, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA held
that carbon dioxide (“CO2”), the most common GHG, was a “pollutant” under the CAA, and, although the Court did not compel
regulation of GHGs, it did require an evaluation of whether GHG
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emissions from all sources were causing an endangerment to public health and the environment, whether automobile emissions
were contributing to that endangerment, and whether regulation
of mobile sources was required.8 The Court also directed EPA to
“ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute.”9
The CAA requires PSD permits in attainment areas (areas
that comply with air quality standards) when a new or modified
major source causes a significant net emissions increase, but this
only applies for “each pollutant subject to regulation.”10 Once
GHGs are “subject to regulation” under the CAA, the regulatory
authority must assess if a technology that meets the definition of
BACT exists for GHGs and, if so, must mandate installation of
such BACT as part of the PSD permitting process.11
EPA’s pre-2009 interpretation was that only a pollutant that
is presently subject to a statutory requirement or regulatory provision that requires actual control of a pollutant is “subject to regulation” under the new source review (“NSR”) program described
above. Under this interpretation, CO2 is not “subject to regulation” because EPA has not established a National Ambient Air
Quality Standard (“NAAQS”) or New Source Performance Standard (“NSPS”) for CO2, classified CO2 as a Title VI substance, or
otherwise regulated CO2 under any other provision of the Act.12
In response to the remand in Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA discussed its options in an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(“ANPR”) in June 2008,13 and the new Administration proposed
on September 28, 2009, to regulate GHG emissions from lightduty vehicles (based on EPA’s proposed endangerment finding).14
On December 7, 2009, EPA found that GHG emissions from all
sources endanger public health and welfare and that mobile source
emissions contributed to that endangerment.15
On October 27, 2009, EPA proposed its PSD Tailoring Rule
to address industrial stationary sources of GHG emissions.16 EPA
felt that such a rule was necessary because, once the light-duty
vehicle rule is final, GHGs will be “subject to regulation,” and,
therefore, the GHGs from stationary sources will also immediately be “subject to regulation” under the PSD program.17
For criteria pollutants (i.e., nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides,
particulates, lead, ozone, and carbon monoxide), the CAA PSD
and Title V programs define “major” sources as those that emit
more than 100 tons per year for applicability and 250 tons per year
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for PSD significance. If these thresholds are applied to GHGs,
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of companies (including
many small businesses) will be, in EPA’s words, “burdened by
the costs of individualized PSD control technology requirements
and permit applications . . . . State permitting authorities would
be paralyzed.”18 To avoid this, EPA invoked the judicial doctrines of avoiding absurd results and administrative necessity19
in a two-phase approach. First, EPA proposed establishing applicability thresholds of 25,000 tons per year of CO2 equivalents
(“CO2e”) and a PSD significance level of between 10,000 and
25,000 tons per year of CO2e. Then, EPA proposed that it would
issue a rule within six years that will either confirm the first-phase
permitting levels or establish revised levels or other streamlining
techniques.20

Comments on the Proposed PSD
Tailoring Rule
The Proposed PSD Tailoring Rule has the potential to
adversely affect millions of plants from an extremely diverse
range of industries and of widely differing sizes. All industry
comments concluded that the rule, if issued as written, will significantly impact industrial operations in the United States. More than
5,800 comments (many from individual companies, trade associations, and industry coalitions representing thousands of companies) were filed on the PSD Tailoring Rule.21 These comments
express an interesting diversity of views, as well as some clear
and consistent messages.

Congress Did Not Intend to Regulate GHG
Emissions Using the CAA
Virtually every industry comment stated the obvious and irrefutable fact that Congress simply did not have GHG emissions in
mind when it originally drafted the CAA in 1970 or subsequently
amended it in 1977 to include the PSD program.22 The nature of
GHG emissions (i.e., a global, very long-term impact on climate)
and their control are fundamentally different from the criteria pollutant emissions intended to be addressed by the original CAA
(i.e., protection of local or regional ambient air quality). Thus,
the square peg of GHG emissions does not fit the round hole of
the CAA. This is precisely the reason why Congress has devoted
so much time to considering climate change legislation and why
the presidential candidates from both parties in the last election
favored legislation during the campaign.

Regulation of GHG Emissions Pursuant to the
CAA Is Not Required by the Supreme Court
Most industry comments argued persuasively that regulation
of GHG emissions pursuant to the CAA is not required by Massachusetts v. EPA (see discussion above). Some comments, but by
no means all, argued that climate change regulation was so important that it should be addressed by Congress, but such comments
naturally provided little detail concerning what such legislation
might include. In essence, some argue that GHG is a political
issue of global impact that should be decided by Congress. Congress, however, could decide to take no action.
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Industry Split Concerning Whether the Absurd
Results and Administrative Necessity Doctrines
Applied
Interestingly, the industry comments split concerning
whether, on one hand, the “absurd results” and “administrative
necessity” legal doctrines applied to GHG emissions at all. Thus,
some comments concluded that, if EPA was required to regulate
stationary sources, EPA was compelled to regulate every source
emitting more than 250 tons per year, arguably an absurd result
to be avoided. This legal argument also provides an incentive for
Congress to intervene by amending the CAA to bar or at least
delay use of the CAA to regulate GHG emissions, and proposed
legislation along those lines has already been introduced. The
question remains whether there are enough votes in the House and
Senate to pass legislation barring use of the CAA, no less override
an anticipated Presidential veto.
On the other hand, some industry comments argued not only
that these doctrines applied but that they dictated that EPA must
delay application of the CAA until a regulatory scheme crafted to
address the unique challenges presented by GHG emissions was
developed.

Industry Opposed Acting Before a More Reasoned
Scheme Could Be Devised
Many of the comments argued that EPA should delay any
regulation—or at least its effective date—for three to six years.
This delay will prevent or minimize ad hoc industry-by-industry
and plant-by plant determinations of whether BACT exists and
will otherwise avoid inadvertently establishing a regulatory program without assessing whether it will accomplish the desired
ends, will be cost-effective, or may otherwise result in unintended
adverse consequences.
Such an ad hoc approach to regulating GHG emissions
through permit challenges and enforcement actions presents several problems. For coal-fired electric-generating plants, converting to oil and gas means using more expensive and less reliable
alternative fuels. Forcing the relocation of a coal-fired plant to
another location fails to reduce GHG emissions and may actually
increase them, because of the inefficiency involved in transmitting
power over distance. There has not been a successful large-scale
demonstration of the technical, economic, and environmental performance of geological carbon sequestration, which is considered
to be one of the most promising GHG emission reduction technologies.23 Immediate application of the PSD applicability threshold and triggers will result in unacceptable delays in permitting
and, therefore, in the construction of new industrial plants and
major modifications of existing plants, a cost not advocated by
Congress.24 Such delays will have a direct and significant adverse
economic impact (including a disincentive to convert to “green”
technologies, which would also need permits).
This concern about delay is more than theoretical. Environmental groups have filed administrative or legal challenges in
more than 166 existing coal-fired electric plant permit proceedings, with 113 claimed “victories” (which includes remands,
delays, and other non-final determinations).25 In fact, the Sierra
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Club settled one lawsuit in exchange for the utility “voluntarily”
agreeing to add a legally enforceable permit provision that
requires capture and sequestration of fifty eight percent of the CO2
generated by the plant.26
Also, as some comments noted, there is precedent in EPA’s
implementation of the CAA for delaying implementation of
aspects of the PSD program in order to avoid administrative
impracticability. For example, the 1980 PSD regulations contained a number of transition provisions that delayed applicability
to certain classes of sources. EPA, in effect, has deferred application of PSD provisions based on PM2.5 emissions, despite adoption of National Ambient Air Quality Standards for PM2.5 in 1997,
relying on PM10 (larger-sized particulate matter) instead because
of problems measuring and modeling PM2.5 emissions.27 As a
practical matter, delaying any regulatory decision would provide
Congress a reasonable amount of time to act.

One Size Does Not Fit All Emitters
Some industries argued that EPA should not use a onesize-fits-all approach but rather should tailor the trigger to each
industry (i.e., apply an industry-specific applicability and GHG
emission trigger). A plant-by-plant BACT determination is costineffective and, in any case, either will inevitably result in a determination that there is no BACT, as discussed below. However, the
mere existence of such a process creates uncertainty in planning,
obtaining capital, and reacting nimbly to new business opportunities (such as expanding the production of renewable energy and
more energy-efficient products).
Similarly, some industries argued that the global nature of
endangerment required EPA to take into account on an industryby-industry basis, not the percentage of U.S. emissions covered,
but the percentage that each facility within each industry represents compared to worldwide GHG emissions from all sources in
all countries.
Many industries noted that EPA simply had not performed
even the bare minimum level of evaluation needed to promulgate a regulation of this magnitude and import. Various comments demanded that EPA gather sufficient information to tailor
its rules to the circumstances of each industry before issuing a
rule. In evaluating the significance of the GHG emissions from an
individual industry, the EPA should take into account the larger
quantities of GHGs emitted compared to other CAA-regulated
pollutants, the level of significance compared to total GHG emissions, the effectiveness on a global scale of such regulation (e.g.,
the carbon leakage issue) for a particular industry, and the other
issues discussed in the various comments.

Higher Thresholds Should Apply
Many industries28 argued for higher thresholds than 25,000
tons per year because the PSD program was intended to regulate only the “major” emitters, such as electric generating plants,
which are financially able to bear the regulatory costs of PSD and
are collectively responsible for most of the nation’s air pollution.
One industry, in effect, recommended changes that result in a
threshold of 777,000 tons per year.29 PSD was not designed to
cover the small- and medium-sized emitters that form a substantial
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portion of the nation’s core manufacturing base, but the proposed
rule would do so.30
EPA estimated that if the major source threshold is set at
25,000 tons per year, 13,661 facilities would exceed this threshold, which would cover sixty-eight percent of national stationary source emissions.31 At 100,000 tons per year, 4,850 facilities
would be covered, corresponding to sixty-four percent of national
GHG emissions.32 Thus, increasing the threshold from 25,000 to
100,000 tons per year would reduce the number of “major emitters” by almost two-thirds but would only decrease the GHG
emissions subject to regulation by four percent. This marginal
incremental benefit is not consistent with the intent of the PSD
program. One solution presented by an ethanol industry trade
group is to subject plants to PSD for GHGs only if the plant is
already covered by BACT requirements for other regulated pollutants such as nitrous oxides or sulfur oxides.33
The Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy
also took issue with the 25,000 tons per year threshold by arguing that EPA improperly certified that the Tailoring Rule would
not harm a substantial number of small businesses, thus evading
the Regulatory Flexibility Act’s requirement that a special Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Act (“SBREFA”) panel be
convened.34 Under EPA’s Regulatory Flexibility Act Guidance,
rules cause a significant economic impact when the compliance
cost for a small business is one to three percent of operating revenues. If less than 1,000 small entities are significantly affected,
the rule is presumed to be ineligible for a SBREFA panel.35 The
Small Business Administration asserted that, had EPA thoroughly
analyzed the potential reach of the GHG permitting requirements
on small entities, it would have learned that the Tailoring Rule
would adversely affect much more than 1,000 small businesses;
therefore, EPA would have to convene a SBREFA panel prior to
promulgating its rule.36

Process Emissions Should Be Excluded
Those industries that utilize intense heat to process raw materials naturally containing carbonate (e.g., the cement industry, the
limestone mineral processing industry, and the glass manufacturing industry) will release CO2, and there simply is no BACT
for these process emissions. Typically, there are no substitutes
for these raw materials and nothing as a practical measure can
be implemented to reduce these emissions. Moreover, some of
these industries meet new tough energy efficiency requirements or
make products that will reduce GHG emissions when utilized in
other energy-saving applications downstream. Nothing in EPA’s
administrative record to the PSD Tailoring Rule demonstrates
that GHG emissions from process emissions can be significantly
reduced with any existing technology. Put simply, there is nothing
meaningful that can be required at this time. Attempting to regulate these industries will be a useless act.

The Tailoring Rule Should Not Apply to Plants
That Might Result in Carbon Leakage
Several industries and industry coalitions noted that so called
carbon leakage is almost certain to increase the net global GHG
emission if the PSD Tailoring Rule prompts regulated entities
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to move operations abroad. Many manufacturing industries are
energy-intensive and trade-sensitive, according to EPA,37 industry groups’ testimony to Congress,38 the General Accountability
Office,39 and the comments provided in this rulemaking.
The costs (direct transactional costs, delay costs, and the regulatory uncertainty’s effect on ability to raise capital) will increase
at U.S. plants in regulated industries. Additional costs will be
imposed if costly BACT is required by states (with little reduction
in GHG emissions). Since no comparable costs will be imposed
on such energy-intensive industries in developing countries, their
U.S. counterparts will suffer a competitive disadvantage. EPA’s
and virtually every other analysis has found that such competitive
disadvantage moves production from the United States to other
countries with less stringent GHG controls.40 Thus, carbon “leakage” occurs and, in reality, the total global emissions increase,
not decrease, thereby increasing the endangerment, not reducing
it. The law should not (and does not) require such a truly absurd
result.

There Are No BACTs
None of the traditional air pollution controls are designed
to control CO2 since it has not yet been regulated. Industry comments could not identify any BACTs for any industry. Even
carbon capture and sequestration (“CCS”) has not been implemented in the United States at a large coal-fired electric generating plant. In fact, the Department of Energy is offering billions
of dollars in research to establish whether such technology can
be implemented. The smaller the GHG emission source, the less
likely that such a technology will be considered BACT under
EPA’s “top-down” analysis, which eliminates technologies that
may have a high removal efficiency, but low cost-effectiveness.
Finally, the EPA CAA regulations do not include GHG emission allowances. As a result, unlike the House and Senate bills,
free GHG emission allowances cannot be provided to utilities as
incentives to offset the enormous cost of CCS.

The Rule Should Provide Incentives to Industries
that Produce Products that Reduce GHG
Emissions or Use Renewable Energy
Some comments urged EPA to provide an incentive to industries that initiate modifications and produce products to support
other GHG emission reduction programs like manufacturers of

components or assemblers of renewable energy sources (e.g.,
solar cells, wind power, and biomass energy), materials that
meet energy efficiency standards for buildings, and other energy
efficiency standards. Thus, EPA should consider the net GHG
emission impact of the entity’s project and the purpose for which
it was conducted.

Conclusion
In summary, addressing climate change is a scientific, economic, and political challenge that raises equity issues within
nations and regions, and between developed and developing
nations. The inherent complexity is reflected in the fact that
it took more than 1,400 pages to address all of these climate
change issues in the House bill.
EPA’s “regulatory fix,” although elegantly simple, is also
fundamentally unworkable. The CAA is a technology-forcing
statute that EPA is attempting to use in a situation where there is
little likelihood that GHG reduction technologies will be developed in the foreseeable future. The rigid command and control
approach is in stark contrast to the market-based cap and trade
approach of legislative measures, which is anticipated to lower
the cost of compliance.
Most of industry (including some companies and industries
that support comprehensive federal climate change legislation)
oppose utilizing the CAA to regulate GHG emissions. The tone
and even anger expressed in many of these comments is extraordinary for comments in a rulemaking, which may be due to the
frustration faced by industry. These comments demonstrate that
the proposed PSD GHG Tailoring Rule is not only broken, but
seems unfixable, at least in the short- to medium- term.
Legal challenges to the rule are already in the works. Senator Murkowski has proposed a bill that vetoes the endangerment
finding, thereby preventing the EPA from regulating GHGs
using the CAA. Senator Rockefeller has offered a more moderate bill that will simply delay the effective date of the tailoring
rule requirements for two years. In reaction to the industry comments and Congressional interest, EPA Administrator Jackson
announced that EPA intends to use a threshold substantially
higher than the 25,000-ton limit that EPA originally proposed
and perhaps as high as 75,000 tons. The future of this regulation
is uncertain.

Endnotes: Industry Cries Foul to EPA’s Attempt to Regulate GHG
Emissions Using the Clean Air Act

1

H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009).
3 See H.R. 2454; S. 1733.
4 See S. 1733.
5 See Conference of the Parties Fifteenth Session, Copenhagen, Den., Dec.
7-18, 2009, Copenhagen Accord U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18,
2009), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/
cop15_cph_auv.pdf (encouraging nations to commit to GHG emission goals
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by “tak[ing] note of the Copenhagen Accord”). See generally United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, S. Treaty Doc
No. 102-38, U.N. Doc. A.AC.237/18(Part II)/Add.1, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992),
available at http://unfccc.int/2860.php (providing other United Nations administered environmental agreements and texts).

Endnotes: Industry Cries Foul to EPA’s Attempt to Regulate
GHG Emissions Using the Clean Air Act continued on page 61
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SEC Interpretive Guidance for ClimateRelated Disclosures
By Nickolas M. Boecher*

O

n January 27, 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) provided public companies with interpretive guidance for climate change related disclosure
requirements.1 In light of recent legislation and investor demand,2
the SEC acted prudently because the interpretive guidance will
probably encourage more complete disclosure of the risks and
opportunities faced by publicly traded businesses. In turn, increased
disclosure should foster greater transparency, provide incentive for
cleaner technologies,3 and facilitate dialogue concerning the effects
of climate change on the business world.4
Established disclosure requirements oblige publicly traded
companies to report the reasonably likely material costs of complying with environmental statutes and regulations.5 The newly issued
interpretative guidance highlights four areas where climate change
may trigger disclosure requirements: Legislation and Regulation;
International Accords; Indirect Consequences of Regulation or
Business Trends; and Physical Impacts of Climate Change.6 The
interpretive guidance does not create new legal requirements or
change established ones, but rather it clarifies what public companies need to disclose.7
The release of the interpretive guidance has received criticism
from within the SEC.8 One commissioner has argued that the physical risks of climate change are not relevant for disclosure because
they are not reasonably foreseeable and often only occur over the
course of decades or centuries.9 She has also pointed out that climate change concerns are outside the expertise of the SEC, which
was established to ensure investor protection.10
Investors have submitted reports suggesting that current climate-related disclosure is insufficient.11 A 2008 report, submitted
by an institutional investor, surveyed over six thousand annual filings by Standard & Poor’s 500 companies and found that 76.3% of
2008 filings failed to mention climate change.12 In January 2010,
the world’s largest investors, holding over thirteen trillion dollars
in assets, released a statement demanding action by world leaders
in regard to climate change.13 Among their demands was a request
that the SEC require greater climate-related disclosure.14
In addition, numerous examples, both domestic and international, suggest a changing legislative and regulatory space requiring more complete disclosure.15 Recent requirements from the
Environmental Protection Agency as well as legislation in state
and local governments regulating greenhouse gas emissions constitute active legislation that may require disclosure.16 Additionally,
Congress is considering a national cap-and-trade system for the
regulation of emissions.17 Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol and the
related European Union Emissions Trading System, which many
SEC registrants operating in international business must follow,
also may have material effect.18
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Commentators have suggested that legal problems could arise
if disclosure requirements are extended.19 Hostile shareholders
could file frivolous lawsuits by taking advantage of imperious disclosure requirements.20 Additionally, businesses may have trouble
accurately disclosing the outcome of pending litigation resulting
from climate change.21 Legal disclosure requirements could also
weaken legal positions in pending litigation, undermining the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.22
By limiting itself to providing interpretive guidance on climate change disclosure, the SEC has likely avoided these types of
legal problems. SEC Rule 10b-5 permits individual shareholders
an action against companies failing to make required disclosures.23
Rule 10b-5 actions provide companies an incentive to comply with
disclosure requirements and to reduce activity that would be unfavorable to share value if publicly disclosed.24 Successful 10b-5
actions require a duty to disclose, something which the SEC has
never expressly required for environmental issues.25 Thus, while
the interpretive guidance provides some further basis for insufficient disclosure arguments under rule 10b-5, the fact that it does not
create an express duty to disclose should work to limit the number
of frivolous lawsuits.26 Additionally, the interpretive guidance does
not require detailed reporting of pending litigation.27 Moreover, as
a policy matter, the interpretive guidance probably will not be interpreted as obliging companies to compromise pending litigation by
disclosing pertinent information.
The SEC acted evenhandedly in its release of the interpretive
guidance. Although companies may have difficulty in predicting
the physical effects of climate change,28 legislative, regulatory, and
investment trends suggest a need for more complete disclosure.29
The interpretive guidance suggests that the SEC will be more likely
to enforce disclosure on climate-related issues than it has in the
past.30 However, by stopping short of creating an express duty to
disclose, the SEC has limited potential abuse of Rule 10b-5 litigation.31 Increased disclosure can provide more information to investors and also create an incentive for companies to invest in cleaner
technology as an alternative to disclosing damaging information.32
Increased disclosure might also provide legislators with a feedback
mechanism for evaluating the effects of climate change legislation.
The new interpretive guidance should help stream the flow of information concerning climate-related matters and facilitate ongoing
dialogue in this area of increasing attention.33
Endnotes: SEC Interpretive Guidance for Climate-Related
Disclosures continued on page 62
*Nickolas M. Boecher is a J.D. Candidate, May 2012, at American University
Washington College of Law.
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Readily Deployable Approaches to
Geoengineering: Cool Materials and
Aggressive Reforestation
by Max G. Bronstein*

H

Introduction

umans have been disrupting the Earth’s climate for
hundreds of thousands of years.1 Burning a piece of
wood for warmth, cutting down a tree to build shelter,
or even planting a crop are all ways that humans have interacted
with and fundamentally altered the climate and the environment.
New research has indicated that breakthroughs in agriculture
as long as 8,000 years ago have played a major role in greenhouse gas emissions and may have even reversed a trend toward
global cooling.2 The widespread cultivation of rice in Asia,
which first began 5,000 years ago, was followed by unnatural
increases in methane concentration that some scientists believe
may have averted another ice age.3 Today, rice paddies cover
130 million hectares of the Earth’s surface, emitting between 50
and 100 million metric tons of methane per year.4 In addition,
ruminants produce a significant amount of methane and, when
combined with the emissions from rice, account for nearly half
of the world’s methane output.5 Hence, human behavior that
originated thousands of years ago continues to alter the climate
today albeit on a much larger scale.
Deforestation was first recorded in 1086 AD when a survey of England indicated that humans had cleared upwards of
90 percent of the forests to make way for agriculture.6 Between
2,000 and 3,000 years ago, humans also deforested wide swaths
of fertile land near rivers in China and India to support quickly
growing and increasingly dense settlements.7 The scale of this
deforestation deprived the planet of major carbon sinks.8 Forestlands were often burned and then subsequently flooded to provide irrigation; both activities produce significant greenhouse
gas emissions.9 Today, forests are being destroyed at an unprecedented rate—every year, human activities destroy an area the
size of Panama.10 At this rate, the world’s rain forests, the most
bio-diverse portions of the planet, could disappear entirely in
less than 100 years.11 A recent study found that decreasing the
rate of deforestation by 50 percent and maintaining that level
for 100 years would reduce global fossil fuel emissions by the
equivalent of six years.12 These occurrences demonstrate that
humans have historically caused significant climate disruptions
and even modest changes in behavior—such as decreasing the
rate of deforestation—can have a marked impact on carbon
emissions.
Most people believe erroneously that humans did not
begin to significantly alter the climate until the second half of
the 19th century, which marked the start of the second Industrial Revolution.13 Rather, the Industrial Revolution acted as
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a carbon multiplier by automating and scaling up the carbonintensive activities that humans had already undertaken for
thousands of years. The new technologies and innovations of
this age required carbon-based fuels to power factories, automobiles, and the industrial machines that automated agriculture
and deforestation. In fact, from 1850 to 1863, total world carbon
emissions nearly doubled from 54 million metric tons (“MMT”)
per year, to 104 MMT. By 1900, world emissions had reached
534 MMT.14 By 2006, the world was emitting 8230 MMT, an
increase of 259 MMT from the previous year.15
For thousands of years, humans have been altering the climate and fundamentally remaking the environment at a local
and planetary scale.16 The behaviors driving such changes,
like agriculture, deforestation, and transportation, are deeply
ingrained hallmarks of civilization and are a core component of
traditional development and economic progress. It should come
as no surprise that policymakers have been struggling for over a
decade to create a viable framework for limiting emissions and
mitigating climate change.17 Meanwhile, as our understanding
of the impacts of climate change has sharpened, it is increasingly
evident that failure to limit emissions will result in massive and
irreparable damage to the environment and human welfare.18
This realization has been one of the factors driving research and
debate around geoengineering19—a “Plan B”—should policymakers fail to create a viable framework for mitigating climate
change.20
However, the geoengineering solutions put forth by scientists are often untested, expensive, difficult to deploy, and ignorant of the non-technological barriers to implementation, such
as policy and politics. Many of the so-called geoengineering
“solutions” are overly reliant on advanced technologies that do
not exist today and may require decades to deploy, which could
only have a significant impact on the climate at an enormous
financial cost. Effectively implementing such technologies on a
meaningful scale would require an international framework and
cost-sharing scheme that could be as complex and politically
sensitive as the current climate treaty negotiations. If the nations
of the world struggle even to reach an agreement to limit climate

* Max G. Bronstein is a graduate student at the University of Michigan pursuing
a masters in Public Policy, a certificate in science and technology policy, and is
a graduate student instructor for a course in National Science Policy. He previously served as a policy analyst and advisor to the Directors of the U.S. National
Science Foundation. He has also completed a Congressional internship with the
House Committee on Science and Technology. In the fall of 2010, he plans to
pursue a PhD in science and technology policy.
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emissions in a timely manner, a future international resolution
on geoengineering will face similar obstacles.
Rather than relying on untested and poorly understood geoengineering interventions, scientists and policymakers need to
look toward tested and readily deployable mechanisms for regulating climate and mitigating the impacts of carbon emissions.
Many proposed geoengineering solutions aim to deflect the
sun’s energy, including proposals ranging from space-based
mirrors to cloud whitening and
cloud seeding using aerosol
particles.21 The goal of these
approaches is to control the
amount of solar energy striking
the Earth by deflecting more
of this energy into space.22 If
ultimately successful, the climate will cool because energy
is being reflected rather than
absorbed by the Earth and the
atmosphere.23 While these are
intriguing approaches, some
are exorbitantly expensive (e.g.
space mirrors) and, although
others are more affordable, they
are relatively untested and could
result in other irreversible, unintended consequences.24 However, there are more affordable
and practicable methods for
increasing the Earth’s global
albedo or reflectivity.  What follows is a low-cost, low-tech, low-risk, geoengineering plan that
can be implemented on a local, regional, or national level without the need for a complex international treaty, which makes it
more politically feasible than other proposed solutions.

Temperature differences are most marked when compared to
non-urban areas, which are 1-3 degrees Celsius cooler and on a
clear, windless night the temperature difference can be as much
as 12 degrees Celsius.30 These higher urban temperatures result
in an increased demand for electricity for energy intensive air
conditioning.31 In fact, one study estimates that the heat island
effect alone accounts for 5-10 percent of the peak electricity demand for cooling buildings in cities.32 Hence, mitigating
the heat island effect through
simple interventions like white
roofs can be an effective way of
reducing energy demand, cutting CO2 emissions, and increasing global albedo.
In addition to roofs, roads
are another component of urban
infrastructure that can play a
significant role in global reflectivity and mitigation of the heat
island effect. Cool pavements,
as they are commonly called,
work on the same principle as
white roofs. Urban pavement
accounts for 35 percent of urban
surface area whereas roofs only
account for 25 percent.33 Some
calculations have indicated
that a cool pavements initiative could offset as much as 38
kg CO2 per square meter.34 If
extrapolated to account for all
urban areas, cool pavements could offset up to 20 billion gigatons of CO2.35 Aside from the reflectivity and energy savings
benefits, cool pavements can also enhance nighttime visibility
and reduce the amount of street lighting needed during the evening hours, thereby further reducing energy demand.36
What is most appealing about these “cool” solutions is that
there are low barriers to implementation, as they are largely
cost competitive with existing approaches and the underlying technology is relatively mature.37 Hence, these approaches
have already been deployed in various urban areas across the
United States38 and have been shown to actually increase albedo
regardless of color.39 Cool roofs do not necessarily have to be
white, but must contain composite materials that increase solar
reflectance and thermal emittance.40 In addition, experiments
have even begun to test newly developed paints for cooler cars,
which also cover much of the land surface in urban areas.41
When combined, these “cool” approaches present a relatively
low-risk, low-cost, and politically viable approach to geoengineering. Even simple policy interventions at the local or state
level could have a marked impact on reducing the heat island
effect, lowering energy demand, and ultimately decreasing CO2
emissions. While this is an important approach to mitigating
climate change, increasing the global albedo is only part of the

Meanwhile, as our
understanding of the
impacts of climate change
has sharpened, it is
increasingly evident that
failure to limit emissions
will result in massive and
irreparable damage to
the environment and
human welfare.

Cool Materials Cool the World
The U.S. Secretary of Energy, Nobel Laureate Dr. Steven
Chu, has frequently avowed the virtues of white roofs.25 The
theory underlying this solution is quite simple; lighter colors
reflect more sunlight and therefore increase the planet’s reflectivity, which, on a large scale, can result in global cooling.26
This intervention would be most effective in urban areas, which
only account for about one percent of the Earth’s land surface,
but if implemented on a large scale, could equate to a 63 kg CO2
offset for every square meter of white roof.27 Estimates have
also shown that a “cool roofs” initiative could offset about 24
billion gigatons of CO2—the equivalent of total annual global
CO2 emissions—over the course of the roofs’ lives.28
In addition to increasing global albedo, white roofs keep
buildings cooler. Cooler buildings reduce energy costs and in
turn lower CO2 emissions. Lower energy costs and a smaller
carbon footprint help to minimize the “heat island” effect. The
heat island effect is an increase in temperature in urban areas
caused by warming of absorptive surfaces and infrastructure.29
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solution. The planet also needs a strategy to sequester the vast
concentrations of CO2 already in the atmosphere.

Aggressive Reforestation
Forests serve as an enormous carbon sink and store more
than double the amount of carbon than is present in the atmosphere.42 In addition, forests store 45 percent of all terrestrial
carbon.43 However, deforestation is releasing that stored carbon on an unprecedented scale; every year a forest area the size
of Panama is lost.44 Deforestation can occur naturally through
wildfires—which have been increasing in number with global
warming—but deforestation is more commonly driven by the
need for agricultural and grazing space.45 In 2004, deforestation
and decay of biomass accounted for 17.3 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions.46 Hence, forests can act as both a sink and
a source of carbon. The fate of the carbon in forests, however,
largely depends on how humans interact with them.
There are several ways in which forests can increase uptake
of CO2: through reforestation that increases the carbon density
of existing forests; through use of fuels from biomass; and by
limiting deforestation and degradation. Calculations done by
Canadell et al. have shown that, if all deforested land was converted back to forests, the sequestration potential would be 1.5
Pg C (petagrams of carbon) per
year, which would reduce atmospheric CO2 by 40-70 parts per
million (“ppm”) by 2100 (CO2
concentration in 2008 was estimated to be 385 ppm).47 Even
reducing deforestation by 50
percent (a laudable goal), would
offset 50 Pg C.48 While reducing deforestation is socially and
politically difficult, individual
nations can take the initiative to
reforest or increase the carbon
intensity of existing forests. For
example, in 2000, China used 24
mega hectares (“Mha”) of new
and old forest re-growth to offset 21 percent of emissions in
2000.49
However, it is important to point out that creating new forests is only the first step in this process. In order for such offsets to be permanent, the forests must have proper protection
and stewardship to prevent future deforestation or degradation
that can lead to carbon emissions. Hence, in order for reforestation to create a viable carbon sink, it requires not only a shortterm planting period, but also a continued investment in forest
stewardship. Stewardship is especially challenging in light of
the negative impacts associated with climate change. The frequency and intensity of forest fires is expected to continue to
rise as is the number of insect outbreaks that can destroy healthy
forests.50

Reforestation not only alters carbon concentrations, but can
also have a significant impact on global albedo.51 On one hand,
dense forest canopies can actually decrease albedo, thereby
absorbing more solar radiation, which can cause an increase in
temperature.52 On the other hand, forests also play an important
role in the water cycle through evapotranspiration, the migration
of water from roots, through leaves, and into the atmosphere.53
This moisture can ultimately seed clouds that can increase global
albedo and therefore lower the amount of solar radiation warming the planet.54 The extent of the impact of these competing
forces is unclear and varies by region. For example, as forest
canopies substitute for snow-covered ground in boreal regions,
this would result in a net decrease in albedo.55 However, in tropical regions, more forests would result in increasing cloud formation, which would have a positive impact on albedo.56 This
evidence suggests that tropical regions would be most suited for
reforestation and stewardship programs.57

Policy Implications & Implementation
Mechanisms
Compared to other proposed methods of climate engineering such as space mirrors, artificial trees, or ocean fertilization,
reforestation and albedo management are two simple, relatively
inexpensive, and effective
methods for mitigating climate change. Reforestation not
only increases albedo in certain
regions, but more widespread
and healthy forests act as a natural carbon sink, provide innumerable ecosystem services,
and create new habitation space
in areas that have traditionally been threatened by human
development. Using novel roofs
and roads provides a cost-effective mechanism for deflecting
the sun’s energy and decreasing
the heat island effect, which can
ultimately lower energy usage
and the requisite carbon emissions. But, for these solutions to
be viable, they must be implemented on regional and national
scales and must involve a variety of stakeholders. The following
recommendations outline a U.S. reforestation and albedo management program.
The President should establish an office of Climate Change
Mitigation within the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) by executive order. Establishing this office via executive order would bypass Congress, because this program needs
to be implemented as soon as possible in order to maximize
impact and effectiveness. The office would be responsible for
drafting, implementing, and enforcing best practices for developers and civil engineers to mitigate climate change through

Estimates have also
shown that a “cool roofs”
initiative could offset
about 24 billion gigatons
of CO2—the equivalent
of total annual global
CO2 emissions—over the
course of the roofs’ lives.
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the use of reflective materials. Specifically, the office would
establish requirements and regulations for using reflective materials in the construction of civil infrastructure. Roads are constantly being repaved or maintained and, as a result, it would be
relatively straightforward and expedient to phase in the use of
reflective and cooling materials. Developers in the private sector
need incentives to implement these best practices in both new
buildings and existing structures.  
While this initiative could be effectively seeded at the federal level, proper implementation and execution would require
trained agents working at the state and local levels. This would
require buy-in from these stakeholders and could be achieved
through additional training. A brief educational program should
be developed that illustrates the benefits of cool materials for
energy consumption and mitigation of climate change. This
material could then be disseminated to state and local departments of transportation and to public planners.
In addition to establishing a new office at the EPA, the federal government should fund more research into development
of cost-competitive advanced materials that can have an even
greater impact on reflectivity and global albedo. Recently, the
Technology Innovation Program at the National Institute of Standards in Technology (“NIST”) released a call for proposals.58
One of the topic areas was in civil infrastructure, but it made no
mention of reflective or cool materials that could replace current infrastructure and mitigate the impacts of climate change.59
The fiscal year 2010 solicitation should call for research and
development proposals on cool materials and should give funding priority to proposals that demonstrate potential for commercialization. Emphasizing development could enable late-stage
projects to become viable in the market and ultimately be sold to
meet the increased demand that could be expected to follow the
release of new EPA regulations and best practices.
Throughout U.S. history, wide swaths of the country’s forest have been cleared to make way for development or harvested
as a natural resource. As a consequence, there are vast areas of
vacant and uninhabited rural land that could be reforested with
relatively little investment. Over time and with periodic maintenance, these areas could give way to new, healthy forests. The
U.S. Forest Service has the expertise to take the lead on such an
initiative, but lacks sufficient resources to have an impact on a

scale that would significantly offset emissions. As the climate
bill is currently being discussed in the Senate,60 this is an opportune time to lobby for a reforestation provision that could spearhead a nationwide initiative. The costs of the program could be
funded through revenues generated by the cap-and-trade scheme
and a nationwide program would assist the United States in
reaching its emissions targets.
Recently, Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack announced
the recipients of a grant program that aims to revitalize urban
areas through community forestry grants.61 While this is a relatively modest program in terms of its funding ($900,000) and
scope, 62 programs like this should be expanded to urban areas
around the country. As a consequence of the current economic
downturn, there are many former business and industrial centers
in urban areas (“brownfields”)63 that could be re-purposed as
green spaces or as constructed wetlands. The benefits of urban
green spaces are widely known and constructed wetlands have
been shown to provide valuable ecosystem services at a lower
cost than traditional methods.64 Ultimately, these improvements
could act as an urban carbon sink, provide local and global ecosystem services, and enhance the aesthetic appeal of previously
abandoned areas.

Conclusion
While these initiatives may appear overly ambitious or
unlikely, they present a more pragmatic approach to addressing
one of the most profound and complex challenges of our time.
Other proposals for geoengineering are more expensive, less
reliable, non-deployable, and likely to stir political controversy.
In contrast, reforestation and albedo management are relatively
apolitical policies that are readily deployable. Furthermore, with
the climate bill currently pending in the U.S. Senate,65 the nation
has a unique opportunity to enact new domestic initiatives
that could have both national and global benefits. While it is
undoubtedly important to conduct further research and continue
to debate the effectiveness and risks associated with geoengineering, we do posses effective methods for sequestering carbon
and managing planetary albedo. But every day of inaction and
lack of leadership brings the world closer to the harsh consequences and realities of a planet in great peril.

Endnotes: Readily Deployable Approaches to Geoengineering: Cool
Materials and Aggressive Reforestation
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U.S. Climate Change Policy v. International
Trade Rules: Complying with GATT
by Tina R. Goel*

T

he Copenhagen negotiations did not result in the global
environmental treaty desired by many, but, instead, in
plans to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions or
carbon intensity from fifty-five nations, including China, India,
and the United States.1 The U.S. pledge, to reduce emissions
by seventeen percent, came with a catch: Congressional action.2
Enacting federal climate change legislation in the United States
has been difficult because policymakers fear that increased regulation may place domestic industry at a competitive disadvantage,
and that production facilities will relocate, thereby causing carbon
leakage—the movement of emissions to a less regulated country—and associated U.S. job losses.3 Manifesting these fears, the
Senate resolved, in 1997, that the United States should not consent
to an international agreement that does not limit emissions from
developing countries.4
Monumentally, in June 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security
Act (“ACES”):5 legislation designed, in part, to reduce GHG emissions by placing a cap on emissions and issuing a certain number
of permits, or allowances, for the release of the emissions.6 One
measure, intended to alleviate carbon leakage, grants to eligible
domestic sectors allowance rebates, and another, the International
Reserve Allowance Program (“IRAP”) requires importers of foreign goods to submit international reserve allowances (“IRA”).7
Although Congress is unlikely to enact ACES, due in part to a
similar Senate bill, future legislation is likely to contain comparable language.8
Domestic rebates and importer allowance requirements, such
as those in ACES, are likely to violate U.S. obligations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).9 GATT prohibits the use of trade-restrictive measures, i.e., taxes, laws and
regulations, to protect domestic industry, but it allows their use to
achieve legitimate environmental goals.10 In particular, Article I
prohibits discrimination by member nations between “like” products from different nations, and Article III prohibits discrimination
between “like” imported and U.S. goods.11 These rules are tempered by the Article XX General Exceptions, pursuant to which
member nations may employ measures violating substantive provisions for the achievement of limited policy goals, including the
“conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”12
The importer allowance requirement in ACES is likely to
violate GATT Articles I and III because it treats “like” products
dissimilarly. IRAP requires importers to submit IRAs based upon
a “general [calculation] methodology” to ensure that imported
and U.S. goods are subject to similar GHG emissions requirements.13 The calculation is likely to violate Article I if it treats
“like” foreign goods from two countries dissimilarly based upon
Winter 2010

non-product specific factors such as sector or economy-wide GHG
emissions.14 Five exceptions to IRAP largely exclude imported
goods from the program based upon factors that indirectly indicate if the imported goods are regulated similarly to “like” U.S.
goods, e.g., whether the imported goods originate in countries
with a binding emissions agreement, rather than whether fewer
emissions were actually released during the manufacture of the
product.15 These exceptions are also likely to treat “like” domestic
and imported products differently, violating Article III.
ACES is also likely to violate Article III by failing to provide
equality of competitive conditions for “like” U.S. and imported
goods by providing domestic actors avenues to lower compliance
costs unavailable to foreign producers. Domestic actors may demonstrate compliance by holding international and domestic allowances, offset credits, and compensatory allowances; banking and
borrowing allowances; submitting allowances received for “free;”
or paying a penalty for non-compliance, while importers may
only submit and bank IRAs.16 As a result, only domestic actors
may determine whether it is cost-effective to violate ACES and
pay a penalty or invest in forestry projects to earn offsets rather
than buy allowances, while importers do not have such options.17
Nonetheless, GATT Article XX permits certain trade-restrictive environmental measures and arguably should permit the use
of measures that “accurately assess carbon leakage and competitiveness losses” and impose a “fair” price upon imported products.18 To ensure that U.S. legislation is covered by the Article
XX exception, IRAP and its implementing regulations should
require importers to submit allowances based upon a methodology that accurately accounts for emissions. To avoid disparate
treatment between “like” products of two countries or between
“like” imported and domestic products, IRAP should calculate
allowance requirements based upon product-specific GHG emissions rather than economy-wide or sector-specific emissions. In
addition, importers should be permitted to submit offset credits, as
well as other allowances, and borrow allowances to equalize competitive conditions between “like” domestic and imported products. Moreover, to further the goals of ACES, exceptions should
only be granted when an imported product is manufactured with
fewer emissions than a “like” U.S. product, thereby challenging
domestic actors to reduce emissions.

Endnotes: U.S. Climate Change Policy v. International Trade
Rules: Complying with GATT continued on page 64
* Tina R. Goel is a J.D. candidate, May 2011, at American University Washington College of Law.
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Equitable But Ineffective: How the
Principle of Common But Differentiated
Responsibilities Hobbles the Global Fight
Against Climate Change
by Mary J. Bortscheller*

S

Introduction

cientists now predict that despite global efforts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, climate change effects like
long-term droughts and significant sea-level rise are inevitable.1 Consequently, the climate change crisis demands a comprehensive international response, with meaningful participation
by all the major greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emitters.2 The current
climate regime embodied in the Kyoto Protocol distinguishes
between developed and developing countries in a way that maintains an invidious inertia in the international fight against climate
change.
China is a major GHG emitter that does not have any obligations to reduce emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, the current
binding international climate change regime.3 The international
community took a fresh look at the Protocol at the 15th Conference of the Parties (“COP”) in Copenhagen in December 2009. A
critical question at that time was whether China would agree to
reduce its GHG emissions; China’s position impacts the global
community’s ability to combat climate change because other
major GHG emitters (most notably the United States) have used
China’s lack of binding commitments to justify their non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol.4 Positive signs were evident during
and in the wake of the Copenhagen COP, however, when China
played a key role in drafting the Copenhagen Accord, and further acknowledged the need for all countries to take action to fight
climate change.5 Notably, China agreed to international verification of domestic mitigation measures, a significant step towards
increased transparency in the regime.6
The fight against climate change is necessarily a global one,
and China’s full participation in the United Nations’ Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) is especially crucial in the short term.7 And although the Copenhagen COP did
not produce a binding document, future COPs will. In so doing,
the international community must reassess the application of the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (“CDR”),
which divides countries into two primary categories—developing
and developed—and determines obligations accordingly.8
This article examines China’s unique situation within the
UNFCCC and argues that the current interpretation of CDR is
politically and practically flawed because it leaves out emerging
economies that are major GHG emitters. The principle of CDR, as
currently applied, does not distinguish among developing nations
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in a way that recognizes the critical importance of emerging
economies like China.9 China and other large emerging economies, no longer fit comfortably in the CDR’s existing developing country category.10 A third category is therefore necessary to
encompass emerging economies like China. The international climate regime’s failure to actively engage China presents a problem
for the entire international community.11 Indeed, as an emerging
economy and a major GHG emitter, and as an international actor
whose participation in the climate regime impacts other major
emitters’ compliance, it is essential that China actively participates in the successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol.12 Current
incentives in the Protocol are not sufficient to persuade China to
accept emission reduction commitments; consequently, the next
protocol requires a combination of extra-legal incentives to convince China to take a more active role.13 Further, while China
has made statements about working together within the UNFCCC
structure, the United States and other developed countries have
not yet succeeded in persuading China to accept binding commitments in a climate change regime.14

Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
In recognition of the daunting environmental problems it
faces, China is shifting toward increased domestic environmental
responsibility, making resource conservation and environmentalism major policy goals.15 China’s commitment to the international fight against climate change, however, is not on par with
other major emitters like the United States and Europe because it
does not involve any GHG emissions reductions.16 This situation
results from the application of CDR in the international climate
change regime.17 The presence of the principle of CDR, in turn,
is the result of a complex negotiation process between developing
and developed countries.
During the UNFCCC negotiations in 1992, both developed
and developing countries had concerns about who would be
the first to reduce GHG emissions, and who would finance the
associated costs.18 Developed countries wanted an inclusive
international agreement for maximum effect and legitimacy.19
Developing countries hesitated to commit themselves to reduction targets when they had historically not contributed to global

* Mary J. Bortscheller is a J.D. Candidate, May 2010, at American University
Washington College of Law.
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greenhouse gas stocks, nor benefited from such emissions in the
form of elevated standards of living.20 Thus, in order to reach
a comprehensive international agreement that brought all the
necessary players to the table, the first COP used the principle
of CDR to strike a political compromise with continuing legal
implications.21
The principle makes developed countries the first actors in
reducing emissions, and allows developing countries to follow
over time. The notion of common but differentiated responsibilities is not new: it reflects general principles of equity in international law.22 The principle was present in nascent form in the
1987 Montreal Protocol, which acknowledged the “special situation” of developing countries by allowing them to delay their
compliance with Protocol control measures for ten years.23 The
UNFCCC has attempted to duplicate this successful model in a
climate change context.24

CDR Distinguishes Between Developed and
Developing Countries
The principle of CDR now embodied in the UNFCCC means
that two factors determine a nation’s obligations concerning climate change. The first factor is a particular nation’s contribution to climate change through GHG emissions; the second is its
economic and technological capacity to reduce emissions.25 The
CDR is primarily backward-looking, as it focuses on past contributions to existing stocks of emissions and lays out responsibilities intended to have remedial effects.26
Based upon the two central considerations of CDR, the
UNFCCC distinguishes between member countries, with the
primary division occurring between developed and developing
country parties.27 Though the developed/developing paradigm
dominates in the Convention, there is also intra-group differentiation between types of developed countries and types of developing countries.28
In practice, the principle of CDR means that developed countries are subject to binding commitments to cut GHG emissions.29
Further, certain developed countries are responsible for money
and technology transfer to aid developing countries in adapting
to and mitigating the effects of climate change.30 In contrast, the
UNFCCC does not require developing countries to reduce emissions or contribute funding, because of their minor contribution to
existing GHG stocks and their reduced economic and technological capacity.31 Moreover, the Convention pays special attention
to the plight of so-called “least developed countries,” as well as
countries that will be especially harmed by climate change.32
Country designation as Annex I or II is self-imposed.33 In
other words, the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC is not
vested with the power to determine which countries are developed and which are developing. Rather, any country desiring to
be included in Annex I or II “may” notify the Secretary-General
of the United Nations that it “intends to be bound” by developed
country commitments.34 There are no further provisions in the
UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol that elaborate on the process
of categorizing member nations.35 This makes the international
law-making process on climate change especially vulnerable
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to political horsetrading, as entering into binding agreements is
entirely voluntary for countries designated under the UNFCCC as
“developing.”
As the first measure arising from the UNFCCC with binding commitments carrying the force of law, the Kyoto Protocol
set specific emission reduction commitments for each developed
country party.36 To date, 183 nations and the European Community have ratified the instrument; the United States is the only
developed country party that has not.37 Developing countries
have no binding commitments under the Kyoto Protocol but do
agree to monitor emissions, promote sustainable development,
and cooperate with the Conference of the Parties in mitigating and
adapting to the impacts of climate change.38 China is designated
a developing country party, and therefore did not commit itself to
any emissions targets when it signed and ratified the UNFCCC
and subsequent Kyoto Protocol.39 The highly-anticipated December 2009 Copenhagen COP did not produce a binding successor-instrument to the Kyoto Protocol, but instead resulted in the
Copenhagen Accord.40

China’s Unique Situation in the International
Climate Change Regime
CDR guides China’s official position with respect to the international climate change regime.41 As a self-designated developing country party, China’s current obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol extend only to soft commitments like GHG monitoring
and information-sharing, promoting sustainable development, and
enhancing carbon-absorbing resources, like forests.42 A key contributor to the drafting of the Copenhagen Accord in December
2009 at the Copenhagen COP, China nonetheless remains among
the group of countries which is not legally obligated to reduce
GHG emissions.43
One of China’s chief strategies for addressing global climate change is to “uphold” the principle of CDR, which currently
allows China to avoid emissions reduction commitments.44 In
support of its position, China advances several arguments, noting
the nation’s relative poverty, its relatively low per capita emissions, and low level of responsibility for the existing stock of
GHG emissions.45 Moreover, China argues that it would not be
fair to deprive a developing nation of the right to emit freely in the
course of its development, as developed countries have already
done.46
Although China underscores its low development status,
recent history shows that the country is unique among developing
nations, as it has rapidly gained stature in the international community.47 Starting in 1979 with its Reform and Opening Policy,
China has implemented an ambitious plan to modernize the oncemarginalized nation.48 An illustration of China’s remarkable success at modernization is the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, which
engaged the world with China in an unprecedented way. The last
decade has made it clear that China is an increasingly dominant
player on the global stage.49
Even as China gains prominence in the international community, its GHG emissions and air pollution problems are mounting; stark statistics detailing the situation abound.50 Perhaps most
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importantly, China now leads the world in annual GHG emissions.51 Further, a recent World Bank report estimated that air
pollution causes about 750,000 deaths per year in China.52 The
World Bank also reported that the nation is home to sixteen of
the world’s twenty most-polluted cities.53 Atmospheric brown
clouds, produced by automobile emissions and coal-fired power
plants, have reduced sunlight and interfered with crop yields in
several cities.54
In light of these facts, the Chinese government has given
more attention to environmental issues.55 Because environmental degradation has emerged as an increasingly popular cause of
citizen activism, China’s leadership will not be able to ignore the
issue in the future.56 With an eye on its own continued legitimacy,
the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) is concerned with the delicate balancing of continued economic growth against the domestic and international imperatives for environmental protection.57

A Sound Principle, With Flawed Application
In its stated terms, CDR is sound and equitable; it has widespread acceptance in the international community, and will continue to play a central role in climate negotiations.58 Although
some scholars find the principle objectionable, their opposition
arises out of a different interpretation of what is equitable for
developed and developing country parties.59 Critics argue that it
is too difficult to predict the differentiated needs of developing
countries in light of scientific uncertainty about the specifics of
adverse climate change impacts.60 While it is true that some scientific uncertainty remains about the impacts of climate change,
widespread agreement exists that developing countries will bear
a disproportionate amount of damages from climate change.61
Therefore, the principle of CDR correctly seeks to bridge the
divide.
Detractors also find it questionable that multi-lateral environmental agreements should hold developed countries accountable for their historic emissions stocks, finding it unjust to ask
modern-day citizens to make amends for pollution emitted generations ago.62 This argument fails to acknowledge the benefits
that current generations have derived and continue to derive from
living in a developed country. For example, a high standard of
living, solid infrastructure, and economic strength are all aftereffects of development and industrialization achieved through
significant pollution.63 Because citizens of developed countries
currently enjoy the fruits of past GHG emissions, it is only fair
to require those nations to bear a greater burden in solving the
climate change problem.

The Principle of CDR in Application is Politically
Ineffective
Notwithstanding the soundness of CDR, the principle is
problematic because it has created a paradigm that, if it persists, will not allow the nations of the world to effectively combat global warming.64 The current interpretation of CDR in the
Kyoto Protocol is politically ineffective because its exception
of emerging economy, major-emitter countries like China has a
chilling effect on global climate change negotiations.65 Because
of its status as the leading GHG emitter and its rising prominence
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in the international community, China’s participation is especially crucial to a multilateral climate change agreement. Within
the United States, the fact that the Kyoto Protocol did not include
obligations for China was advanced by President Bush and prominent congressional leaders as a reason for refusing to ratify the
document.66 This is a direct result of the vague construction of the
principle of CDR in the current climate regime.
For example, the regime does not sufficiently distinguish
between developing countries like China and Botswana.67 The
closest it comes to distinguishing between developing country
parties is to emphasize the need to help developing countries
that are “particularly vulnerable” to the adverse impacts of climate change.68 Accordingly, China frames its policy statements
on climate change to fit this characterization; indeed, a recent
government White Paper echoes the UNFCCC’s provision distinguishing the especially susceptible developing countries.69
By describing itself as a country that is “particularly vulnerable”
to climate change, China seeks to fit its increasingly square reality into the round hole of the developed country category of the
UNFCCC.70 Unfortunately, the language of the UNFCCC is not
sufficiently specific to prevent such subtle mischaracterizations,
which then lead to an undesirable result.71
China’s willingness to accept increased responsibility under a
more nuanced interpretation of the CDR could contribute significantly to the success of a post-Kyoto regime.72 On the other hand,
without at least some corresponding commitments by China,
the United States is unlikely to commit to the Kyoto Protocol’s
successor.73 The interpretation of the CDR and the concomitant
assignment of obligations, therefore, have major political implications for the success of a multilateral climate regime.

The Principle of CDR in Application is Practically
Ineffective
Any climate change agreement that excludes China and other
emerging economies from emission reduction targets will not
have practical utility because these countries’ rates of emissions
are increasing rapidly. Although China leads the world in GHG
emissions, it is in complete compliance with the Kyoto Protocol
under the current interpretation of CDR.74 Indeed, emissions from
China and other developing nations are growing so fast today that
even if all developed countries reduced their emissions to zero,
emissions from developing countries will cause global concentrations of GHGs to increase by over eighteen percent in sixty
years.75 This would be a dramatic increase, as GHG concentrations have increased by thirty-five percent in the last 200 years,
and this comparatively gradual shift has set in motion the current
climate change crisis.76 These facts illustrate the present danger
in failing to engage developing countries—particularly China—in
more concrete efforts at long-term GHG emissions reduction.77 A
continued application of CDR in a way that allows major-emitter,
developing countries to avoid reduction targets will result in a
considerable amount of GHG emissions left unregulated.78
Moreover, because CDR is chiefly backward-looking, it
does not provide any mechanism to adapt to the evolving global
reality.79 The principle is now focused on the existing stocks of
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emissions that were produced when the major economies of the
United States and Europe industrialized and thus does not account
for the current and future emissions of emerging economies.80
The remedial nature of the principle of CDR in the UNFCCC is
necessary, as developed nations emitted the majority of the current stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and they are
comparatively well-situated to reduce emissions.81 Nevertheless, it is not sufficient for the principle to be merely backwardlooking because China and other developing countries are making
significant current contributions to the global stock of emissions,
and will continue to do so in increasing proportions.82 Without
consideration for future emissions, the current application of
CDR excludes major portions of emissions from regulation and
therefore hinders the overall effectiveness of the climate change
regime.83

No Category Currently Exists to Properly
Address Emerging Economies Like China
The current division of obligations created by the principle of
CDR in the Kyoto Protocol lacks a proper category to encompass
China, an emerging economy and major-emitter that continues to
develop rapidly.84 The Protocol adopts the language of CDR from
the UNFCCC, and does not further differentiate among the group
of developing country parties.85 Rather, it re-emphasizes the distinctions of the UNFCCC, calling on the Annex I developed country parties to implement policies that minimize the adverse effects
of climate change, including the adverse impacts on other developing country parties and “especially” those types of developing
countries listed in Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC.86
Despite China’s efforts to depict itself as one of the developing countries that is “particularly vulnerable” to adverse climate
change impacts, economic data does not support that characterization.87 Further, recent history—from the Beijing Olympics
to China’s influence on global financial issues—also contradicts
the idea that China is a developing country by demonstrating its
relatively advanced level of development and sophistication.88
Plainly China does not fit into the same developing country category as the least developed countries in Africa or especiallyvulnerable small island nations, and thus should not have similar
rights and obligations.89
Furthermore, it is highly relevant that China recently passed
the United States as the leading global emitter of GHGs because
it demonstrates the shifting realities of the climate change crisis.90
China may well want to maintain the current unnuanced construction of CDR, which allows it to self-categorize as a developing country without binding reduction commitment targets. If
the world were not in such a precipitous position with regard to
climate change—as most scientists agree it is—under basic principles of equity China would not be required to take the measures
the moment now demands of them. 91 Consequently, a set of differentiated responsibilities that allow a major-emitting country
like China to go unregulated is fundamentally flawed.92
Although China does not fit into the current developing country category, neither does it fit in with the developed countries
of Annex I and Annex II.93 For all of its recent progress, China
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has not yet fully industrialized and continues to develop both its
physical infrastructure and its economy.94 A useful metaphor is
to envision China as consisting of a set of relatively developed
islands located in a sea of people living in developing country
conditions.95 Indeed, hundreds of millions of Chinese remain in
poverty, a characteristic China distinctly does not share with the
developed nations in Europe or the United States.96 According to
the 2008 World Development Index, all of the Annex I and Annex
II countries qualified as highly developed; China, by contrast, has
only medium development.97 Neither a developed, nor a least
developed country, China does not fit into either category under
the current application of the principle of CDR.98

The UNFCCC Needs a New Category of
Emitter to Ensure Greater Participation
Although member countries must agree to be bound by the
protocols of the UNFCCC, there is no clear mechanism in the
Convention to determine the degree to which each country will
be bound.99 Therefore, the regime relies upon individual actors’
sense of responsibility for damage done to a common good—the
climate—and provides little else as incentive to commit to reducing emissions. The UNFCCC as a legal instrument relies on selfdesignation and elective commitments made in the global public
interest.100
China and other emerging economies are unlikely to undertake the costly and burdensome task of reducing GHG emissions
solely in the interest of an international common good.101 Therefore, because it lacks both the teeth to impose binding commitments upon parties and sufficient incentives to draw parties to
voluntarily commit, the UNFCCC has very few legal tools at its
disposal to obtain increased commitments out of unwilling parties.

The International Community Must Use A Variety
of Incentives in Climate Negotiations
To many observers and participants, the 2009 Copenhagen
COP ended rather disappointingly, without a binding successor
to the Kyoto Protocol.102 The international community, however,
retains the opportunity, and in fact the imperative, to create a more
effective climate change agreement in the near future. The division of responsibilities under the CDR is one area that must be
revised.
China could be persuaded by a combination of extra-legal
incentives to participate in a future international climate regime
that entails binding commitments.103 The incentives include the
prospect of increased global stature and an opportunity to efficiently solve an international problem that domestically poses
great dangers, as well as pressure from internal and external
sources.104
The first key incentive for China to accept binding commitments in a successor to the Kyoto Protocol would be to mitigate
the serious threats that climate change impacts pose to Chinese
public health.105 As China’s GHG emissions increase, it will
become more difficult for the Chinese government to ignore the
link between outdoor air pollution and mortality.106 Significantly
reducing GHG emissions could deliver important improvements
in public health while also contributing to the global effort to
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fight climate change.107 Second, greater participation in the postKyoto regime would provide a corresponding opportunity for
China to influence the design of the next international climate
change agreement to their national benefit.108 Because successful
international regimes distribute net benefits to participating countries, if China takes the lead among developing nations in fighting
global climate change, its position at the negotiating table will be
enhanced and benefits flowing to China from the structure of the
plan would reflect that position.109 Finally, greater participation
in the fight against climate change would further enhance China’s
reputation as an international leader and indicate to the world
that China envisions a leadership role that involves greater global
responsibility.110
In addition to the incentives directly derived from greater
commitment to fighting climate change, China faces pressure to
act from domestic as well as foreign sources.111 Within China,
intense GHG emissions have translated to incredible air pollution, which in turn has caused a corresponding public health problem.112 This situation poses a threat to the legitimacy of the CCP,
which has thus far focused on rapid development at the expense of
environmental quality.113 Further, the danger of widespread civil
unrest over climate change impacts is real.114 China may need to
take more aggressive action on air pollution and climate change
and deliver tangible results in order for the CCP to maintain control over the country.115
Finally, China may face increasing pressure to reduce emissions from developing countries that are not enjoying a similar
economic boom.116 For example, small island developing countries and those countries the UNFCCC designates as least developed may resent that China lacks binding commitments yet is a
major GHG emitter.117 Likewise, developing countries that are
not experiencing rapid economic development should take a more
aggressive and vocal role in negotiations. Developing nations, on
average, will suffer greater costs than developed countries in the
wake of significant climate change.118 These actors must rally
support during the international climate negotiations for all major
emitters to take responsibility in reducing emissions.
Although the UNFCCC does not include many legal tools,
the COP could pursue other strategies to obtain greater Chinese
participation. If engaged in a general appeal to enlightened pragmatism, China may agree to some binding commitments in the
successor to the Kyoto Protocol so long as it can expect both
global and domestic net benefits.119

A New Category For High-emitting, Emerging
Economies
If China can be persuaded to commit to reducing emissions
in an international climate change regime, this could involve the
creation of a category creating obligations at a level somewhere
in between those of developed and developing countries parties. Because the principle of CDR applied in the Kyoto Protocol
already has created distinctions within both the developed and the
developing country categories, the post-Kyoto regime could carry
the differentiation one step further to take into account emerging
economies.
Specifically, one option would be to create a third distinct
category for China and other similarly-situated countries like
India and Indonesia.120 This category would require emerging
economies to reduce emissions to a lesser degree than developed
nations, but their commitments would increase over time as the
emerging economies attain developed nation status. In a converse
construction to the relationship between Annex I and Annex II
countries, emerging economies would commit to some binding
emission reduction targets, and would continue to receive the benefit of money and technology transfer from developed countries in
Annex I.121 China would certainly fall into an emerging economy
category and thus could be subject to a set of commitments occupying the middle ground between developed countries and developing countries.122

Conclusion
Climate change is a complex, daunting problem requiring a
high degree of international cooperation for any effective solution. Thus far, the nations of the world have agreed on the existence of a problem, but a functional solution remains elusive.123
The Copenhagen Accord represents a step in the right direction,
as major-emitting, emerging economies like China and India have
signaled their intent to engage in the UNFCCC in the future.124
Going forward at subsequent COPs, China and the rest of the
world must reexamine the current interpretation of CDR, and realize that a more nuanced categorization model is necessary. China
can and must be persuaded—perhaps through an appeal to Chinese pride and pragmatism—to accept binding emissions-reduction quotas in a revised application of the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities.125 Although achieving such
goals will be difficult, it is nevertheless incumbent upon the global
community to seek out a feasible international regime to fight the
adverse impacts of climate change.

Endnotes: Equitable But Ineffective: How the Principle of Common
But Differentiated Responsibilities Hobbles the Global
Fight Against Climate Change
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See Juliet Eilperin, Long Droughts, Rising Seas Predicted Despite Future
CO2 Curbs, Wash. Post, Jan. 27, 2009, at A4 (reporting the results of an international study showing that such impacts could persist for as long as 1,000
years).
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Legal Foundations for NGO Participation in
Climate Treaty Negotiations
by Winfield J. Wilson*

D

uring the Copenhagen climate change negotiations in
December 2009,1 as the talks concluded tensely for
government representatives,2 coalitions of environmental groups were disappointed because their efforts to play
a participatory role had been frustrated.3 The silencing of the
nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) perspective runs counter to established international principles of broad participation
in multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”),4 and is
particularly troubling in light of the global challenge climate
change poses to humanity.
At the beginning of the second of two weeks of the negotiations, as pressure mounted for the talks to produce a meaningful
and binding treaty, logistics and site-management broke down
at the conference center and the UN suspended observer registration, leaving thousands literally standing in the cold.5 On
a broader level, the lockout prompted NGO leaders to invoke
international principles on public involvement in MEAs in a
letter to political leaders, which cited the 1992 Rio Declaration
and the UN Commission on Sustainable Development’s Agenda
21 language that “non-governmental organizations play a vital
role in the shaping and implementation of participatory democracy.”6 More pointedly, NGOs considered the lockout a Danish
violation of the Aarhus Convention,7 which provides for public
participation in MEA decision-making as vital for accountable
governance and effective environmental protection.8
NGOs could claim a violation of the Aarhus Convention’s
Articles 6, 7, or 8, on public participation in environmental decision-making.9 The challenge for NGOs, however, is that only
Parties are bound by these articles and can enforce them, and
NGOs are not Parties.10
While the Convention provides negotiation and arbitration
between Parties as enforcement mechanisms, additional measures for compliance have been further outlined in subsequent
Convention Decisions made during Meetings of the Parties at
Lucca, Italy and Almaty, Kazakhstan.11 Notably under these
Convention Decisions, members of the public including NGOs
may submit formal communications to the Compliance Committee and allege a violation, subject to some procedural requirements.12 Based on the Lucca and Almaty Decisions, NGOs
could petition for a compliance action against Denmark for the
administrative actions that led to the exclusion of observers at
the conference center in Copenhagen. Ultimately, however,
compliance rests with the Parties when they decide whether to
take action at Meetings of the Parties, although they do take into
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account the reports from the Compliance Committee.13 Even
though NGOs would not be able to force Denmark to comply
with the Convention, such an action could create publicity and
ongoing pressure on future hosts of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).
However, invocation of participatory requirements of the
Aarhus Convention is also limited in geographic scope, as only
some European and Eurasian countries are Parties, and does not
include many of the largest nations and greenhouse gas emitters, for example, the United States or China.14 Notably, the
next Conference of the Parties (“COP”) of the UNFCCC is in
Mexico, also not a party to Aarhus, leaving open the possibility
of exclusion of NGOs from that meeting.15
The UNFCCC has draft rules of procedure that could
serve as the basis for greater public participation, but it has not
adopted them, even though it, in effect, operates under them.16
These draft rules do include provisions on public participation,
but are not nearly as inclusive and ambitious as the goals set
out in the Aarhus Convention.17 The draft rules, which allow
for observers to attend and participate without any voting privileges,18 should be adopted by the UNFCCC as a first step to
ensuring NGO participation.
In order to be more comprehensive and consistent with the
Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, and the Aarhus Convention, the
UNFCCC should further create procedures providing the opportunity for meaningful public participation at all climate meetings, regardless of location. At a minimum, the UNFCCC should
write and adopt new rules that specifically address the logistics
of observer participation at every meeting. Ideally, affirmative
rights to petition for public participation, which embrace the
principles of MEAs and create a progressive and democratic
process, will also be created.19 The universal problem of climate
change impacts every person on the globe and climate negotiations must provide legal protection for public participation to
ensure an inclusive and effective solution.

Endnotes: Legal Foundations for NGO Participation in
Climate Treaty Negotiations continued on page 69

* Winfield J. Wilson is a J.D./M.P.P. candidate, May 2011, at American University Washington College of Law & School of Public Affairs.

54

Book Review
Book Review: Storms of My Grandchildren:
The Truth About the Coming Climate
Catastrophe and Our Last Chance to Save
Humanity
by James Hansen
Reviewed by Lauren Trevisan*

I

n the recently released Storms of My Grandchildren,1 NASA
physicist James Hansen presents analyses that have led the
majority of the global scientific community to conclude that
climate change is not only real, but also a danger to posterity.
The book, which is Hansen’s first, chronicles the last eight years
of his journey as a government scientist interacting with policymakers and increasingly, with the public. He describes how
his growing concern about the hazards of inaction led him to
leave the comfort of the laboratory and enter the public sphere.
Despite disappointing interactions with politicians, censorship by the Bush administration, and criticism for his tenacity,
Hansen has maintained his unyielding and optimistic view that
humanity can avert the most extreme consequences of climate
change. However, he makes it very clear: we must act now to
do so.
Hansen’s story begins on his sixtieth birthday, March 29,
2001, the day he was invited to attend the first meeting of the
Vice President’s Climate Task Force. Hansen was optimistic going into the meeting, taking his invitation as a sign that
the Bush administration planned to make good on its campaign promises to reduce carbon dioxide. However, this meeting, and several other cabinet-level presentations, proved to
be disappointments; Hansen’s urgent recommendations were
cherry-picked or ignored completely. Evidencing his bipartisan
approach to politics, Hansen does however give credit where
credit is due. After his initial meetings with the Bush administration, the White House did take steps to reduce methane
emissions and regulate soot from cars and trucks; however, the
administration dismissed Hansen’s urgent call for carbon dioxide reductions.
In part, Hansen attributes the Bush administration’s inaction to simultaneous presentations given by Dr. Richard
Lindzen, whom Hansen calls the “dean of global warming contrarians.” Hansen’s difficulty in being pitted against Lindzen in
those meetings seems to epitomize the broader environmental
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and scientific communities’ difficulties in confronting climate
skeptics. Hansen explains that “Lindzen makes qualitative statements that sound reasonable, and he raises technical matters
that a layperson cannot assess, making it sound like there is an
argument among theorists.” Hansen addresses and clarifies these
perceived inconsistencies and identifies them as part of the motivation behind political inaction.
Although the perceived divide among scientists has lent
itself to slow-to-nonexistent policy changes, Hansen devotes a
large portion of his book to decry the role of special interests in
policy making. Hansen argues that the short-term, profit-driven
focus of special interests, in particular the fossil fuel industry,
fundamentally conflicts with the long-term solutions needed to
deal with climate change. The impact of special interests is part
of what drove Hansen to enter the public sphere. He states that
“[t]he public, if well informed, has the ability to override the
influence of special interests . . . . Scientists can play a useful
role if they help communicate the climate change story to the
public in a credible, understandable fashion.” While seemingly
straightforward and logical, Hansen’s reasoning proved to be
highly controversial.
Hansen details his numerous public appearances and the
almost instantaneous pushback he received. Despite threats from
Bush-era NASA Office of Special Counsel, Hansen went ahead
with several presentations on climate change, speaking as a public citizen and not a government employee. Hansen entered the
public sphere after being widely quoted in the press for comments about Bush administration censorship of scientific data
and disregard for scientific results that went against its prerogatives. Hansen’s description of his 2006 60 Minutes interview and
others gives an insight into the impact his outspoken approach to

*Lauren Trevisan is a J.D. Candidate, May 2012, at American University
Washington College of Law.
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climate change had within NASA, even prompting the removal
of a portion of its mission statement that Hansen used to begin
his talks: “to understand and protect our home planet.”
Hansen presents his journey from laboratory scientist, to
government advisor, to public advocate, while simultaneously
using science to explain the history, differing theories, and alternative future scenarios of climate change. To address climate
change effectively, knowledge is key; Hansen endeavors and
succeeds in presenting this knowledge in his book. He acknowledges the complexity of the issue, but refuses to allow that to be
an obstacle. In the later portion of the book, Hansen provides

recommendations for advocacy: namely increased renewable
energy production and energy efficiency, an end to the use of
coal, and the use of nuclear energy. For these objectives to be
realized requires widespread, active public involvement. Hansen
does not disparage politicians or public office; rather, he emphasizes the importance of citizens engaging in the political process
and making their voices heard. Storms of My Grandchildren is at
its core, a call to well-informed action. In the final pages, Hansen juxtaposes photographs of his grandchildren with his urgent
and direct message that “[y]ou will need to be a protector of
your children and grandchildren . . . [i]t is our last chance.”
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press-releases/879.html; Press Release, Ladislav Kriz, Press Officer, CEZ, a.
s., Renewal of CEZ´s Brown-Coal Resources? Opportunity for Firms in the
District of Usti (Feb. 11, 2005), http://www.cez.cz/en/cez-group/media/nuclearpower-plant-news/2733.html (noting that CEZ Power Company is a subsidiary
of the Skupina ČEZ Group).
2 See Leos Rousek, Micronesia Wants Czechs to Scrap Coal-Fired
Plant Renewal, Wall St. J. (Jan. 15, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/neweurope/2010/01/15/micronesia-wants-czechs-scrap-coal-fired-plant-czechsmay-want-more-warmth/tab/article/ (relaying the Czech Republic’s intention to
complete the project by the end of January 2010).
3 See Letter from Andrew Yatilman, Dir., Office of Env’t and Emergency
Mgmt, F. States of Micr., to Ministry of the Env’t of the Czech Rep. 1 (Dec. 3,
2009), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/case-documents/
cz/FSM.request.TEIA.pdf; Letter from Andrew Yatilman, Dir., Office of Env’t
and Emergency Mgmt, F. States of Micr., to Ing. Karel Bláha, CSc., Deputy
Minister, Dir. Gen. of the Directorate of Technical Prot. of Env’t, Ministry
of the Env’t of the Czech Rep. 1 (Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://www.
pohodacez.cz/files/file/Viewpoint %20of%20FSM%20on%20renovation%20
of%20Prunerov%20II%20Plant.pdf.
4 See Letter from Andrew Yatilman, supra note 3, at 1.
5 See Id.
6 See Council Directive 85/337, On the Assessment of the Effects of Certain
Public and Private Projects on the Environment, 1985 O.J. (L 175) (EEC) as
Amended in Council Directive 97/11, 1997 O.J. (L 73) (EC) and 2003/35, art. 3
(5), 2003 O.J. (L 156) 17, 19 (EC) (requiring Member States to consider a project’s “significant effects” on the environment in another Member State).
7 See Greenpeace, Background FSM / Czech Republic TEIA 2, http://www.
greenpeace.org/ raw/content/international/press/reports/teia_fsm.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Greenpeace] (noting that while EIAs frequently
consider environmental impact on adjacent states, FSM’s claim is also unique
in its request for such an assessment even though it is far from the source of the
emission).
8 See Letter from Andrew Yatilman, supra note 3, at 1.
9 See id. at 1.
10 See id. at 1, 4.
11 See Letter from Andrew Yatilman, supra note 3, at 1.
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12

See generally United Nations Economic Commission for Europe [UNECE],
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context
(Espoo Convention), Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309.
13 See Council Directive 85/337, On the Assessment of the Effects of Certain
Public and Private Projects on the Environment, 1985 O.J. (L 175) (EEC),
amended by Council Directive 97/11, 1997 O.J. (L 73) (EC) and 2003/35, art. 3
(5), 2003 O.J. (L 156) 17, 19 (EC).
14 See zákon č. 100/2001 Sb., Posuzování Vlivů na Životní Prostředí [EIA
Environment] ve znění [as amended by] zákon č. 93/2004 Sb. (based on a translated version).
15 See Greenpeace, supra note 7.
16 See Council Directive 85/337, On the Assessment of the Effects of Certain
Public and Private Projects on the Environment, 1985 O.J. (L 175) (EEC),
amended by Council Directive 97/11, 1997 O.J. (L 73) (EC) and 2003/35, art. 3
(5), 2003 O.J. (L 156) 17, 19 (EC).
17 zákon č. 100/2001 Sb., Posuzování Vlivů na Životní Prostředí [EIA Environment] ve znění [as amended by] zákon č. 93/2004 Sb. (based on a translated
version).
18 See Greenpeace, supra note 7.
19 See Letter from Andrew Yatilman, supra note 3, at 2.
20 See Directive 2008/1, Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control [IPPC],
(18), 2008 O.J. (L 24) 8, 9 (EC), amending Council Directive 96/61 IPPC
1996 O.J. (L 275) (EC); see also zákon č. 76/2002 Sb., Integrovaná Prevence
a Omezování Znečištění (IPPC) [Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control
(IPPC)] (based on a translated version).
21 See Press Release, Ladislav Kriz, supra note 1.
22 See Press Release, Ladislav Kriz, Press Officer, CEZ, a. s., CEZ Group
Wants to Reduce Greenhouse Gases Emissions by 15 per cent (Mar. 16, 2007),
http://www.cez.cz/en/cez-group/media/press-releases/779.html.
23 See European Commission, IPPC, Reference Document on Best Available
Techniques for Large Combustion Plants 269 (July 2006) [hereinafter IPCC
Reference Document].
24 Member States, under Article 3 of the IPPC shall implement the application
of BAT. Article 9 applies at the installation level, such as the Prunéřov II plant,
and requires the use of BAT to establish the “emission limit values.” In addition, Article 12, requires that Member States take appropriate action to ensure
that no “substantial change” proposed by the operator is made unless in accordance with this Directive. See Directive 2008/1, IPPC, art. 3, 9, 12, 2008 O.J.
(L 24) 8, 9 (EC), amending Council Directive 96/61 IPPC 1996 O.J. (L 275)
(EC).
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See IPCC Reference Document, supra note 24, at 11.
See SCES–Group, spol. s r. o., Dokumentace Záměru Komplexní Obnova
Elektrárny Prunéřov II 3 × 250 MWe dle Zákona č. 100/2001 Sb., v Platném
Znění, 11, 13 (Dec. 2008), available at http://tomcat.cenia.cz/eia/download.
jsp?view=eia_cr&id=MZP221&file=dokumentaceDOC (based on a translated
version).
27 See Letter from Andrew Yatilman, supra note 3, at 2.
28 The BREF BAT range for thermal efficiency of an existing pulverized combustion (“PC”) lignite plant ranges from 36%-40% or an incremental improvement of more than 3%. The current efficiency level of Prunéřov II lignite plant
is 33%. See supra, note 24, at 269; Press Release, Jan Dusík, M.Sc., First
Deputy Minister and Dir. of the Foreign, Legislative and State Admin. Section,
Czech Ministry of the Env’t, Ministerstvo Životního Prostředí Nechá Posoudit
Obnovu Uhelné Plektrárny Prunéřov Nezávislým Mezinárodním Týmem
(Jan. 26, 2010), available at http://www.mzp.cz/cz/news_tz100126prunerov_
posouzeni_brifink (translation unavailable).
29 See Letter from Andrew Yatilman, supra note 3, at 2; Press Release,
Ladislav Kriz, supra note 1.
30 See IPCC Reference Document, supra note 24, at 269.
31 See Letter from Andrew Yatilman, supra note 4, at 2.
32 See Press Release, Jan Dusík, supra note 29; see also Michael Kahn & Jan
Korselt, Micronesia Leads Czechs to Seek Power Plant Review, Reuters (Jan.
26, 2010), http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE60P2C520100126.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See generally Press Release, Jan Dusík, supra note 29; see also Michael
Kahn, supra note 29. But see Letter from Andrew Yatilman, supra note 4, at 1.
36 On February 9, 2010, the Czech Environmental Minister Jan Dusík,
announced that the ministry selected Norwegian firm DNV to review the
planned expansion of the Prunéřov II plant. DNV will review: (1) the BAT as
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detailed in the BREF for large combustion sources and energy efficiency; (2)
the EIA process as it pertains to completeness, accuracy, and transparency; and
(3) calculate and evaluate the difference in CO2 emissions from the proposed
plant and the plant conforming to the higher BAT level. The finalization of the
EIA final opinion will use DNV’s report, expected in mid March of 2010, as an
advisory document. See Press Release, Jan Dusík, M.Sc., First Deputy Minister
and Dir. of the Foreign, Legislative and State Admin. Section, Czech Ministry
of the Env’t, Mezinárodní Posouzení Záměru,Komplexní Obnova Elektrárny
Prunéřov 3 x 250 MWe“ Zpracuje Konzultační Firma DNV (based on a translated version) (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.mzp.cz/cz/news_100208_prunerov;
see also Jason Hovet, Czechs tap Norwegian firm for coal plant, Reuters
(Feb. 9, 2010) http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE6181UV20100209. On
March 18, 2010, the Czech Environmental Minister Jan Duskin resigned after
Prime Minister Jan Fischer put pressure on him to approve state-owned CEZ’s
planned expansion of the Prunéřov II plant. Duskin referenced DNV’s report
indicating CEZ’s renovation would not use best available technology (“BAT”)
and thus refused to approve the project. “I am not convinced that it is possible
to give a positive or negative opinion with a clear conscience now, with regards
to the situation in which the EIA (“Environmental Impact Assessment”) process is presently in,” Dusik said. “That’s why I decided to resign.” See Press
Release, Jan Dusík, M.Sc., First Deputy Minister and Dir. of the Foreign,
Legislative and State Admin. Section, Czech Ministry of the Env’t, Elektrárna
Prunéřov: Ministr Dusík Odchází Z Vlády (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.mzp.cz/
cz/news_TZ_100318; see also Press Release Tisková Zpráva A Studie DNV K
Záměru Obnovy Uhelné Elektrárny Prunéřov (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.mzp.
cz/cz/news_TZ_100318_DNV; Czech Enviro Minister Resigns Over Power
Plant, Business Week (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/
financialnews/D9EH85O80.htm; Jason Hovet, Czech Minister Quits Over Controversial Power Plant, Reuters (Mar. 18, 2010), http://uk.reuters.com/article/
idUKLDE62H22D20100318.

Endnotes: Climate Change and the Regional Human Rights Systems continued from page 38
4

In response to Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23, the Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a detailed analytical study,
inviting submissions from states, intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations, national human rights organizations, and other experts, on the
implications of climate change for the enjoyment of human rights. The results
were submitted with its annual report to the Human Rights Council, with Part
II using this means of measuring of consequences. See Report of the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship
between Climate Change and Human Rights, A/HRC/10/61, Jan. 15, 2009, pt.
II.
5 See, e.g. id. pt. III (detailing the relevant national and international human
rights obligations of states).
6 Parallel Workshop on Climate Change and Human Rights, Presented at
the 2009 Global Humanitarian Forum Geneva on Human Impact of Climate
Change, June 23-24, 2009, available at http://www.ghf-ge.org/Portals/0/pdfs/
climate_change_and_human_rights_wk.pdf (identifying individual petitions
before the regional human rights systems as one of four avenues for legal
recourse using human rights law).
7 Council of Europe, supra note 3, at 4 (describing international environmental
law as “a law of co-operation, in which States undertake commitments to support each other[] to address global concerns”).
8 Despite positive developments in laying the groundwork for future negotiations, UNFCCC COP-15 failed to result in a comprehensive agreement on
climate change. Video: Press Briefing by UNFCCC Executive Secretary Yves
de Boer on the Outcome of Copenhagen and the Way Forward in 2010, Jan. 20,
2010, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgNkkBHlZqg&feature=
player_embedded (describing Copenhagen as “not a complete success”).
9 For example, the United States has not ratified the American Convention on
Human Rights and does not accept the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights.
10 In each system, the enforcement of judgments relies on the political weight
and moral authority of the Council of Europe, the Organization of American
States (“OAS”), and the African Union. Whereas the European system formally
charges the Council of Ministers to enforce judgments of the European Court
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of Human Rights, the role of the OAS in enforcement is not explicit, but rests
on moral weight and political pressure rather than threat of sanctions. See Lea
Shaver, The Inter-American Human Rights System: An Effective Institution
for Regional Human Rights Protection?, 9:4 Washington U. Global L. Stud.
Rev., available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1437633. In the African system,
“blatant disregard” for the recommendations of the African Commission is
more widespread. Fekadeselassie F. Kidanemariam, Enforcement of Human
Rights under Regional Mechanisms: a Comparative Analysis (2006) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Georgia School of Law), available at http://
digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079&context=stu_
llm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
11 See, generally, Kidanemariam, supra note 10.
12 Cross-referencing Article 22, which articulates a people’s collective right
to economic, social, and cultural development, Article 24 of the Charter
enshrines a people’s “right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to
their development.” African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
adopted June 27, 1981, arts. 22, 24, available at http://www.africa-union.org/
official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Banjul%20Charter.pdf.
13 See, e.g., The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for
Economic and Social Rights / Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96, Decision ACHPR/
COMM/A044/1 ¶ 52 (2002) (stating that Article 24 of the Banjul Charter
“imposes clear obligations upon a government . . . to take reasonable and other
measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable development and use of natural
resources”), available at http://www.cesr.org/downloads/AfricanCommissionDecision.pdf.
14 ACHPR Resolution, supra note 3.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking
Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and
Omissions of the United States, Dec. 7, 2005 [hereinafter Inuit Circumpolar
Petition], available at http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/files/uploads/icc-files/
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FINALPetitionICC.pdf.
18 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Adopted by the 9th
International Conference of American States, Bogota, Colombia, 1948, available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.American%20Declaration.
htm. Although the American Declaration was originally adopted as a declaration rather than a binding instrument, both the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have interpreted
it as a source of international obligations for members of the Organization of
American States. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Introduction,
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic1.%20Intro.htm#_ftnref5 (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
19 Inuit Circumpolar Petition, supra note 9, at 1-9.
20 Id. at 5 (noting that the rights violated arise either from the American Declaration or other international human treaties binding on the United States).
21 Id. at 103-110.
22 Shaver, supra note 10.
23 Inuit Circumpolar Petition, supra note 9, at 13-69.
24 Center for International Environmental Law, The Inuit Case, http://www.
ciel.org/Climate/Climate_Inuit.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
25 Letter from the IACHR to representatives of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, EarthJustice, and CIEL, Ref: Global Warming and Human Rights, Hearing – 127th Ordinary Period of Sessions, Feb. 1, 2007, available at http://www.
ciel.org/Publications/IACHR_Response_1Feb07.pdf.
26 Video: General Hearing on Global Warming and Human Rights, IACHR
127th Ordinary Period of Sessions, Mar. 1, 2007 [hereinafter Hearing], available at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/videosasf/2007/03/CIDH_1.wmv (question of Commissioner Paulo Sergio Pinheiro).
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Id. (question of Commissioner Victor Abromovich) (author’s translation).
Id. (question of Commissioner Santiago Canton).
29 Id. (question of Commissioner Paulo Sergio Pinheiro).
30 Id. (response of Martin Wagner, Earthjustice Managing Attorney).
31 Attorney Martin Wagner discussed the then-pending case, Massachusetts
v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 49 U.S. 497 (2007), in which the
U.S. Supreme Court determined that GHGs constitute air pollutants covered
by the Clean Air Act and therefore subject to regulation by the EPA. But, as
he pointed out, the Clean Air Act does not offer a mechanism for individuals
to obtain compensation for violations resulting from government failure to
regulate, because under U.S. tort law, a tort claim can only be brought if the
government waives its sovereign immunity, which is highly unlikely. Moreover, Wagner pointed out that the rights at issue in this case, such as the right to
culture, are not guaranteed in the U.S. constitution or U.S. law. Id. (response of
Martin Wagner, Earthjustice Managing Attorney). Paul Crowley, the Canadian
attorney for Sheila Watt-Cloutier, noted that similar barriers to legal recourse
exist in Canada. Id. (response of Paul Crowley).
32 Hearing, supra note 26 (response of Donald Goldberg, CIEL Senior Attorney).
33 Id. (question of Commissioner Victor Abromovich) (author’s translation).
34 Council of Europe, supra note 3, at 11.
35 Id. at 12.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 13.
38 Council of Europe, supra note 3.
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Endnotes: Industry Cries Foul to EPA’s Attempt to Regulate GHG Emissions Using the Clean Air Act
continued from page 42
6

See Notice of Issuance of the Administrator’s Interpretation, 73 Fed. Reg.
80,300 (Dec. 31, 2008); Memorandum from Stephen L. Johnson, Administrator of EPA, to Regional Administrators of EPA (Dec. 18, 2008), [hereinafter
Memorandum], available at http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/psd_interpretive_memo_12.18.08.pdf (proposing and financing its endangerment finding
and advocating an interpretation of “subject to regulation” that permits public
comment).
7 See generally EPA, New Source Review: Fact Sheet (Sept. 30, 2009), http://
www.epa.gov/NSR/fs20090930action.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Fact Sheet] (summarizing the regulation from the EPA’s perspective).
8 Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (stating that EPA “can avoid taking
further action . . . if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot
or will not exercise its discretion,” but “not reach[ing] the question whether on
remand EPA must make an endangerment finding, or whether policy concerns
can inform EPA’s actions in the event that it makes such a finding”).
9 Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
10 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(4) (1990). But cf. EPA Protection of
Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(50)(iv) (2010) (using very similar language
to include more regulated pollutants).
11 See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed.
Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008).
12 See Memorandum, supra note 6.
13 See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed.
Reg. at 44,354 (explaining that the classification of GHGs individually or as a
class has impacts on the determination of BACT requirements).
14 Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed.
Reg. 49,454 (Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86 and 600).
15 See EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases under the Clean Air Act (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (clarifying that though
the finding does not impose new requirements, it is a prerequisite to regulation).
16 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (Oct. 27, 2009) [hereinafter PSD and Title V
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GHG Tailoring Rule] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 52, 70 and 71). See
generally Fact Sheet, supra note 7 (describing the proposal as addressing “large
facilities emitting over 25,000 tons of GHGs a year”).
17 PSD and Title V GHG Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292.
18 Id.
19 See id. (citing Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
20 Id.
21 See, e.g., National Association of Manufacturers, National Association of
Manufacturers’ Form Comment Page, http://namissvr.nam.org/minisites/EPA/
index.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (encouraging comment on the EPA’s tailoring rule from the perspective of the manufacturer).
22 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 144-45 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-172, at
96-97 (1977) (“Such a [permitting] process is reasonable and necessary for very
large sources, such as new electrical generating plants or new steel mills. But
the procedure would prove costly and potentially unreasonable if imposed on
construction of storage facilities for a small gasoline jobber or on the construction of a new heating plant at a junior college, each of which may have the
potential to emit 100 tons of pollution annually.”). See also Ala. Power Co., 636
F.2d at 353-54 (stating that Congress’s “intention [in passing the CAA] was to
identify facilities which, due to their size, are financially able to bear the substantial regulatory costs imposed by the PSD provisions and which, as a group, are
primarily responsible for emission of the deleterious pollutants that befoul our
nation’s air. . . . [A] further look at the legislative history reveal[s] that Congress
was concerned with large industrial enterprises—major actual emitters of air
pollution. The draftsmen were of the view that certain small industrial facilities
within these categories might actually and potentially emit less than the threshold amount.”). Id.
23 But see MIT, The Future of Coal (2007), available at http://web.mit.edu/
coal/The_Future_of_Coal.pdf. The cost of carbon sequestration is about $30/ton
of CO2, although the estimate is uncertain. See id. at 91.
24 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 94-717, at 23 (1976) (noting that Congress did not
intend to simply create delays or impair economic growth). See Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7470 (1990) (The PSD program was intended ‘‘to insure that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent with the preservation of existing
clear air resources.”); H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 154 (1977) (legislation “not only
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protect[s] public health and welfare but also assur[es] future air resources will be
available for continuing the industrial and energy development so necessary for
the growth of the Nation”).
25 E.g., Sierra Club, Stopping the Coal Rush, http://www.sierraclub.org/
environmentallaw/coal/plantlist.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) (listing coal
plant projects by state and reporting where Sierra Club is in the response process); Lawsuit by Utah Utility Reflects GHG Woes for Coal Industry, Carbon
Control News, Aug. 27, 2007, available at http://publicutilities.utah.gov/
news/lawsuitbyutahutilityreflectsghgwoesforcoalindustry.pdf (discussing the
lawsuit initiated against a Californian energy company for removing its support for a power plant because of the passage of additional California laws);
David Hodas, Changing the Course Towards an Energy-Efficient Future, ABA
Trends, Nov./Dec. 2007, at 8 (reporting that Florida’s Public Service Commission rejected a proposal to build a $5.7 billion coal-fired plant near the
Everglades because of concerns about global warming); Patricia T. Barmeyer &
John C. Bottini, Longleaf: Georgia Court of Appeals rules in coal-fired power
plant appeal, ABA Trends, Nov./Dec. 2009, at 15 (illustrating that even if the
utility prevails, the project is delayed).
26 See Letter from Mike Simon, Stationary Source Program Manager, Idaho
Department of Environmental Quality, to Tom Hornyak, Manager, Southeast
Idaho Energy, LLC (Nov. 30, 2009), available at http://www.deq.idaho.gov/air/
permits_forms/ptc_final/se_idaho_energy_power_county_ptc_1109_permit.pdf
(issuing the permit under agreed terms).
27 See Implementation of the New Source Review Program for Particulate Matter Less Than 2.5 Micrometers, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,321, 28,324 (May 16, 2008)
(allowing the surrogate level to be used “until certain difficulties were resolved,
primarily the lack of necessary tools to calculate the emissions of PM2.5 and
related precursors, the lack of adequate modeling techniques to project ambient
impacts, and the lack of PM2.5 monitoring sites”).
28 See, e.g., Letter from the Solid Waste Ass’n of N. America to Envtl. Prot.
Agency (Dec. 23, 2009), available at http://swana.org/Portals/Advocacy/
SWANA_Comments_on_Tailoring_Rule.pdf [hereinafter SWANA Comments]
(arguing that the rule disproportionately negatively impacts the waste industry);
Letter from Pamela A. Rygalski, Head of Env’t, Health, and Safety, to EPA
(Dec. 23, 2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.
html#documentDetail?R=0900006480a72213 (alleging that the rule disproportionately negatively impacts glass manufacturers).
29 See SWANA Comments, supra note 28.
30 S. Rep. No. 95-172, at 96-97 (1977); Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323,
353 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
31 PSD and Title V GHG Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at Table VIII-2.
32 Id.
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See Letter from Tom Buis, Chief Executive Officer, Growth Energy, to Lisa
P. Jackson, Administrator, EPA (Dec. 23, 2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=0900006480a707df
(recommending that the rule have limited applicability to GHG emission from
fuel ethanol plants).
34 See Letter from Susan M. Walthall, Acting Chief Counsel for Advocacy,
Small Business Administration, to Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Administrator (Dec.
23, 2009), [hereinafter SBA Comments], available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/
laws/comments/epa09_1223.html.
35 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, No. GAO/GGD-00-193, Regulatory Flexibility Act: Implementation in EPA Program Offices and Proposed
Lead Rule 13 (2000), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/gao00_193.
pdf.
36 See SBA Comments, supra note 34; Robin Bravender, Small Businesses
See Devil in Details of EPA Greenhouse Gas Rule, N.Y. Times , Jan. 11, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/01/11/11greenwire-small-businesses-seedevil-in-details-of-epa-g-41923.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) (arguing that the
EPA did not sufficiently evaluate the effects of the tailoring rule on small businesses).
37 See EPA, EPA Analysis of the American Clean Energy and Security Act
of 2009: H.R. 2545 in the 111th Congress: Appendix 75 (2009), available at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/pdfs/HR2454_Analysis_Appendix.pdf (clarifying that this bill attempts to preserve domestic competitiveness).
38 See Hearing on Trade Aspects of Climate Change Legislation: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th
Cong. (2009) (statement of John J. McMackin on behalf of The Energy-Intensive Manufacturers’ Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Regulation), available
at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/111/mcm.pdf.
39 See Letter from Loren Yager, Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, to Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman of S. Committee on Finance (July 8, 2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d09724r.pdf (attaching U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, No. GAO-09-724R,
Climate Change Trade Measures: Consideration for U.S. Policy Makers
(July 2009)).
40 See discussion infra notes 28-30. See generally Climate Change Trade Measures: Estimating Industry Effects: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance,
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Loren Yager, Director International Affairs
& Trade, Gov’t Accountability Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d09875t.pdf; Trevor Houser et al., Leveling the Carbon Playing Field:
International Competition and US Climate Policy Design (Peterson Inst.
for Int’l Econ. & World Res. Inst. 2008), available at http://pdf.wri.org/leveling_the_carbon_playing_field.pdf.

Endnotes: SEC Interpretive Guidance for Climate-Related Disclosures continued from page 43
1

Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Interpretive Guidance on Disclosure Related to Business or Legal Developments Regarding Climate Change (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/news/
press/2010/2010-15.htm.
2 See Comm’n Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change,
Release Nos. 33-9106; 34-61469; FR-82, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,295-97 (Feb. 8, 2010)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211, 231, 241) [hereinafter Comm’n Guidance],
available at http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID
=103875523539+1+2+0&WAISaction=retrieve.
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Endnotes: U.S. Climate Change Policy v. International Trade Rules: Complying with GATT
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reduce carbon leakage and protect U.S. competitiveness). See also Chris Wold,
David Hunter & Melissa Powers, Climate Change and the Law 445 (2009)
(noting that the carbon leakage could be “significant”); Pew Center on Global
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§§ 763-64 (providing allowance rebates to eligible domestic sectors); id. § 768
(establishing the International Reserve Allowance Program).
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Foreign Trade Council, Inc., WTO – Compatibility of Four Categories of
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thinks such a provision could be “illegal and counterproductive”).
10 See Wold, supra note 3, at 447 (noting that GATT has been successful in
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world economy).
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14 See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 442 (discussing similar provisions in the
Lieberman-Warner bill, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007) and concluding that
requiring different allowances from different countries for “like” products
violates Article I); see H.R. 2454 supra note 5, § 768(a)(1)(A) (specifying that
the Administrator shall issue regulations regarding the details of IRAP); id. §
768(b) (establishing that the number of IRAs required for a covered good in
an eligible industrial sector shall be adjusted for the benefit conferred by free
allowances and the value of emission allowance rebates distributed to eligible
domestic sectors).
15 See H.R. 2454 supra note 5, § 768(a)(1)(E) (excepting goods that originate
in “the least developed of developing countries,” countries with de minimus
GHG emissions, and countries that are party to a nationally-enforceable international agreement). Because international trade agreements provide different

standards for developing countries in other circumstances, the exception for
goods originating in “any foreign country that the United Nations has identified as among the least developed of developing countries” may be considered
appropriate. See id. § 768(a)(1)(E)(ii).
16 See H.R. 2454 supra note 5, § 722(b) (establishing the methods of demonstrating compliance for domestic actors); id. § 722(d) (listing the rules regarding the use of offset credits, term offset credits, and international emissions
allowances); id. §§ 728, 737, & 743 (discussing the terms of international
emissions allowances, international offset credits and domestic offset credits);
id. §§ 725, 782 (establishing the allocation, banking, and borrowing of allowances for domestic actors); id. § 721(f) (compensatory allowances are permitted, under certain circumstances, for the destruction of fluorinated gases). See
also Dworsky, supra note 8, at 5 (concluding that ACES provides industry
with more allowances than needed to maintain profits and that as a result the
“most energy-intensive industries are likely to enjoy increased profits”). Cf.
Matthew Nicely & Valerie Ellis, The Potential Clash of Climate Change Policy
and International Trade Law, 4 Bus. L. Brief (Am. U) 4, 7 (2007) (noting
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claim that offsets stifle innovations because permitting compliance via investing
in forest conservation is a “low-tech” solution). See also Wold, supra note 3, at
491 (noting that advocates believe that banking promotes early action by lowering costs). However, banking has the possibility to disrupt emissions trading by:
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Endnotes: Equitable But Ineffective: How the Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
Hobbles the Global Fight Against Climate Change continued from page 53
2 See U.N. News Centre, World Has ‘Responsibility to Deliver’ in Year of
Crises, Ban Declares, Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.un.org/ apps/news/story.
asp?NewsID=29337&Cr=crises&Cr1= (last visited Jan. 29, 2009) (quoting UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on the urgent need for a comprehensive and
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3 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (requiring that only the “Parties included in Annex I shall . . . ensure that
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4 See Juliet Eilperin, Developing Nations Plan Emission Cuts, Wash. Post,
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that China, along with the United States, must actively work to reduce GHG
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emissions in order to solve the global climate change problem).
Barbara Finamore, China’s Recent Steps Towards Meeting Its Climate
Commitments, Mar. 5, 2010, http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/bfinamore/
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noting that China’s lack of commitments in the Kyoto Protocol was a major
reason the United States rejected the Protocol).
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2006, http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-03/08/content_246945.htm (last visited
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18 See, e.g., Eilperin, Developing Nations, supra note 4, (quoting South Korea’s
climate ambassador on the existence of a culture of finger-pointing and mistrust
among the member countries, where each country insists that others move first
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19 See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 38
Envtl. Rep. News & Analysis 10566, 10572 (2008) [hereinafter Sunstein, Of
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38 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10575, 10577 (concluding that this history led to a sense of inequity felt by nearly all of the developing countries, and
therefore hindered the negotiation process).
21 See id. (explaining that, unlike during Montreal Protocol negotiations,
developing countries were extremely reluctant to accept any binding reduction
targets until developed countries indicated that they would actually reduce their
emissions first).
22 See Centre for Int’l Sustainable Dev. L., The Principle of Common But
Differentiated Responsibilities: Origins & Scope, 1 (Aug. 26, 2002), http://
www.cisdl.org/pdf/brief_common.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2009) (finding CDR
to be widely accepted in treaty and state practices).
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23

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, art. 5, Sept.
16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 I.L.M. 1541.
24 See Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 19, at 10566, 10568
(deeming the negotiating model established by the Montreal Protocol extraordinarily successful at reversing ozone depletion).
25 See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 Geo.
L.J. 1565, 1607 (June 2008) (summarizing the principle as meaning that developed countries have to spend a significant amount of money on emissions
reduction, while developing countries do not).
26 See Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China?, supra note 12, at
1698 (suggesting that existing stocks and current flows of emissions be considered on separate bases in determining commitments of participating countries in
subsequent climate change agreements).
27 See, e.g., UNFCCC, supra note 7, pmbl. (recognizing the need for developed
countries to act immediately to reduce emissions, and further recognizing that
developing countries face additional challenges from climate change).
28 E.g., id. at Annex I and Annex II (distinguishing between developed countries that have completed a transition to a market economy and those developed
countries that have not).
29 See id. art. 4.2(a) (asserting that developed countries commit themselves
specifically to limit their human-generated GHG emissions to demonstrate that
they “are taking the lead” under the Convention).
30 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, arts. 4.4, 4.5 (emphasizing that developed country Parties shall assist “developing country Parties . . . in meeting costs of adaptation” to the adverse effects of climate change, and that developed countries
will “take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance . . . the transfer
of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to
. . . developing country Parties”).
31 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 3.1 (“The Parties should protect the climate
system . . . on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead. . .”).
32 See id., pmbl. and arts. 3.2, 4.8-4.9 (recognizing that some developing countries have specific needs and special circumstances that merit differentiated
treatment – such as low-lying countries; small island countries; and countries
with areas prone to flooding and fragile mountainous ecosystems – and highlighting the vulnerability of the least developed countries).
33 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4.2(g) (explaining that parties may shift
their status under the Convention at any time).
34 See id. arts. 4.2(g), 19.
35 See generally id. (lacking formal guidance on how the Conference of the
Parties should determine country designations for purposes of CDR differentiation).
36 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto
Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/3145.php (last visited Mar.
19, 2010) (noting that while the UNFCCC encourages developed countries to
reduce GHG emissions, the Kyoto Protocol actually committed them to reduction targets).
37 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/kp_ratification_20091203.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
2010).
38 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 3 (mandating that only developed
countries listed in Annex I shall limit their GHG emissions); see also id. art.
10 (stating all Parties reaffirm existing commitments “in pursuit of the ultimate
objective of the [Framework] Convention”).
39 See Sunstein, The World v. The United States and China?, supra note 12,
at 1682 (arguing that although China ratified the Kyoto Protocol, that decision
was meaningless to the international negotiation process because China’s ratification entails no obligations).
40 See generally Copenhagen Accord, supra note 6.
41 See China State Council Info. Office, White Paper: China’s Policies and
Actions on Climate Change § III (Oct. 29, 2008) available at http://www.
china.org.cn/government/news/2008-10/29/content_16681689.htm [hereinafter
White Paper: Climate Change] (citing CDR as a China guide in addressing
climate change).
42 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 10.
43 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 10; see also Copenhagen Accord,
supra note 6, at 4, 5 (committing Annex I Parties to achieve emissions targets
for 2020, and committing Non-Annex I Parties like China to implement mitigation actions).
44 See White Paper: Climate Change, supra note 41, at § III.
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45

See id. at § III (maintaining that, for their part, in addressing climate
change developing countries should merely adopt adaptation measures, reduce
emissions as much as possible, and generally fulfill their duties under the
UNFCCC); see also Sunstein, The World v. The United States and China?,
supra note 11, at 1682 (noting the reasons China refused to yield to U.S.-led
pressure to agree to emissions limitations under the Kyoto Protocol).
46 See Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 38 (detailing China’s suspicions that international demands for the nation to cut emissions are actually a thinly veiled
effort to impede China’s growth and development).
47 See The Impact of the 2008 Olympic Games On Human Rights and the Rule
of Law in China: Hearing Before the Congressional Executive Commission on
China, 110th Cong. 11 (Feb. 27, 2008) (statement of Roger R. Martella, Jr.,
Gen. Counsel, EPA) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:41150.pdf (testifying that the
Beijing Olympics demonstrated China’s world-class level of sophistication and
its ability to understand and address environmental issues).
48 See Gov.cn, China Fact File: Economic System, http://english.gov.cn/200602/08/content_182584.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2009) (explaining that economic reforms were the centerpiece of the Reform and Opening Policy, as
China transitioned from a planned economy to a market economy).
49 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, As Leaders Wrestle With Downturn, Developing Nations Get Ringside Seats, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 2008, at A13 (noting the
clout of developing nations’ leaders at a November 2008 G20 summit on the
global economic crisis, especially Chinese President Hu Jintao, “a leader with a
fat checkbook and the power that comes with it”).
50 E.g., Jonathan Watts, China Wakes Up To the Dangers of Pollution, The
Guardian, July 18, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/jul/18/
china.pollution (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) (reporting that Beijing’s air quality
can be so poor sometimes that schoolchildren are not allowed to go outside to
play at recess); see also Elizabeth C. Economy, The Great Leap Backward?
The Costs of China’s Environmental Crisis, Foreign Aff., Sept./Oct. 2007 at 40
(noting that GHG emissions like particulate matter and sulfur dioxide contribute to respiratory problems in Chinese citizens and cause agriculture-harming
acid rain).
51 See Pew Center Report supra note 4, at 18 (reporting that together, China
and the United States emit forty percent of global GHGs, and that while China
is the current leader in annual emissions, China accounts for only eight percent
of historic emissions stocks).
52 See Economy, supra note 50, at 47 (citing the World Bank report’s controversial finding, which Beijing reportedly did not want publicly released, fearing
incitement of social unrest).
53 See Louisa Lim, Air Pollution Grows in Tandem With China’s Economy,
National Public Radio, May 22, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=10221268 (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) (explaining that the
main sources of pollution are industry, car emissions, and coal-processing).
54 See Andrew Jacobs, U.N. Report Points to Peril from Noxious ‘Brown
Clouds,’ N.Y. Times Nov. 13, 2008, at A6 (calling the resulting air a toxic mix
that can cause cardiovascular and respiratory disease).
55 See, e.g., Tougher Law to Curb Water Pollution, China Daily, Feb. 2, 2008,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ china/2008-02/29/content_6494712.htm (last
visited Feb. 18, 2009) (reporting on amendments to the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, which involve tougher punishments for polluters through
increased fines); see also Steven M. Dickinson, Energy Efficiency Law Devoid
of Substance, China Economic Review, Oct. 2008, http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/columnists/teven_m_dickinon/2008_10_01/An_empty_vessel.
html (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) (reporting that the primary goal of the Circular
Economy Law is to increase energy efficiency).
56 See Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Ann. Rep. 32, 133
(2008) (observing increased participation in environmental protests in the last
few years, particularly among the urban middle-class).
57 See Economy, supra note 50, at 46 (describing the threat that domestic environmental problems present to the Communist Party authority).
58 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 3.1 (asserting the equitable basis that the
parties to the Convention rely on in the climate change regime); see also Christopher D. Stone, Common But Differentiated Responsibilities in International
Law, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 276, 278 (chronicling the history of CDR, which is
present in the Treaty of Versailles, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, and various United Nations agreements); Lieberthal supra note 11, at 3,
55 (arguing that if the United States and China cooperate on fighting climate
change, their collaboration will help establish a successful post-Kyoto agreement, and that their agreement should be based upon the principle of CDR).
59 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 58, at 277-80 (arguing that CDR creates an
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arbitrary distinction, and citing the principle as a primary cause of struggles in
climate negotiations).
60 See, e.g., id. at 290-91 (likening instruments that adhere to CDR to rescue
vehicles for developing countries).
61 See Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 19, at 10571 (detailing
how countries in Africa are projected to lose nearly 4 percent of their GDP
from a 2.5 degree Celsius warming, whereas OECD Europe would lose 2.83
percent and the United States would only lose 0.45 percent).
62 See Stone, supra note 58, at 291-92 (arguing that the Polluter Pays principle
would be a better justification for differentiated responsibilities in MEAs than
general equitable considerations).
63 See Lieberthal supra note 11, at 38 (identifying the United States’ great institutional capacity and simultaneous refusal to accept GHG emissions targets as a
source of resentment to China).
64 See id. at 8 (noting alarming new studies that show rates of atmospheric
GHG accumulation have accelerated faster than expected because of China’s
rapid development).
65 Compare Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 3.1 (excluding emerging economies like China from emissions reduction commitments), with Sunstein, Of
Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 19, at 10568-69 (correlating the Kyoto Protocol’s exclusion of developing nations with the United States’ refusal to ratify
the instrument).
66 See Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 25 (explaining the U.S. government’s concern that any benefit from emissions reductions in the U.S. would be cancelled
out by unregulated GHG emissions from China).
67 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4.8 (including all self-designated developing countries in the same category, without quantitative commitments).
68 See id. pmbl.
69 Compare White Paper: Climate Change, supra note 41, at § I (highlighting
China’s fragile environment, coastal areas vulnerable to sea level rise, and areas
prone to desertification), with UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4.8 (listing developing countries with “low-lying coastal areas,” “liable to . . . desertification” and
with “fragile ecosystems” as those most deserving of funding and technology
transfer from developed countries).
70 Id. Compare Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: China,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last
visited Feb. 18, 2009) (estimating China’s 2008 GDP at 4.222 billion USD),
with United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Vanuatu’s
First Report (1999), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/vannc1.pdf (last visited
Feb. 18, 2009) (reporting fellow developing country Vanuatu’s low development status and its extreme vulnerability as a small island nation), and Central
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Vanuatu, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nh.html#Intro (last visited Mar.
19, 2010) (estimating Vanuatu’s 2008 GDP at 560 million USD).
71 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, arts. 3.1, 4.8 (failing to define clearly which
countries should be subject to binding commitments and which should receive
special consideration).
72 See John M. Broder, Climate Goal is Supported By China and India,
N.Y.Times, Mar. 10, 2010, at A9 (citing EU climate commissioner Connie
Hedegaard’s hope that UNFCCC nations will create an enforceable climate
regime by 2011).
73 See Wiener, supra note 7, at 1809; see also Sunstein, The World vs. the
United States and China?, supra note 12, at 1681 (noting the U.S. Senate’s
unanimous conclusion that the United States had more to lose than to gain in
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol because developing country GHG emissions were
exempted).
74 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Compliance Under the Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/
items/2875.php (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) (reporting that only Canada,
Greece, and Croatia had compliance issues).
75 See Wiener, supra note 7, at 1808 (explaining that China’s actual emissions
have continually exceeded predictions; for example, in 1998, the U.S. government projected that China would surpass the United States as the leader in
emissions in 2030).
76 See Pew Center Report, supra note 51, at 16 (describing the trajectory of
climate change and predicting ever stronger impacts resulting from current
emission levels).
77 See id. at 15 (asserting that prospects for a successful new climate change
agreement depend largely upon China’s actions).
78 See Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China?, supra note 26, at
1685 (detailing how projections show past major GHG emitters will continue
to contribute to climate change, but emerging powers like China and India will
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also become significant emitters).
79 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, pmbl. (discussing global GHG emissions in
terms of historical and current outputs) (emphasis added).
80 Cf. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China?, supra note 26, at
1686 (predicting that the highest GHG emitters of the past may not be the high
emitters of the future).
81 Cf. Pew Center Report, supra note 51, at 18 (reporting that the United States
is the largest contributor to historic GHG stocks in the atmosphere, accounting
for twenty-nine percent of emissions since 1850).
82 See Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China?, supra note 26, at
1686 (noting projections that developing world nations like China, Indonesia,
India, and Brazil are expected to contribute no less than 55 percent of total
GHG emissions by 2030).
83 See Pew Center Report, supra note 4, at 14 (arguing that the world cannot
meet the climate change challenge without China’s full participation).
84 See generally Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3 (failing to include any reference
to the special situation and special capabilities of emerging economies).
85 See id. pmbl. and art. 2 (stating that the parties should fulfill their obligations
pursuant to the commitments articulated in Article 4 of the UNFCCC).
86 See id. art 2.3; see also UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4.8.
87 Compare White Paper: Climate Change, supra note 41, at Foreword (asserting that China has a fragile eco-environment and is vulnerable to adverse
climate change impacts), with Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and
China?, supra note 12, at 1683 (contrasting the projected, comparatively minimal impact on GDP for countries like China, Russia, and the United States with
the massive losses in GDP projected for African countries).
88 See Pew Center Report, supra note 4, at 14 (calling China’s reemergence
since 1978 extraordinary, and noting the immense power China has acquired in
the last thirty years).
89 See United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing Countries, List of Least Developed Countries, http://www.unohrlls.org/
en/ldc/related/62/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) (defining forty-nine countries as
“least developed;” China is not included on the list).
90 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Booming China Leads the World in Emissions of
Carbon Dioxide, a Study Finds, N.Y. Times, June 14, 2008, at A5 (quoting a
European report finding that China’s 2007 emissions were fourteen percent
higher than the United States’ emissions).
91 See Elisabeth Rosenthal and Andrew C. Revkin, Science Panel Says Global
Warming Is “Unequivocal,” N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter
Rosenthal & Revkin] (citing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s
2007 report, which concluded that climate change is definitely occurring and
that human activity is the primary cause).
92 See generally UNFCCC, supra note 7 (creating a system that does not regulate major emitters like China).
93 See id. at Annex I and Annex II (listing developed countries like the United
Kingdom, France, Australia, and the United States); see also Lieberthal, supra
note 11, at 36 (describing China as a country with problems similar to developing nations, but with many attributes of a developed, industrialized nation).
94 See Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 35 (stating many non-Chinese do not comprehend that China lacks the institutional and technological capacity of a fully
developed nation).
95 See id. at 34 (describing the difficulties Chinese leaders face in balancing the
competing priorities of the developed and the developing areas of the country).
96 See Howard W. French, Grinding Poverty Defies China’s Boom, Int’l
Herald Tribune, Jan. 13, 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/13/asia/poverty.php (citing a World Bank report estimating that
300 million people in China still live below poverty levels).
97 See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development
Reports, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) (categorizing world nations as having either high, medium, or low human development; China falls into the medium group, ranking 92nd of the 182 nations on
the list).
98 See Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 36 (characterizing China as a country in an
uncomfortable transition stage).
99 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, pmbl. (indicating indirectly that developed
countries should carry most of the burden when noting that “the largest share of
historical and current emissions of [GHGs] has originated in developed countries”).
100 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, pmbl., art.4(g) (describing the climate change
issue as a “common concern of humankind” and setting forth that any party
may choose to be bound by the Convention’s emissions reduction standards).
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101 See

Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 38 (reporting China’s belief that it is unreasonable to demand the nation to commit to GHG reduction targets because they
are not sufficiently developed).
102 See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar and John M. Broder, U.N. Climate Chief Quits,
Deepening Sense of Disarray, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2010, at A12 (calling the
Copenhagen COP “largely unsuccessful” because it failed to produce a binding international treaty “but instead generated mostly acrimony and a series of
unenforceable pledges”).
103 See Wiener, supra note 7, at 1805 (explicating that China could be engaged
by the international community through several distinct methods).
104 See, e.g., World Bank, Statement from World Bank China Country Director
on “Cost of Pollution in China” Report, July 11, 2007, http://go.worldbank.
org/68GG2KJ8Z0 (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) [hereinafter World Bank Statement] (reporting the finding that air pollution contributes to a huge economic
cost to China and is also leading to higher incidences of respiratory diseases
and cancer among Chinese citizens); see also Wiener, supra note 7, at 1805
(warning that climate change impacts could exacerbate pre-existing political
and social stresses within China, and positing that as a result, leadership on climate change may soon look more favorable to the government).
105 See World Bank Statement, supra note 104 and accompanying text.
106 See World Bank, Cost of Pollution in China, 19 (Feb. 2007), available
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/
Resources/China_Cost_of_Pollution.pdf [hereinafter World Bank Report]
(noting epidemiological evidence that outdoor air pollution is a contributing
cause of mortality and that a dramatic increase in cancer cases in China is
attributable to worsening air and water pollution).
107 See Wiener, supra note 7, at 1817 (observing that a progressive Chinese climate policy could bring simultaneous benefits by controlling local pollution).
108 See id. at 1823-24 (explaining that benefits flowing to China from a successful international climate regime depend upon reaching a cooperative deal with
other countries).
109 See id. (arguing that in order to persuade China to join an international climate regime, the structure of the regime itself must offer specific incentives
to China and outlining several reasons why China would benefit from actively
participating in a climate change regime).
110 See, e.g., Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 36 (asserting that China wants to
be seen as a constructive player on the international stage, and that this will
increase its incentive to participate in an international climate regime).
111 E.g., Officials Responsible for Pollution Accidents, Xinhua News Agency,
Apr. 25, 2006, available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Apr/166691.
htm (quoting a Chinese Environmental Protection official on the great threat
pollution poses to social stability in China).
112 See Pew Center Report, supra note 4, at 20 (cataloguing the harmful air pollutants released into China’s atmosphere that present a health threat to Chinese
citizens).
113 See Economy, supra note 50, at 46 (noting China’s leaders are aware that
air pollution causes indirect effects in terms of threats to social stability, public
health, and continued economic growth, which together could threaten the
authority of the Communist Party).
114 See Congressional-Executive Commission on China, supra note 56, at 13437 (describing recent protests organized against the construction of chemical
plants and rail line extensions).
115 See id .at 135-37 (calling public protests significant because they represent
an unprecedented example of public participation that is at least tacitly allowed
by the CCP).
116 See e.g., Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 35 (describing how Chinese diplomats
are increasingly being asked to explain why the nation is not doing more to
reduce its emissions).
117 See, e.g., Small Island Developing States Network, Vulnerability and
Adaptation to Climate Change in Small Island Developing States 7 (2007),
available at http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/adverse_effects_and_response_
measures_art_48/application/pdf/200702_sids_adaptation_bg.pdf (stating that
small island developing states are among the most vulnerable countries in the
world to climate change and yet produce extremely low levels of GHGs, meaning that they will suffer disproportionately from the damaging impacts of climate change).
118 See Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 19, at 10571 (noting that
countries such as India and all of Africa are projected to lose as much as 4.93
percent of their GDP from a 2.5 degree Celsius warming, whereas the United
States would only lose 0.45 percent of GDP).
119 See Wiener, supra note 7, at 1816, 1825 (arguing that enlightened pragmatism is the best approach for the international community to move both China
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and the United States to meaningful participation in a climate change regime).
120 See Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China?, supra note 12, at
1686 (indicating that China, India, and Indonesia have all increased emissions
by more than fifty percent in the last fifteen years).
121 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, arts. 4.4, 4.5 (stating that only countries in
Annex II shall assist in providing financial and technical assistance to developing country parties).
122 See Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 36 (describing the awkward stage of China’s development, where the country has modernized significantly but is not yet
fully developed).

123 See,

e.g., Rosenthal & Revkin, supra note 91 (reporting on the widespread
consensus that climate change is real and that human activity is causing it).
124 See Barbara Finamore, China Officially Associates With the Copenhagen
Accord, Mar. 11, 2010, http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/bfinamore/china_officially_associates_wi.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2010) (noting China and India’s
official association with the Accord “alleviates some previous concerns about
their engagement while breathing new life” into the UNFCCC).
125 Cf. Magraw, supra note 20, at 10578 (asserting that many factors weigh
enter into a nation’s evaluation of its interests in an MEA, and arguing that
cost-benefit analysis is only one of those factors).

Endnotes: Legal Foundations for NGO Participation in Climate Treaty Negotiations continued from page 56
1

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992),
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter
UNFCCC]. The talks were formally called the fifteenth Conference of the Parties (“COP 15”) of the UNFCCC and COP 15 website is http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/items/5257.php (last visited Mar. 4, 2010).
2 Andrew C. Revkin & John M. Broder, A Grudging Accord in Climate Talks,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009 at A1.
3 See Posting of Kevin Grandia, NGO Shutdown at Copenhagen Climate
Talks, http://tcktcktck.org/stories/campaign-stories/ngo-shutdown-copenhagen-climate-talks (last visited Mar. 4, 2010) (offering the perspective of the
tcktcktck initiative, the Copenhagen-focused campaign of the global coalition
350.org, and reprinting a letter from the director of the Climate Action Network
(“CAN”) to the Prime Minister of Denmark and the Executive Secretary of the
UNFCCC).
4 See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 23, §5, June 5, 1992,
1760 U.N.T.S. 79, 31 I.L.M. 818, available at http://www.cbd.int/convention/
convention.shtml (“Any other body or agency, whether governmental or nongovernmental, qualified in fields relating to conservation and sustainable use
of biological diversity, which has informed the Secretariat of its wish to be
represented as an observer at a meeting of the Conference of the Parties, may
be admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object.”); United
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, art. 4, June 17,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1328, available at http://www.unccd.int/convention/text/convention.php; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, art. XI, §7, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243,
available at http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.shtml#texttop.
5 See Sunita Narain, Copenhagen: Excluding People and Voices for an Unfair
Deal, OUTREACH, Dec. 17, 2009, at 1-2, available at http://www.stakeholderforum.org/fileadmin/files/Outreach_issues_2009/091217-outreach-color.pdf
(describing, from a personal account, the inability to gain access to enter the
building to even register). In response to more disruptive demonstrations, some
groups were entirely excluded for their actions at the conference center, as
noted in the CAN letter.
6 Id. (referring to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I
(Aug. 12, 1992), available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/
Default.asp?DocumentID=78&Article ID =1163): Agenda 21: Programme of
Action for Sustainable Development, ch. 27, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda
Item 21, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (1992), available at http://www.un.org/esa/
dsd/agenda21/res_agenda 21_27.shtml.
7 See Outrage over lockout, ECO: NGO NEWSLETTER, Dec. 18, 2009, at 4.
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8

Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, arts. 6-7, June 25, 1998,
2161 U.N.T.S. 447, 38 I.L.M. 517, available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/
documents/cep43e.pdf [hereinafter Aarhus Convention]. See also U.N. Econ.
& Soc. Council, Econ. Comm’n of Eur., Decision II/4: Promoting the Application of the Principles of the Aarhus Convention in International Forums, ECE/
MP.PP/2005/2/Add.5, (June 20, 2005), available at http://www.unece.org/
env/documents/2005/pp/ece/ece.mp.pp.2005.2.add.5.e.pdf [hereinafter Almaty
Agreement] (adopting the Almaty Guidelines for compliance with the Aarhus
Convention, contained in the annex of the Decision).
9 Aarhus Convention, supra note 8, at arts. 6-8. Article 6 addresses public
participation in decisions on specific activities, Article 7 addresses public participation concerning plans, programs, and policies related to the environment,
and Article 8 addresses public participation during the preparation of executive
regulations and/or multilateral treaty negotiations.
10 See Aarhus Convention, supra note 8, at arts. 15, 16 (stating the provisions
of the Convention on compliance and dispute settlement).
11 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Econ. Comm’n of Eur., Decision I/7: Review
of Compliance, ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8, (Apr. 4, 2004), available at http://www.
unece.org/env/pp/documents/mop1/ece.mp.pp.2.add.8.e.pdf [hereinafter Lucca
Decision]. Almaty Agreement, supra note 8.
12 Lucca Decision, supra note 12, at §18.
13 Id., at §37.
14 Aarhus Convention, supra note 8, at art. 17.
15 The UNFCCC schedule lists the location as “to be determined,” though the
meeting is widely expected to be held in Cancun, Mexico, http://unfccc.int/
meetings/unfccc_calendar/items/2655.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
16 UNFCCC, Adoption of the Rules of Procedure, FCCC/CP/1996/2 (May 22,
1996), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop2/02.pdf (taking note of
UNFCCC Article 7.3 that “the Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, adopt its own rules of procedure as well as those of the subsidiary bodies
established by the Convention ...” but merely “inviting” the Parties to adopt the
Draft Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties and its Subsidiary
Bodies which begin on page 2).
17 See id. § V (stating that observers may attend and participate, provided: they
notify the Secretariat, have qualifications related to the matters being discussed,
gain permission from the Secretariat, and their presence is not objected to by
one third or more of the Parties).
18 Id.
19 See generally Svitlana Kravchenko, The Myth of Public Participation in a
World of Poverty, 23 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 33 (2009) (addressing the deficiencies
of environmental decision making when public participation and transparent
democratic processes are not present).
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